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BERKSHIREHATHAWAY INC.
伯克希爾·哈撒韋有限公司
Goodwill and its Amortization: The Rules and The Realities
商譽及其攤銷：規(guī)則與現(xiàn)實
This appendix deals only with economic and accounting Goodwill – not the goodwill of everyday usage. For example, a business may be well liked, even loved, by most of its customers but possess no economic goodwill. (AT&T, before the breakup, was generally well thought of, but possessed not a dime of economic Goodwill.) And, regrettably, a business may be disliked by its customers but possess substantial, and growing, economic Goodwill. So, just for the moment, forget emotions and focus only on economics and accounting.
這篇附錄探討的只是經(jīng)濟和會計商譽，而不是日常所說的聲譽。比如，一個公司可能被大多數(shù)客戶喜歡，甚至熱愛，但是卻不具有任何經(jīng)濟商譽。（AT&T在分拆前總的來說聲譽很好，但沒有一分錢的經(jīng)濟商譽。）遺憾的是，一個公司可能被其客戶所不喜歡，但卻具有大量，而且不斷增長的經(jīng)濟商譽。所以，就目前而言，讓我們先忘掉感情，只關(guān)注于經(jīng)濟和會計。
When a business is purchased, accounting principles require that the purchase price first be assigned to the fair value of the identifiable assets that are acquired. Frequently the sum of the fair values put on the assets (after the deduction of liabilities) is less than the total purchase price of the business. In that case, the difference is assigned to an asset account entitled "excess of cost over equity in net assets acquired". To avoid constant repetition of this mouthful, we will substitute "Goodwill".
當(dāng)一個公司被并購時，會計準(zhǔn)則要求并購價格首先分配給所并購的可確認資產(chǎn)的公允價值。資產(chǎn)的公允價值總和（經(jīng)過扣除負債后）經(jīng)常是少于公司的并購總價格。在這種情況，這兩者的差異就被分配到一個資產(chǎn)帳戶，稱為“超出并購的凈資產(chǎn)權(quán)益的額外成本”。為了避免不斷的重復(fù)這一很長的說法，我們將用“商譽”來替代之。
Accounting Goodwill arising from businesses purchased before November 1970 has a special standing. Except under rare circumstances, it can remain an asset on the balance sheet as long as the business bought is retained. That means no amortization charges to gradually extinguish that asset need be made against earnings.
在1970年11月前購買公司所產(chǎn)生的商譽有不同的處理。除非在極少的情況下，只要仍然持有所購買的公司，商譽就可以存在于資產(chǎn)負債表上。這意味著不需針對盈利核算攤銷費用而逐漸削減這項資產(chǎn)。
The case is different, however, with purchases made from November 1970 on. When these create Goodwill, it must be amortized over not more than 40 years through charges – of equal amount in every year –to the earnings account. Since 40 years is the maximum period allowed, 40 years is what managements (including us) usually elect. This annual charge to earnings is not allowed as a tax deduction and, thus, has an effect on after-tax income that is roughly double that of most other expenses.
但是1970年以后的并購就不同了。當(dāng)并購產(chǎn)生商譽，這些商譽必須在不超過40年的時間里進行攤銷。每年以相等的攤銷費用減少利潤帳戶。由于40年是所允許的最長時間，這也是管理層（包括我們自己）通常選用的。這項減少利潤的年度費用不允許被用來抵扣稅，所以具有一般費用大約兩倍的稅后收入影響。
That’show accounting Goodwill works. To see how it differs from economic reality, let’s look at an example close at hand. We’ll round some figures, and greatly oversimplify, to make the example easier to follow. We’ll also mention some implications for investors and managers.
這就是會計商譽的做法。為了揭示這與經(jīng)濟商譽實際情況的不同，讓我們看一個手頭的例子。我們將近似一些數(shù)字，并極大的簡化，以讓這個例子容易理解。我們還將提及一些對投資者和經(jīng)理人的影響。
Blue Chip Stamps bought See’s early in 1972 for $25 million, at which time See’s had about $8 million of net tangible assets. (Throughout this discussion, accounts receivable will be classified as tangible assets, a definition proper for business analysis.) This level of tangible assets was adequate to conduct the business without use of debt, except for short periods seasonally. See’s was earning about$2 million after tax at the time, and such earnings seemed conservatively representative of future earning power in constant 1972 dollars.
Blue Chip Stamps于1972年初以2500萬美元購買了喜詩糖果。當(dāng)時，喜詩有大約8百萬的凈有形資產(chǎn)。（在整個討論中，應(yīng)收帳款將被歸于有形資產(chǎn)，這個定義對商業(yè)分析是適合的。）這個水平的有形資產(chǎn)，除了季節(jié)性的短時期，當(dāng)時足夠不用債務(wù)而運營業(yè)務(wù)。喜詩當(dāng)時的稅后盈利是2百萬美元，這似乎保守的代表了以1972年美元計的未來盈利能力。
Thus our first lesson: businesses logically are worth far more than net tangible assets when they can be expected to produce earnings on such assets considerably in excess of market rates of return. The capitalized value of this excess return is economic Goodwill.
因此，我們學(xué)到的第一課：當(dāng)凈有形資產(chǎn)能產(chǎn)生遠超過市場水平的回報率時，公司價值從邏輯上講，遠超過凈有形資產(chǎn)。這一超出市場回報的價值被資本化就變成了經(jīng)濟商譽。
In 1972 (and now) relatively few businesses could be expected to consistently earn the 25% after tax on net tangible assets that was earned by See’s – doing it, furthermore, with conservative accounting and no financial leverage. It was not the fair market value of the inventories, receivables or fixed assets that produced the premium rates of return. Rather it was a combination of intangible assets, particularly a pervasive favorable reputation with consumers based upon countless pleasant experiences they have had with both product and personnel.
在1972年（和現(xiàn)在）相對來說只有很少的公司能像喜詩那樣穩(wěn)定的獲得25%的稅后凈有形資產(chǎn)回報率。而且這種回報率還是建立在保守的會計方式和沒有財務(wù)杠桿的情況下。并不是公允市場價值的庫存，應(yīng)收款，或者固定資產(chǎn)，產(chǎn)生了這種非凡的回報率。正好相反，是無形資產(chǎn)的組合，尤其是在消費者中良好的聲譽產(chǎn)生了這一切。這種良好的聲譽是建立在消費者對其產(chǎn)品以及公司員工無數(shù)愉快的體驗之上。
Such a reputation creates a consumer franchise that allows the value of the product to the purchaser, rather than its production cost, to be the major determinant of selling price. Consumer franchises are a prime source of economic Goodwill. Other sources include governmental franchises not subject to profit regulation, such as television stations, and an enduring position as the low cost producer in anindustry.
這種聲譽創(chuàng)造出了一個消費者特許經(jīng)營權(quán)。這讓產(chǎn)品對購買者的價值，而不是產(chǎn)品的生產(chǎn)成本，成為了決定銷售價格的主要決定性因素。消費者特許經(jīng)營權(quán)是經(jīng)濟商譽的主要來源。其他的來源包括無盈利管制的政府特許經(jīng)營權(quán)，如電視臺和在一個行業(yè)的低成本生產(chǎn)者的持久地位。
Let’s return to the accounting in the See’s example. Blue Chip’s purchase of See’s at $17 million over net tangible assets required that a Goodwill account of this amount be established as an asset on Blue Chip’s books and that $425,000 be charged to income annually for 40 years to amortize that asset. By 1983, after 11 years of such charges, the $17 million had been reduced to about $12.5 million. Berkshire, meanwhile, owned 60% of Blue Chip and, therefore, also 60% of See’s. This ownership meant that Berkshire’s balance sheet reflected 60% of See’s Goodwill, or about $7.5 million.
讓我們回到喜詩這個例子的會計處理。BlueChip對喜詩的并購超出了凈有形資產(chǎn)1700萬美元。這就要求在BlueChip的資產(chǎn)負債表上設(shè)立同等額度的商譽帳戶，并在40年的時間里，每年把這項資產(chǎn)攤銷42.5萬美元的費用，隨之減少利潤。到了1983年，經(jīng)過了11年這樣的攤銷，這1700萬已經(jīng)被減少到了1250萬。伯克希爾，與此同時，擁有60%的BlueChip，所以也就是60%的喜詩。這一所有權(quán)意味著伯克希爾的資產(chǎn)負債表反映了60%的喜詩的商譽，即750萬美元。
In 1983 Berkshire acquired the rest of Blue Chip in a merger that required purchase accounting as contrasted to the “pooling” treatment allowed for some mergers. Under purchase accounting, the“fair value” of the shares we gave to (or “paid”) Blue Chip holders had to be spread over the net assets acquired from Blue Chip. This “fair value” was measured, as it almost always is when public companies use their shares to make acquisitions, by the market value of the shares given up.
1983年伯克希爾并購了BlueChip余下的股份。這一合并要求使用并購會計處理，而不是一些合并所允許的“合并”會計處理。在并購會計處理下，我們給（或“支付”）Blue Chip的股份的“公允價值”必須在我們從BlueChip獲得的凈資產(chǎn)上分攤。這一“公允價值”的多少，當(dāng)上市公司用股票進行并購時總是用所放棄的市場價值來衡量。
The assets “purchased” consisted of 40% of everything owned by Blue Chip (as noted, Berkshire already owned the other 60%). What Berkshire “paid” was more than the net identifiable assets we received by $51.7 million, and was assigned to two pieces of Goodwill: $28.4 million to See’s and $23.3 million to Buffalo Evening News.
“并購”的資產(chǎn)包括了Blue Chip所擁有的所有東西的40%（如上所示，伯克希爾一直擁有余下的60%）。當(dāng)伯克希爾“支付”的超過了我們收到的5170萬美元可確認凈資產(chǎn)，這一超出的部分被分配到兩部分商譽：2840萬美元在喜詩，以及2330萬美元在Buffalo Evening News。
After the merger, therefore, Berkshire was left with a Goodwill asset for See’s that had two components: the $7.5 million remaining from the 1971 purchase, and $28.4 million newly created by the 40% “purchased” in 1983. Our amortization charge now will be about $1.0 million for the next 28 years, and $.7 million for the following 12 years, 2002 through 2013.
所以在并購后，伯克希爾有了喜詩的商譽，具有兩部分：從1971年并購所剩下的750萬美元，以及1983年的40%“并購”所新創(chuàng)造的2840萬美元。我們在未來28年的攤銷費用將是每年1百萬美元，之后的12年也就是2002到2013年是每年70萬美元。
In other words, different purchase dates and prices have given us vastly different asset values and amortization charges for two pieces of the same asset. (We repeat our usual disclaimer: we have no better accounting system to suggest. The problems to be dealt with are mind boggling and require arbitrary rules.)
換句話說，不同的并購日期和價格，讓我們對同樣一個資產(chǎn)有了兩個非常不同的價值和攤銷費用。（我們重復(fù)我們的免責(zé)聲明：我們沒有更好的會計系統(tǒng)可以建議。必須被解決的大量問題令人難以想象，因此必須有硬性的規(guī)則。）
But what are the economic realities? One reality is that the amortization charges that have been deducted as costs in the earnings statement each year since acquisition of See’s were not true economic costs. We know that because See’s last year earned $13 million after taxes on about $20 million of net tangible assets – a performance indicating the existence of economic Goodwill far larger than the total original cost of our accounting Goodwill. In other words, whilea ccounting Goodwill regularly decreased from the moment of purchase, economic Goodwill increased in irregular but very substantial fashion.
但是，經(jīng)濟現(xiàn)實是什么？一個實際情況是，從喜詩并購后每年從利潤表中作為成本扣除的攤銷費用并不是真正的經(jīng)濟成本。我們知道喜詩去年在2000萬美元的凈有形資產(chǎn)之上，掙了1300萬美元的稅后利潤。這一業(yè)績表明現(xiàn)存的經(jīng)濟商譽遠高于最初總的商譽會計成本。換句話說，雖然會計商譽從并購那一刻就有規(guī)律的定期減少，但經(jīng)濟商譽卻以不規(guī)律但卻非常重大的方式增加。
Another reality is that annual amortization charges in the future will not correspond to economic costs. It is possible, of course, that See’s economic Goodwill will disappear. But it won’t shrink in even decrements or anything remotely resembling them. What is more likely is that the Goodwill will increase– in current, if not in constant, dollars – because of inflation.
另一個現(xiàn)實是，未來的年度攤銷費用將無法符合經(jīng)濟成本。當(dāng)然，喜詩的經(jīng)濟商譽也可能消失。但商譽不會穩(wěn)定的消耗，或者以類似穩(wěn)定的方式消耗。最有可能的是，商譽將會增加。由于通脹的作用，商譽將會以目前的美元價值，而不是以不變美元價值計增加。
That probability exists because true economic Goodwill tends to rise in nominal value proportionally with inflation. To illustrate how this works, let’s contrast a See’s kind of business with a more mundane business. When we purchased See’s in 1972, it will be recalled, it was earning about $2 million on $8 million of net tangible assets. Let us assume that our hypothetical mundane business then had $2 million of earnings also, but needed $18 million in net tangible assets for normal operations. Earning only 11% on required tangible assets, that mundane business would possess little or no economic Goodwill.
這一可能性的存在是因為真實的經(jīng)濟商譽傾向于隨通脹在名義價值上成比例增加。為了說明這是如何運作的，讓我們把喜詩這樣的業(yè)務(wù)和一個更普通的業(yè)務(wù)做一個對比。1972年，當(dāng)初我們并購喜詩時，它在8百萬美元凈有形資產(chǎn)之上的盈利是2百萬美元。讓我們假定我們假設(shè)的普通業(yè)務(wù)也有2百萬美元的盈利，但卻需要1800萬美元的凈有形資產(chǎn)來維持正常運營。在必須的有形資產(chǎn)之上只獲得11%的回報，這個普通的業(yè)務(wù)具有很少，或者沒有經(jīng)濟商譽。
A business like that, therefore, might well have sold for the value of its net tangible assets, or for $18 million. In contrast, we paid $25 million for See’s, even though it had no more in earnings and less than half as much in “honest-to-God” assets. Could less really have been more, as our purchase price implied? The answer is “yes”– even if both businesses were expected to have flat unit volume – as long as you anticipated, as we did in 1972, a world of continuous inflation.
這樣一個業(yè)務(wù)，完全有可能因其凈有形資產(chǎn)而以1800萬美元賣出。與之相反，我們支付了2500萬美元購買了喜詩，即使它沒有更多的盈利，而且只有前面普通業(yè)務(wù)不到一半的實打?qū)嵉馁Y產(chǎn)。難道少既是多，就像我們的并購價格所暗示的那樣？答案是“對”。即便兩個業(yè)務(wù)都預(yù)期有停滯的業(yè)務(wù)量，只要你預(yù)計到了一個持續(xù)通脹的世界，正如我們在1972年預(yù)計的那樣，這個答案就是“對”。
To understand why, imagine the effect that a doubling of the price level would subsequently have on the two businesses. Both would need to double their nominal earnings to $4 million to keep themselves even with inflation. This would seem to be no great trick: just sell the same number of units at double earlier prices and, assuming profit margins remain unchanged, profits also must double.
要理解為什么，想象物價水平翻倍之后對這兩個業(yè)務(wù)的影響。這兩者都需要把名義盈利翻倍到4百萬美元才能趕得上通脹。這似乎不需要太多的手段：只要賣同樣多的數(shù)量，把價格翻倍就行了，假設(shè)利潤率不變，盈利一定翻倍。
But, crucially, to bring that about, both businesses probably would have to double their nominal investment in net tangible assets, since that is the kind of economic requirement that inflation usually imposes on businesses, both good and bad. A doubling of dollar sales meansc orrespondingly more dollars must be employed immediately in receivables and inventories. Dollars employed in fixed assets will respond more slowly to inflation, but probably just as surely. And all of this inflation-required investment will produce no improvement in rate of return. The motivation for this investment is the survival of the business, not the prosperity of the owner.
但是關(guān)鍵的是，為了達到這一點，兩者恐怕都必須把正常的凈有形資產(chǎn)投資翻倍。因為這就是通脹常常強加于商業(yè)的經(jīng)濟要求，有好處也有壞處。以美元計的銷售額翻倍意味著更多的錢必須馬上被用在應(yīng)收款和庫存。固定資產(chǎn)所用的錢對通脹會有較慢的反應(yīng)，但肯定會有反應(yīng)。而且，所有這些通脹要求的投資將無法改善回報率。這種投資的原因在于維持業(yè)務(wù)的生存，而不是擁有者利益的增長。
Remember, however, that See’s had net tangible assets of only $8 million. So it would only have had to commit an additional $8 million to finance the capital needs imposed by inflation. The mundane business, meanwhile, had a burden over twice as large – a need for $18 million of additional capital.
記住，喜詩只有8百萬美元的凈有形資產(chǎn)。所以，它只需要投入額外的8百萬美元來支持通脹所強加的資本需求。而普通的業(yè)務(wù)，則有著兩倍的負擔(dān)，需要1800萬美元的額外資本。
After the dust had settled, the mundane business, now earning $4 million annually, might still be worth the value of its tangible assets, or $36 million. That means its owners would have gained only a dollar of nominal value for every new dollar invested. (This is the same dollar-for-dollar result they would have achieved if they had added money to a savings account.)
塵埃落定之后，這個普通的業(yè)務(wù)，現(xiàn)在每年盈利4百萬美元，可能仍然價值相當(dāng)于其有形資產(chǎn)價值，即3600萬美元。這意味著所有者投資的每一個美元，只產(chǎn)生了一個美元的名義價值增加。（這與他們把錢加到存款帳戶中一樣，都是一美元對一美元。）
See’s, however, also earning $4 million, might be worth $50 million if valued (as it logically would be) on the same basis as it was at the time of our purchase. So it would have gained $25 million in nominal value while the owners were putting up only $8 million in additional capital – over $3 of nominal value gained for each $1 invested.
喜詩同樣也盈利4百萬美元，用我們購買時同樣的估值方法評估（邏輯上應(yīng)該如此）可能價值5000萬美元。所以喜詩獲得了2500萬美元的名義價值增加，而所有者僅僅投入了8百萬美元的額外資本，這相當(dāng)于每投入1美元獲得超過3美元的名義價值。
Remember, even so, that the owners of the See’s kind of business were forced by inflation to ante up $8 million in additional capital just to stay even in real profits. Any unleveraged business that requires some net tangible assets to operate (and almost all do) is hurt by inflation. Businesses needing little in the way of tangible assets simply are hurt the least.
記住，即使是這樣，喜詩的擁有者也由于通脹被迫付出8百萬美元的額外資本，這也才僅僅是維持真實利潤。任何不用杠桿而且需要一些凈有形資產(chǎn)來運營（幾乎所有的業(yè)務(wù)都是如此）的業(yè)務(wù)都會被通脹傷害。只需要很少有形資產(chǎn)的業(yè)務(wù)只不過受的傷害最少。
And that fact, of course, has been hard for many people to grasp. For years the traditional wisdom – long on tradition, short on wisdom –held that inflation protection was best provided by businesses laden with natural resources, plants and machinery, or other tangible assets (“In Goods We Trust”). It doesn’t work that way. Asset-heavy businesses generally earn low rates of return – rates that often barely provide enough capital to fund the inflationary needs of the existing business, with nothing left over for real growth, for distribution to owners, or for acquisition of new businesses.
然而這個事實，當(dāng)然一直很難被許多人領(lǐng)悟。多年以來，傳統(tǒng)智慧，（長于傳統(tǒng)，短于智慧）認為充滿天然資源，工廠，機器和其他有形資產(chǎn)（“我們信賴的商品”）的業(yè)務(wù)能夠提供最好的通脹保護。其實根本不是這樣。重資產(chǎn)的業(yè)務(wù)通常獲得低回報率，低到僅能提供足夠的資本來滿足現(xiàn)存業(yè)務(wù)的通脹下需求，而根本無法剩下任何東西來支持真正的增長，分配股息給所有者，或者并購新的業(yè)務(wù)。
In contrast, a disproportionate number of the great business fortunes built up during the inflationary years arose from ownership of operations that combined intangibles of lasting value with relatively minor requirements for tangible assets. In such cases earnings have bounded upward in nominal dollars, and these dollars have been largely available for the acquisition of additional businesses. This phenomenon has been particularly evident in the communications business. That business has required little in the way of tangible investment – yet its franchises have endured. During inflation, Goodwill is the gift that keeps giving.
與之相反，不成比例的大量商業(yè)財富在通脹時期積累起來。這些財富是通過擁有一些業(yè)務(wù)運營而實現(xiàn)的，這些運營結(jié)合了具有持久價值的無形資產(chǎn)與相對很少的有形資產(chǎn)需求。在這些例子里，名義盈利大幅增加，這些資金可以用來并購其他的業(yè)務(wù)。這種現(xiàn)象在通訊行業(yè)尤為明顯。這一行業(yè)僅需要很少的有形資產(chǎn)投資，但是卻能保持特許經(jīng)營權(quán)。在通脹時期，商譽是不斷奉獻的禮物。
But that statement applies, naturally, only to true economic Goodwill. Spurious accounting Goodwill – and there is plenty of it around –is another matter. When an overexcited management purchases a business at a silly price, the same accounting niceties described earlier are observed. Because it can’t go anywhere else, the silliness ends up in the Goodwill account. Considering the lack of managerial discipline that created the account, under such circumstances it might better be labeled “No-Will”. Whatever the term, the 40-year ritual typically is observed and the adrenalin so capitalized remains on the books as an “asset” just as if the acquisition had been a sensible one.
但是這一論斷自然只適用于真正的經(jīng)濟商譽。欺騙性的會計商譽（有很多這樣的例子）是另外一碼事。當(dāng)一個過度興奮的管理層用愚蠢的高價購買一個業(yè)務(wù)時，前面描述的同樣的會計細節(jié)也能被觀察到。因為它無處可去，愚蠢的買價最終留在商譽帳戶?？紤]到由于缺乏管理紀(jì)律而創(chuàng)造的這樣一個帳戶，在這種情況下，應(yīng)該稱之為“無譽”。無論期限，通常可以觀察到40年的儀式性攤銷。管理層追求刺激的腎上腺素被資本化保留在帳面上作為一項“資產(chǎn)”，就好像這個并購是一個明智的舉動。
If you cling to any belief that accounting treatment of Goodwill is the best measure of economic reality, I suggest one final item to ponder.
如果你堅持相信對商譽的會計處理是衡量經(jīng)濟現(xiàn)實的最佳方式，我建議你思考最后一個例子。
Assume a company with $20 per share of net worth, all tangible assets. Further assume the company has internally developed some magnificent consumer franchise, or that it was fortunate enough to obtain some important television stations by original FCC grant. Therefore, it earns a great deal on tangible assets, say $5 per share, or 25%.
假設(shè)一個公司有每股20美元的凈資產(chǎn)，全部是有形資產(chǎn)。進一步假設(shè)公司內(nèi)部發(fā)展了一個絕妙的消費者特許經(jīng)營權(quán)，或者這個公司足夠幸運，獲得了一些重要的FCC最初授予的電視臺許可。所以，這個公司于有形資產(chǎn)上盈利豐厚，比如每股5美元，或者25%的回報。
With such economics, it might sell for $100 per share or more, and it might well also bring that price in a negotiated sale of the entire business.
有這樣的經(jīng)濟狀況，這支公司的股票可能賣價每股100美元或更高。而且還有可能在一個談判賣出整個業(yè)務(wù)中獲得如此的價格。
Assume an investor buys the stock at $100 per share, paying in effect $80 per share for Goodwill (just as would a corporate purchaser buying the whole company). Should the investor impute a $2 per share amortization charge annually ($80 divided by 40 years) to calculate“true” earnings per share? And, if so, should the new “true” earnings of $3 per share cause him to rethink his purchase price?
假設(shè)一個投資者支付了每股100美元購買股票，實際上是用每股80美元支付了商譽（正如一個企業(yè)并購整個公司時那樣）。這個投資者是否應(yīng)該每年拿出2美元的攤銷費用，用于計算“真實”每股盈利？如果是這樣，新的3美元“真實”盈利是否應(yīng)該促使他重新思考購買價格？
We believe managers and investors alike should view intangible assets from two perspectives:
我們相信經(jīng)理人和投資者應(yīng)該從兩個視角看待無形資產(chǎn)： 1. In analysis of operating results – that is, in evaluating the underlying economics of a business unit – amortization charges should be ignored. What a business can be expected to earn on unleveraged net tangible assets, excluding any charges against earnings for amortization of Goodwill, is the best guide to the economic attractiveness of the operation. It is also the best guide to the current value of the operation’s economic Goodwill.
在分析運營結(jié)果，也就是評估一個業(yè)務(wù)單元的內(nèi)在經(jīng)濟狀況時，攤銷費用應(yīng)該被忽略。一個業(yè)務(wù)預(yù)期在凈有形資產(chǎn)上所能獲得的利潤，除去任何商譽的攤銷費用，才是衡量業(yè)務(wù)運營在經(jīng)濟上是否有吸引力的最佳指導(dǎo)。這也是衡量業(yè)務(wù)運營的經(jīng)濟商譽的當(dāng)前價值的最佳指導(dǎo)。 2. In evaluating the wisdom of business acquisitions, amortization charges should be ignored also. They should be deducted neither from earnings nor from the cost of the business. This means forever viewing purchased Goodwill at its full cost, before any amortization. Furthermore, cost should be defined as including the full intrinsic business value – not just the recorded accounting value – of all consideration given, irrespective of market prices of the securities involved at the time of merger and irrespective of whether pooling treatment was allowed. For example, what we truly paid in the Blue Chip merger for 40% of the Goodwill of See’s and the News was considerably more than the $51.7 million entered on our books. This disparity exists because the market value of the Berkshire shares given up in the merger was less than their intrinsic business value, which is the value that defines the true cost to us. 在評估商業(yè)并購是否明智時，攤銷費用也應(yīng)被忽略。攤銷費用既不應(yīng)該從業(yè)務(wù)的盈利中減去，也不應(yīng)該從業(yè)務(wù)的成本中扣除。這意味著永遠視所購買的商譽為在任何攤銷之前的全部成本。更重要的是，并購成本應(yīng)該被定義為，包含所支付代價的全部內(nèi)在商業(yè)價值，而不僅是其記錄的會計價值，不論合并當(dāng)時所涉及的證券的市場價格，也不管是否允許用合并會計處理。比如，我們在合并Blue Chip 40%的喜詩和Buffalo Evening News的商譽時，真正支付的代價遠超過我們記錄在賬面上的5170萬美元。這種不一致的存在是由于在合并時，伯克希爾股票的市場價值低于其內(nèi)在商業(yè)價值，對我們來說這才是決定真實成本的價值。
Operations that appear to be winners based upon perspective (1) may pale when viewed from perspective (2). A good business is not always a good purchase – although it’s a good place to look for one.
從視角（1）看似乎是贏家的業(yè)務(wù)運營，有可能從視角（2）看卻黯然失色。一個好的業(yè)務(wù)不一定是一個好的并購對象，雖然好業(yè)務(wù)是尋找好并購的地方。
We will try to acquire businesses that have excellent operating economics measured by (1) and that provide reasonable returns measured by (2). Accounting consequences will be totally ignored.
我們將尋求并購那些用（1）衡量是優(yōu)秀的運營狀況，而且用（2）衡量能產(chǎn)生合理回報的業(yè)務(wù)。會計后果將完全被忽略。
At yearend 1983, net Goodwill on our accounting books totaled $62 million, consisting of the $79 million you see stated on the asset side of our balance sheet, and $17 million of negative Goodwill that is offset against the carrying value of our interest in Mutual Savings and Loan.
在1983年底，在我們會計帳面上的凈商譽是6200萬美元，包括7900萬美元標(biāo)明在資產(chǎn)負債表的資產(chǎn)一側(cè)，以及1700萬美元負的商譽以沖銷我們持有的Mutual Savings and Loan的權(quán)益價值。
We believe net economic Goodwill far exceeds the $62 million accounting number.
我們相信凈經(jīng)濟商譽遠超過這6200萬美元的會計數(shù)字。 |
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