The Future of web startups

未來的互聯(lián)網(wǎng)創(chuàng)業(yè)

作者：Paul Graham

(This essay is derived from a keynote at FOWA in October 2007.)

（本文根據(jù)作者在2007年10月Future of Web Apps 會議上的主題演講改編而成）

There’s something interesting happening right now. Startups are undergoing the same transformation that technology does when it becomes cheaper.

眼下有一件有趣的事情正在發(fā)生。初創(chuàng)公司正在經(jīng)歷著一種轉(zhuǎn)變，它很像發(fā)生在成本降低時期的技術(shù)轉(zhuǎn)變。

It’s a pattern we see over and over in technology. Initially there’s some device that’s very expensive and made in small quantities. Then someone discovers how to make them cheaply; many more get built; and as a result they can be used in new ways.

這種轉(zhuǎn)變，我們在技術(shù)領(lǐng)域已經(jīng)一再見到。一開始，新設(shè)備非常昂貴，只能小批量生產(chǎn)。然后，有人發(fā)現(xiàn)了降低成本的方法，生產(chǎn)數(shù)量開始增加。最終，這種 設(shè)備找到新的用途。

Computers are a familiar example. When I was a kid, computers were big, expensive machines built one at a time. Now they’re a commodity. Now we can stick computers in everything.

電腦是一個大家熟悉的例子。當(dāng)我還是孩子的時候，電腦體積巨大，價格昂貴，一次只能生產(chǎn)一臺?，F(xiàn)在，電腦只是一種普通商品，我們可以把電腦附加在所 有東西上。

This pattern is very old. Most of the turning points in economic history are instances of it. It happened to steel in the 1850s, and to power in the 1780s. It happened to cloth manufacture in the thirteenth century, generating the wealth that later brought about the Renaissance. Agriculture itself was an instance of this pattern.

這種模式已經(jīng)有很長歷史了。在經(jīng)濟(jì)史中，可以找到許多例子，關(guān)于技術(shù)變遷的轉(zhuǎn)折點(diǎn)。比如，19世紀(jì)50年代的鋼鐵，18世紀(jì)80年代的發(fā)電。13世 紀(jì)的紡織業(yè)，正是紡織業(yè)產(chǎn)生的財(cái)富，帶來了文藝復(fù)興。農(nóng)業(yè)本身也是一個例子。

Now as well as being produced by startups, this pattern is happening to startups. It’s so cheap to start web startups that orders of magnitudes more will be started. If the pattern holds true, that should cause dramatic changes.

現(xiàn)在，初創(chuàng)企業(yè)也在經(jīng)歷這種模式，或者說這種模式正在影響初創(chuàng)企業(yè)。因?yàn)榛ヂ?lián)網(wǎng)創(chuàng)業(yè)的成本如此之低，所以初創(chuàng)企業(yè)的數(shù)目將呈指數(shù)式增長。

1. Lots of Startups

1. 無數(shù)的創(chuàng)業(yè)者

So my first prediction about the future of web startups is pretty straightforward: there will be a lot of them. When starting a startup was expensive, you had to get the permission of investors to do it. Now the only threshold is courage.

關(guān)于未來的互聯(lián)網(wǎng)創(chuàng)業(yè)，我的第一個預(yù)言很簡單：無數(shù)人將會創(chuàng)業(yè)。以前創(chuàng)業(yè)很昂貴，你不得不找到投資人才能創(chuàng)業(yè)。而現(xiàn)在，唯一的門檻 就是勇氣。

Even that threshold is getting lower, as people watch others take the plunge and survive. In the last batch of startups we funded, we had several founders who said they’d thought of applying before, but weren’t sure and got jobs instead. It was only after hearing reports of friends who’d done it that they decided to try it themselves.

甚至就連這個門檻也正在變得更低，因?yàn)槿藗儾粩嗫吹街車渌藙?chuàng)業(yè)成功。在上一批我們資助的初創(chuàng)企業(yè)中，有幾個創(chuàng)始人說，他們以前就想創(chuàng)業(yè)，但是下 不了決心，不敢放棄現(xiàn)在的工作。只有當(dāng)他們看到朋友們創(chuàng)業(yè)成功，他們才下決心親自創(chuàng)業(yè)。

Starting a startup is hard, but having a 9 to 5 job is hard too, and in some ways a worse kind of hard. In a startup you have lots of worries, but you don’t have that feeling that your life is flying by like you do in a big company. Plus in a startup you could make much more money.

創(chuàng)業(yè)是艱難的，但是一份早9晚5的工作也是艱難的，在某種意義上，甚至比創(chuàng)業(yè)還艱難。你自己開公司，你會因?yàn)楹? 多事情擔(dān)驚受怕，但是你不會感到虛度生命，在一家大公司里打工，常常會有這種感覺。而且，創(chuàng)業(yè)可能會使得你掙來多得多的錢。

As word spreads that startups work, the number may grow to a point that would now seem surprising.

當(dāng)越來越多的人相信創(chuàng)業(yè)是可行的，初創(chuàng)企業(yè)的數(shù)目就將增長到一個現(xiàn)在的人們會感到難以置信的程度。

We now think of it as normal to have a job at a company, but this is the thinnest of historical veneers. Just two or three lifetimes ago, most people in what are now called industrialized countries lived by farming. So while it may seem surprising to propose that large numbers of people will change the way they make a living, it would be more surprising if they didn’t.

眼下，我們覺得有一份工作是正常的生活模式，但是這是最不可靠的歷史假象。在現(xiàn)在所謂的工業(yè)化國家里，僅僅二三 代人之前，大多數(shù)人都是靠務(wù)農(nóng)為生。如果將來許許多多人改變謀生的方式，這也許會令人感到驚訝，但是如果沒有發(fā)生這種改變，會令人感到更驚訝。

2. Standardization

2. 標(biāo)準(zhǔn)化

When technology makes something dramatically cheaper, standardization always follows. When you make things in large volumes you tend to standardize everything that doesn’t need to change.

當(dāng)技術(shù)極大地降低一件東西的成本之后，標(biāo)準(zhǔn)化就會接踵而至。當(dāng)你大批量生產(chǎn)某種東西，你就會將那些固定不變的部分標(biāo)準(zhǔn)化。

At Y Combinator we still only have four people, so we try to standardize everything. We could hire employees, but we want to be forced to figure out how to scale investing.

在我的風(fēng)險投資公司中，我們現(xiàn)在還是只有4個人。所以，我們試著將一切都標(biāo)準(zhǔn)化。我們可以雇用更多的人，但是我們想強(qiáng)迫自己，找到有效投資的方法。

We often tell startups to release a minimal version one quickly, then let the needs of the users determine what to do next. In essense, let the market design the product. We’ve done the same thing ourselves. We think of the techniques we’re developing for dealing with large numbers of startups as like software. Sometimes it literally is software, like Hacker News and our application system.

我們經(jīng)常告訴創(chuàng)業(yè)者，盡快地發(fā)布一個最簡版本，然后讓用戶的需求決定下一步該做什么。從根本上，讓市場設(shè)計(jì)產(chǎn)品。我 們自己也是這樣做的。我們想象自己，正在開發(fā)一種處理大量創(chuàng)業(yè)者的技術(shù)，就像開發(fā)軟件一樣。有時，它確實(shí)就是軟件，比如Hacker News和我們的風(fēng)險投資申請系統(tǒng)。

One of the most important things we’ve been working on standardizing are investment terms. Till now investment terms have been individually negotiated. This is a problem for founders, because it makes raising money take longer and cost more in legal fees. So as well as using the same paperwork for every deal we do, we’ve commissioned generic angel paperwork that all the startups we fund can use for future rounds.

我們正在著手標(biāo)準(zhǔn)化的最重要的事情之一，就是投資條款。到目前為止，投資條款都是一對一商定的。這對創(chuàng)業(yè)者來說，是一個麻煩，因?yàn)樗沟萌谫Y周期更 長，法律費(fèi)用也更多。我們對每一個交易都使用同樣的文件，我們還授權(quán)讓我們資助的創(chuàng)業(yè)公司，將通用的融資文件用于以后的融資。

Some investors will still want to cook up their own deal terms. Series A rounds, where you raise a million dollars or more, will be custom deals for the forseeable future. But I think angel rounds will start to be done mostly with standardized agreements. An angel who wants to insert a bunch of complicated terms into the agreement is probably not one you want anyway.

一些投資人依然堅(jiān)持制定個性化的投資條款。在可預(yù)見的未來，成熟期的企業(yè)在融資100萬以上美元時，仍然需要個性化的合同。但是我想，早期的天使投 資合同，大部分都將使用標(biāo)準(zhǔn)化合同。一個想在協(xié)議中插入一大堆復(fù)雜條款的天使投資人，可能根本不是你需要的那種投資人。

3. New Attitude to Acquisition

3. 對待并購的新態(tài)度

Another thing I see starting to get standardized is acquisitions. As the volume of startups increases, big companies will start to develop standardized procedures that make acquisitions little more work than hiring someone.

另一件我看到正在標(biāo)準(zhǔn)化的是并購交易。當(dāng)大量的初創(chuàng)企業(yè)出現(xiàn)后，大公司開始發(fā)展一套標(biāo)準(zhǔn)化程序，使得并購就好像雇用一個人那樣簡單。

Google is the leader here, as in so many areas of technology. They buy a lot of startups— more than most people realize, because they only announce a fraction of them. And being Google, they’re figuring out how to do it efficiently.

Google是這方面的領(lǐng)導(dǎo)者，正如它是很多技術(shù)領(lǐng)域的領(lǐng)導(dǎo)者一樣。它買進(jìn)了許多初創(chuàng)公司——比大多數(shù)人意識到的還要多，因?yàn)間oogle只公開了 其中一部分的交易。站在Google管理者的角度，他們會考慮如何使并購更有效。

One problem they’ve solved is how to think about acquisitions. For most companies, acquisitions still carry some stigma of inadequacy. Companies do them because they have to, but there’s usually some feeling they shouldn’t have to—that their own programmers should be able to build everything they need.

他們已經(jīng)解決的一個問題，就是如果看待并購。對于大多數(shù)公司，并購意味著自身有缺陷。那些進(jìn)行并購的公司，往往是因?yàn)椴坏貌蝗绱?。他們會有一種感 覺，覺得本來可以避免并購的，覺得內(nèi)部的程序員應(yīng)該能夠開發(fā)出他們需要的任何東西。

Google’s example should cure the rest of the world of this idea. Google has by far the best programmers of any public technology company. If they don’t have a problem doing acquisitions, the others should have even less problem. However many Google does, Microsoft should do ten times as many.

Google的例子對整個有這種想法的世界，是一帖解藥。Google有著比任何上市公司多得多的優(yōu)秀程序員。如果連Google都覺得并購沒有什 么不好意思的，那么其他人就更不應(yīng)該感到不好意思了。說實(shí)話，同Google的并購數(shù)量相比，微軟的并購數(shù)量本應(yīng)該多十倍的。

One reason Google doesn’t have a problem with acquisitions is that they know first-hand the quality of the people they can get that way. Larry and Sergey only started Google after making the rounds of the search engines trying to sell their idea and finding no takers. They’ve been the guys coming in to visit the big company, so they know who might be sitting across that conference table from them.

Google沒有對并購感到不好意思的一個原因是，他們很清楚地知道，通過這種方式，他們得到的人才的質(zhì)量。Google的創(chuàng)始人 Larry和Sergey，之所以會創(chuàng)立Google，是因?yàn)樗麄兿蚱渌阉饕娑凳鬯麄兊南敕ǎY(jié)果都遭到拒絕。他們的這種拜訪大公司的經(jīng)歷，使得他們 知道坐在會議桌另一頭的人，可能有著什么樣的質(zhì)量。

4. Riskier Strategies are Possible

4. 必須使用風(fēng)險更大的策略

Risk is always proportionate to reward. The way to get really big returns is to do things that seem crazy, like starting a new search engine in 1998, or turning down a billion dollar acquisition offer.

風(fēng)險總是與回報(bào)成正比。得到大筆回報(bào)的方法，就是去做那些看上去很瘋狂的事情，比如1998年的時候開辦一家新 的搜索引擎，或者拒絕一筆10億美元的并購報(bào)價。

This has traditionally been a problem in venture funding. Founders and investors have different attitudes to risk. Knowing that risk is on average proportionate to reward, investors like risky strategies, while founders, who don’t have a big enough sample size to care what’s true on average, tend to be more conservative.

在風(fēng)險投資業(yè)，這是一個傳統(tǒng)的矛盾。創(chuàng)業(yè)者和風(fēng)險投資家對待風(fēng)險有不同的態(tài)度。因?yàn)橹里L(fēng)險大回報(bào)大，所以投資家喜歡風(fēng)險高的策略，而創(chuàng)業(yè)者不像投 資家有那么多投資，從而可以得到平均回報(bào)，創(chuàng)業(yè)者通常會更保守。

If startups are easy to start, this conflict goes away, because founders can start them younger, when it’s rational to take more risk, and can start more startups total in their careers. When founders can do lots of startups, they can start to look at the world in the same portfolio-optimizing way as investors. And that means the overall amount of wealth created can be greater, because strategies can be riskier.

如果創(chuàng)業(yè)變得很容易，這個矛盾就會消失。因?yàn)閯?chuàng)業(yè)者會在更年輕的時候，就開始創(chuàng)業(yè)，所以他可以承受更大的風(fēng)險，在他們的一生中可以創(chuàng)辦更多的企業(yè)。 當(dāng)創(chuàng)業(yè)者能夠創(chuàng)辦多個企業(yè)，他們就會像看待證券組合那樣，看待整個世界，他們就會向投資家那樣優(yōu)化他們的行為方式。這意味被創(chuàng)造出來的總財(cái)富將變得更多， 因?yàn)閯?chuàng)業(yè)策略變得風(fēng)險更大了。

5. Younger, Nerdier Founders

5. 更年輕、更技術(shù)化的創(chuàng)業(yè)者

If startups become a cheap commodity, more people will be able to have them, just as more people could have computers once microprocessors made them cheap. And in particular, younger and more technical founders will be able to start startups than could before.

如果創(chuàng)業(yè)的成本降低，那么更多的人將會去創(chuàng)業(yè)。這就好像芯片成本降低以后，更多的人會購買計(jì)算機(jī)一樣。尤其是，更年輕和更技術(shù)化的創(chuàng)業(yè)者，將能夠更 早地開始創(chuàng)業(yè)。

Back when it cost a lot to start a startup, you had to convince investors to let you do it. And that required very different skills from actually doing the startup. If investors were perfect judges, the two would require exactly the same skills. But unfortunately most investors are terrible judges. I know because I see behind the scenes what an enormous amount of work it takes to raise money, and the amount of selling required in an industry is always inversely proportional to the judgement of the buyers.

過去，創(chuàng)業(yè)成本很高，你不得不說服投資家資助你創(chuàng)業(yè)。這和創(chuàng)業(yè)本身要求的技巧大不相同。如果投資家很懂行，那么創(chuàng)業(yè)和說服投資家就是一回事。但是很 不幸，大多數(shù)投資家不懂行。我知道這一點(diǎn)，因?yàn)槲乙恢痹谀缓螅液芮宄谫Y所要求的大量準(zhǔn)備工作，投資家越不懂行，你的準(zhǔn)備工作就越多。

Fortunately, if startups get cheaper to start, there’s another way to convince investors. Instead of going to venture capitalists with a business plan and trying to convince them to fund it, you can get a product launched on a few tens of thousands of dollars of seed money from us or your uncle, and approach them with a working company instead of a plan for one. Then instead of having to seem smooth and confident, you can just point them to Alexa.

幸運(yùn)的是，如果創(chuàng)業(yè)成本降低，就有另外一種方法說服投資者。你可以不帶著商業(yè)報(bào)告書就去見風(fēng)險資本家，你也不用說服他出錢，你只需用從我們這里得到 的或從你叔叔那里得到的幾萬美金作為啟動資金，先做出一個樣品。你給投資家展示的是一個正在運(yùn)作的公司，而不是一份報(bào)告書。你也不用裝得很有信心，你只需 給他看Alexa上的網(wǎng)站排名就行了。

This way of convincing investors is better suited to hackers, who often went into technology in part because they felt uncomfortable with the amount of fakeness required in other fields.

這種說服投資家的方式，更適合于黑客們。因?yàn)樗麄兿矚g技術(shù)的部分原因就是，他們對其他領(lǐng)域的虛情假意感到不自在。

6. Startup Hubs Will Persist

6. 創(chuàng)業(yè)園區(qū)將繼續(xù)存在

It might seem that if startups get cheap to start, it will mean the end of startup hubs like Silicon Valley. If all you need to start a startup is rent money, you should be able to do it anywhere.

如果創(chuàng)業(yè)成本降低，表面上，硅谷那樣的創(chuàng)業(yè)園區(qū)似乎沒有存在的必要了。要是創(chuàng)業(yè)的啟動成本只是一點(diǎn)租金，那么你應(yīng)該在任何地方都可以創(chuàng)業(yè)。

This is kind of true and kind of false. It’s true that you can now start a startup anywhere. But you have to do more with a startup than just start it. You have to make it succeed. And that is more likely to happen in a startup hub.

這種想法不完全正確。你確實(shí)能夠在任何地方創(chuàng)業(yè)。但是，你要做的并不僅僅是開始干活。你必須讓你的項(xiàng)目獲得成功。在創(chuàng)業(yè)園區(qū)，你更可能獲得成功。

I’ve thought a lot about this question, and it seems to me the increasing cheapness of web startups will if anything increase the importance of startup hubs. The value of startup hubs, like centers for any kind of business, lies in something very old-fashioned: face to face meetings. No technology in the immediate future will replace walking down University Ave and running into a friend who tells you how to fix a bug that’s been bothering you all weekend, or visiting a friend’s startup down the street and ending up in a conversation with one of their investors.

我曾經(jīng)反復(fù)思考這個問題。我似乎覺得，創(chuàng)業(yè)成本的降低反而使得創(chuàng)業(yè)園區(qū)變得更重要了。創(chuàng)業(yè)園區(qū)就像其他任何產(chǎn)業(yè)的中心一樣，它的核心作用非常老式： 就是可以面對面的聚會。你在馬路上散步，碰巧遇到了一個朋友，他告訴你如何解決困擾你整個周末的一個程序問題，或者你走到馬路對面朋友的公司做客，與他們 的一個投資者隨便聊聊，這些事情在近期是沒有任何技術(shù)可以取代的。

The question of whether to be in a startup hub is like the question of whether to take outside investment. The question is not whether you need it, but whether it brings any advantage at all. Because anything that brings an advantage will give your competitors an advantage over you if they do it and you don’t. So if you hear someone saying “we don’t need to be in Silicon Valley,” that use of the word “need” is a sign they’re not even thinking about the question right.

是否要加入創(chuàng)業(yè)園區(qū)，這個問題就好像是否要接受投資一樣。問題的關(guān)鍵不是你需不需要它，而是它是否有用。如果一樣?xùn)|西是有用的，你的競爭對手采用了 它，而你沒有，這就意味著你的競爭對手將比你有優(yōu)勢。所以，當(dāng)你聽到有人說：“我們不用待在硅谷”，“用”這個詞就是一個信號，表明他們還沒有正確地思考 這個問題。

And while startup hubs are as powerful magnets as ever, the increasing cheapness of starting a startup means the particles they’re attracting are getting lighter. A startup now can be just a pair of 22 year old guys. A company like that can move much more easily than one with 10 people, half of whom have kids.

創(chuàng)業(yè)園區(qū)還是像以前一樣是一塊強(qiáng)有力的磁石，隨著創(chuàng)業(yè)成本的降低，它所能吸引的粒子變得越來越輕了?，F(xiàn)在一個22歲的年輕人就能創(chuàng)業(yè)。這樣的小公司 行動起來，比那些10個人、且半數(shù)員工有孩子的公司，快捷多了。

We know because we make people move for Y Combinator, and it doesn’t seem to be a problem. The advantage of being able to work together face to face for three months outweighs the inconvenience of moving. Ask anyone who’s done it.

我們知道這一點(diǎn)，因?yàn)槲覀冏寗?chuàng)業(yè)者搬入我們自己的創(chuàng)業(yè)基地，所以我們有親身體驗(yàn)，創(chuàng)業(yè)園區(qū)對我們來說，似乎沒有什么壞處。能夠面對面一起工作三個 月，有很多好處，這超過了搬家?guī)淼牟环奖?。你隨便問一個參與者就知道了。

The mobility of seed-stage startups means that seed funding is a national business. One of the most common emails we get is from people asking if we can help them set up a local clone of Y Combinator. But this just wouldn’t work. Seed funding isn’t regional, just as big research universities aren’t.

種子期的初創(chuàng)公司有很高的流動性，這意味著為他們提供啟動資金，是一項(xiàng)全國性的業(yè)務(wù)。我們收到的一種最常見的Email，就是人們詢問我們是否幫助 他們在當(dāng)?shù)亟⒁粋€類似的創(chuàng)業(yè)園區(qū)。但是，這是做不到的。種子期的融資不可能是地域性的，這就像大型研究性大學(xué)不可能是地域性的一樣。

Is seed funding not merely national, but international? Interesting question. There are signs it may be. We’ve had an ongoing stream of founders from outside the US, and they tend to do particularly well, because they’re all people who were so determined to succeed that they were willing to move to another country to do it.

如果種子期融資是全國性的，那么它會不會是全球性的呢？這是有趣的問題。有跡象表明，它可能是全球性的。我們一直不斷地有來自美國之外的創(chuàng)業(yè)者，他 們往往表現(xiàn)得非常好，因?yàn)樗麄內(nèi)慷际悄欠N下定決心，一定要成功的人，所以他們愿意到另外一個國家來創(chuàng)業(yè)。

The more mobile startups get, the harder it would be to start new silicon valleys. If startups are mobile, the best local talent will go to the real Silicon Valley, and all they’ll get at the local one will be the people who didn’t have the energy to move.

初創(chuàng)公司的流動性越高，再建一個新的硅谷的可能性就越低。如果初創(chuàng)公司可以自由流動，那么最好的一些人才就會前往硅谷。因?yàn)槿绻@些公司不搬家，那 么它們在當(dāng)?shù)刂荒芄偷侥切]有動力前往硅谷的人。

This is not a nationalistic idea, incidentally. It’s cities that compete, not countries. Atlanta is just as hosed as Munich.

順便說一句，這個問題與國家無關(guān)。它只是城市與城市之間的競爭，而不是國家與國家的競爭。美國的亞特蘭大和德國的慕尼黑一樣讓人精疲力竭。

7. Better Judgement Needed

7. 需要更好的判斷力

If the number of startups increases dramatically, then the people whose job is to judge them are going to have to get better at it. I’m thinking particularly of investors and acquirers. We now get on the order of 1000 applications a year. What are we going to do if we get 10,000?

如果初創(chuàng)企業(yè)的數(shù)目急劇增長，那么那些負(fù)責(zé)判斷它們的人，不得不改進(jìn)自己的工作。我特別對投資家和收購家進(jìn)行了思考。我們現(xiàn)在每年收到的申請?jiān)? 1000份左右。那么當(dāng)這個數(shù)目變成10000的時候，我們應(yīng)該怎么做？

That’s actually an alarming idea. But we’ll figure out some kind of answer. We’ll have to. It will probably involve writing some software, but fortunately we can do that.

這實(shí)際上是一個令人擔(dān)憂的問題。但是我們將會找到某種形式的答案。我們必須找到答案。這可能會涉及編寫一些軟件，很幸運(yùn)的是，我們能夠做到這一點(diǎn)。

Acquirers will also have to get better at picking winners. They generally do better than investors, because they pick later, when there’s more performance to measure. But even at the most advanced acquirers, identifying companies to buy is extremely ad hoc, and completing the acquisition often involves a great deal of unneccessary friction.

收購家也必須改進(jìn)自己挑選贏家的本領(lǐng)。他們通常比投資家做得好，因?yàn)樗麄兏鶕?jù)公司后期的表現(xiàn)進(jìn)行挑選，那時有更多的證據(jù)可以衡量表現(xiàn)。但是即使是那 些最高級的收購家，找到收購目標(biāo)也是極端沒有規(guī)律，完成收購?fù)ǔ０ù罅坎槐匾哪Σ痢?/p>

I think acquirers may eventually have chief acquisition officers who will both identify good acquisitions and make the deals happen. At the moment those two functions are separate. Promising new startups are often discovered by developers. If someone powerful enough wants to buy them, the deal is handed over to corp dev guys to negotiate. It would be better if both were combined in one group, headed by someone with a technical background and some vision of what they wanted to accomplish. Maybe in the future big companies will have both a VP of Engineering responsible for technology developed in-house, and a CAO responsible for bringing technology in from outside.

我想大公司會逐漸設(shè)置首席收購官（chief acquisition officers）這個職務(wù)，由他們負(fù)責(zé)挑選收購方和發(fā)生交易。目前，這兩個只能基本上是分開的。通常，有希望的初創(chuàng)企業(yè)是由程序員發(fā)現(xiàn)的。如果一家大公 司決定要收購這些企業(yè)，那么交易會移交給公司的管理層去談判。這兩個職能由一個團(tuán)隊(duì)來完成，效果會好得多。團(tuán)隊(duì)的領(lǐng)導(dǎo)人應(yīng)該具有技術(shù)背景，了解自己想要完 成的目標(biāo)。也許在未來，大公司會同時有兩個高級管理職員，一個是負(fù)責(zé)內(nèi)部技術(shù)發(fā)展的副總裁，另一個是負(fù)責(zé)將外部技術(shù)帶入公司的首席收購 官。

At the moment, there is no one within big companies who gets in trouble when they buy a startup for $200 million that they could have bought earlier for $20 million. There should start to be someone who gets in trouble for that.

目前，在那些大公司里，還沒有人為一些決策失誤負(fù)責(zé)。當(dāng)他們可以在2000萬美元收購的時候，他們沒有同意收購，反而等到2億美元時才去收購。從現(xiàn) 在起，應(yīng)該有人對這樣的決策失誤負(fù)責(zé)。

8. College Will Change

8. 大學(xué)將發(fā)生變化

If the best hackers start their own companies after college instead of getting jobs, that will change what happens in college. Most of these changes will be for the better. I think the experience of college is warped in a bad way by the expectation that afterward you’ll be judged by potential employers.

如果最好的技術(shù)人才在上完大學(xué)后，沒去找工作，而是去創(chuàng)業(yè)，那么大學(xué)也將因此發(fā)生變化。大多數(shù)變化是好的。我想，大學(xué)教育被一種假設(shè)大大地扭曲了， 這種假設(shè)是畢業(yè)后你的能力將由未來的雇主判斷。

One change will be in the meaning of “after college,” which will switch from when one graduates from college to when one leaves it. If you’re starting your own company, why do you need a degree? We don’t encourage people to start startups during college, but the best founders are certainly capable of it. Some of the most successful companies we’ve funded were started by undergrads.

一個變化是“離校”的涵義，這個詞將從指“畢業(yè)”，改為指“離開學(xué)校”。如果你正在創(chuàng)業(yè)，學(xué)位有什么用呢？我們 不鼓勵人們在校期間創(chuàng)業(yè)，但是最好的創(chuàng)業(yè)者肯定在校期間就有這個能力了。我們資助過的一些最成功的公司，是由肆業(yè)生創(chuàng)辦的。

I grew up in a time where college degrees seemed really important, so I’m alarmed to be saying things like this, but there’s nothing magical about a degree. There’s nothing that magically changes after you take that last exam. The importance of degrees is due solely to the administrative needs of large organizations. These can certainly affect your life—it’s hard to get into grad school, or to get a work visa in the US, without an undergraduate degree—but tests like this will matter less and less.

在我的成長年代，大學(xué)學(xué)位看上去真的很重要，所以我經(jīng)常會潛意識地說出類似的觀點(diǎn)，但是學(xué)位并沒有魔力。學(xué)位的重要性僅僅在于大公 司行政管理上的需要。它們肯定能夠影響你的人生——沒有本科學(xué)位，你很難申請研究生院入學(xué)，或者得到一張美國的工作簽證——但是這種衡 量標(biāo)準(zhǔn)的重要性將變得越來越小。

As well as mattering less whether students get degrees, it will also start to matter less where they go to college. In a startup you’re judged by users, and they don’t care where you went to college. So in a world of startups, elite universities will play less of a role as gatekeepers. In the US it’s a national scandal how easily children of rich parents game college admissions. But the way this problem ultimately gets solved may not be by reforming the universities but by going around them. We in the technology world are used to that sort of solution: you don’t beat the incumbents; you redefine the problem to make them irrelevant.

除了學(xué)位的重要性變得越來越低，你上的是哪一所大學(xué)也將變得越來越不重要。創(chuàng)業(yè)時，判決你的是你的客戶，他們不關(guān)心你在哪里上大學(xué)。所以在一個初創(chuàng) 企業(yè)的世界里，名牌大學(xué)將越來越不再被視為是一個門檻。在美國，富人子弟可以輕易進(jìn)入名牌大學(xué)，這是國家的丑聞。最終解決這個問題的方法，也許不是改革大 學(xué)的入學(xué)制度，而是名牌大學(xué)將會變得不重要。我們這些技術(shù)領(lǐng)域的人，都很習(xí)慣這種類型的解決方法：不是要求負(fù)責(zé)者改變，而是重新定義問題，使得跟他們脫離 關(guān)系。

The greatest value of universities is not the brand name or perhaps even the classes so much as the people you meet. If it becomes common to start a startup after college, students may start trying to maximize this. Instead of focusing on getting internships at companies they want to work for, they may start to focus on working with other students they want as cofounders.

大學(xué)最大的價值，并不是學(xué)校的名字，或者你所在的系所，而是你遇到的那些人。如果離校創(chuàng)業(yè)很普遍，那么學(xué)生可能 應(yīng)該盡早適應(yīng)這一點(diǎn)，不再只關(guān)心到那些他們想工作的公司里找到實(shí)習(xí)崗位，而是關(guān)心到那些其他同學(xué)創(chuàng)辦的公司中工作，并成為共同創(chuàng)辦者。

What students do in their classes will change too. Instead of trying to get good grades to impress future employers, students will try to learn things. We’re talking about some pretty dramatic changes here.

學(xué)生在班級里的行為也可能發(fā)生變化。學(xué)生將不再關(guān)心獲得高分，來打動未來的雇主，而將開始學(xué)習(xí)一些真正有用的東西。我們在這里談?wù)摰氖且恍┱嬲薮? 的變化。

9. Lots of Competitors

9. 許許多多的競爭者

If it gets easier to start a startup, it’s easier for competitors too. That doesn’t erase the advantage of increased cheapness, however. You’re not all playing a zero-sum game. There’s not some fixed number of startups that can succeed, regardless of how many are started.

如果創(chuàng)業(yè)變得很容易，那么你也很容易遇到競爭。但是，這改變不了成本下降帶來的趨勢。你參與的并非一個零和游戲。成功者的數(shù)量并沒有上限，不管有多 少人創(chuàng)業(yè)。

In fact, I don’t think there’s any limit to the number of startups that could succeed. Startups succeed by creating wealth, which is the satisfaction of people’s desires. And people’s desires seem to be effectively infinite, at least in the short term.

事實(shí)上，我認(rèn)為成功者的數(shù)量是沒有任何極限的。初創(chuàng)公司要取得成功，就必須為社會創(chuàng)造出財(cái)富，來滿足人們的欲望。而人類的欲望實(shí)際上是無限的，至少 在短期中看來如此。

What the increasing number of startups does mean is that you won’t be able to sit on a good idea. Other people have your idea, and they’ll be increasingly likely to do something about it.

創(chuàng)業(yè)者數(shù)量的增加，意味著你不能抱著一個想法不動。其他人也會想到你的創(chuàng)意的，并將其投入實(shí)踐的可能性會變得越來越大。

10. Faster Advances

10. 更快地前進(jìn)

There’s a good side to that, at least for consumers of technology. If people get right to work implementing ideas instead of sitting on them, technology will evolve faster.

上面這些變化會帶來一個好的結(jié)果，至少對技術(shù)的消費(fèi)者來說是這樣的。如果人們正確地實(shí)踐了創(chuàng)意，而不是僅僅坐著描述創(chuàng)意，那么技術(shù)就會更快地進(jìn)步。

Some kinds of innovations happen a company at a time, like the punctuated equilibrium model of evolution. There are some kinds of ideas that are so threatening that it’s hard for big companies even to think of them. Look at what a hard time Microsoft is having discovering web apps. They’re like a character in a movie that everyone in the audience can see something bad is about to happen to, but who can’t see it himself. The big innovations that happen a company at a time will obviously happen faster if the rate of new companies increases.

某些革新只是一段時間內(nèi)在一個公司的內(nèi)部產(chǎn)生，就好像進(jìn)化論中的“間斷平衡說”（punctuated equilibrium，指短時期內(nèi)驟變，然后在長時期內(nèi)保持穩(wěn)定）一樣。有些創(chuàng)意太具有顛覆性，所以大公司根本連想都不會想到。比如一旦網(wǎng)絡(luò)應(yīng)用程序變 得流行，微軟公司的日子會變得非常難過。這種情形就像所有觀眾都意識到，電影中的某個角色將會遭到不幸的事件，但是人物本身卻對此一無所知。如果新公司的 數(shù)量不斷增加，那么那些發(fā)生在一個公司內(nèi)部的革新，其出現(xiàn)的速率將明顯變得更快。

But in fact there will be a double speed increase. People won’t wait as long to act on new ideas, but also those ideas will increasingly be developed within startups rather than big companies. Which means technology will evolve faster per company as well.

但是，事實(shí)上，這里有一個雙重的速度增加。一方面，人們不會再坐等，會更快地將創(chuàng)意投入實(shí)踐，另一方面，初創(chuàng)公司比大公司有更多的創(chuàng)意。這意味著， 不管是大公司還是初創(chuàng)公司，技術(shù)的發(fā)展都變得更快了。

Big companies are just not a good place to make things happen fast. I talked recently to a founder whose startup had been acquired by a big company. He was a precise sort of guy, so he’d measured their productivity before and after. He counted lines of code, which can be a dubious measure, but in this case was meaningful because it was the same group of programmers. He found they were one thirteenth as productive after the acquisition.

大公司真的不是一個能夠快速做事的地方。我最近遇到一個創(chuàng)業(yè)者，他的初創(chuàng)公司剛剛被一家大公司收購。他是一個數(shù)字感覺很強(qiáng)的人，所以他衡量了在收購 前后公司的效率。他計(jì)算了代碼的行數(shù)，這個指標(biāo)不能算很準(zhǔn)確，但是在這個案例中是有意義的，因?yàn)槎际峭唤M程序員寫出來的代碼。他發(fā)現(xiàn)，收購后寫出的代碼 只是收購前的十三分之一。

The company that bought them was not a particularly stupid one. I think what he was measuring was mostly the cost of bigness. I experienced this myself, and his number sounds about right. There’s something about big companies that just sucks the energy out of you.

那家收購他們的公司并不是一家特別差的大公司。我想他衡量出來的，主要就是大型化的成本。我自己也有類似的經(jīng)歷，他的數(shù)字聽上去和我的感覺差不多。 大公司里有一些東西，會讓你根本沒辦法發(fā)揮自己的能量。

Imagine what all that energy could do if it were put to use. There is an enormous latent capacity in the world’s hackers that most people don’t even realize is there. That’s the main reason we do Y Combinator: to let loose all this energy by making it easy for hackers to start their own startups.

想象一下，如果人們的能量能夠全部發(fā)揮出來，那會是怎樣的情景。全世界所有技術(shù)人才的極大一部分潛在能量，沒有得到發(fā)揮，大多數(shù)人甚至還沒有意識到 這一點(diǎn)。這就是我們創(chuàng)辦自己的風(fēng)險投資公司的主要原因：解開束縛能量的重重限制，使技術(shù)人才能夠更容易地去創(chuàng)業(yè)。

A Series of Tubes

一系列的管道

The process of starting startups is currently like the plumbing in an old house. The pipes are narrow and twisty, and there are leaks in every joint. In the future this mess will gradually be replaced by a single, huge pipe. The water will still have to get from A to B, but it will get there faster and without the risk of spraying out through some random leak.

現(xiàn)在的創(chuàng)業(yè)有點(diǎn)像在老房子里修水管。這些水管狹窄彎曲，每個結(jié)點(diǎn)上都有漏洞。在未來，這堆亂七八糟的水管將逐漸被一整根暫新的水管取代。水流依然將 從A點(diǎn)流到B點(diǎn)，但是速度將變得更快，并且也不會在每個漏洞上噴出水花。

This will change a lot of things for the better. In a big, straight pipe like that, the force of being measured by one’s performance will propagate back through the whole system. Performance is always the ultimate test, but there are so many kinks in the plumbing now that most people are insulated from it most of the time. So you end up with a world in which high school students think they need to get good grades to get into elite colleges, and college students think they need to get good grades to impress employers, within which the employees waste most of their time in political battles, and from which consumers have to buy anyway because there are so few choices. Imagine if that sequence became a big, straight pipe. Then the effects of being measured by performance would propagate all the way back to high school, flushing out all the arbitrary stuff people are measured by now. That is the future of web startups.

這將改善許多事情。如果有一根又大又直的管子，那么就很容易評估一個人的表現(xiàn)，這種力量將會反饋影響到整個系統(tǒng)。表現(xiàn)永遠(yuǎn)是最終的衡量標(biāo)準(zhǔn)，但是在 現(xiàn)在的這種老式水管系統(tǒng)中，衡量人們的標(biāo)準(zhǔn)大多數(shù)時候都與表現(xiàn)無關(guān)。所以我們現(xiàn)在的世界就是這樣的一個世界，高中生們認(rèn)為必須得到好的成績，然后進(jìn)名牌大 學(xué)；大學(xué)生們認(rèn)為必須得到好的成績，然后打動雇主；雇員們在公司里的大部分時間，都浪費(fèi)在辦公室政治中；消費(fèi)者們不得不購買他們能夠得到的商品，因?yàn)楹苌? 有其它選擇。想象一下，如果世界變了，變成一整根的大水管?？梢愿鶕?jù)人們做出的成績，來判斷他的價值，這種效果就會一路反饋，直到高中，一路上將現(xiàn)在那些 老一套不合理的評價人們的標(biāo)準(zhǔn)都沖刷得干干凈凈。這就是未來的互聯(lián)網(wǎng)創(chuàng)業(yè)。

（完）

譯者：阮一峰

原文網(wǎng)址：http://www./webstartups.html