當(dāng)市場(chǎng)前三的 Sidecar 今年早些時(shí)候關(guān)閉并出售其資產(chǎn)給通用汽車以后，很多人認(rèn)為共享出行市場(chǎng)的戰(zhàn)爭(zhēng)似乎結(jié)束了，普遍的看法是 Uber 注定要成為一個(gè)市場(chǎng)壟斷者。

但是最近，Lyft和滴滴獲得了數(shù)十億美元的投資， 很多人已經(jīng)質(zhì)疑這種看法，并開始思考：這個(gè)市場(chǎng)是否可以有多個(gè)玩家?

硅谷的觀點(diǎn)

紐約客今年早些時(shí)候有一篇文章認(rèn)為技術(shù)驅(qū)動(dòng)的行業(yè)無法支持多個(gè)玩家，硅谷競(jìng)爭(zhēng)趨勢(shì)都是指向一個(gè)壟斷的贏家。

造成這種情況的主要原因來自網(wǎng)絡(luò)效應(yīng)經(jīng)濟(jì) — 即一個(gè)產(chǎn)品或服務(wù)的價(jià)值隨使用人數(shù)的增加而增加。網(wǎng)絡(luò)效應(yīng)在 Facebook 、 eBay 和 Skype 等公司隨處可見，每一個(gè)都是他們自己領(lǐng)域的壟斷者。

互聯(lián)網(wǎng)壟斷企業(yè)存在的第二個(gè)原因是零邊際成本分布 —- 提供單位額外的商品或服務(wù)不會(huì)增加總的成本。除了增加帶寬有一點(diǎn)點(diǎn)可忽略不計(jì)的成本外， Google 和 Snapchat 服務(wù)一個(gè)新用戶的成本基本為零。

這兩種力量在一起，形成良性循環(huán)。一旦服務(wù)流行起來，它創(chuàng)造更多的消費(fèi)需求。由于提供服務(wù)的成本在很大程度上是零，很容易吸引新的用戶使用服務(wù)。這些新增的用戶使產(chǎn)品更有價(jià)值，反過來，吸引更多的用戶。如此循環(huán)，使互聯(lián)網(wǎng)成為不公平競(jìng)爭(zhēng)的滋生地。

提及科技公司，法學(xué)教授Tim解釋說：'從長(zhǎng)遠(yuǎn)來看，競(jìng)爭(zhēng)是異常，壟斷才是常態(tài) ” 。這就是為什么我們看到互聯(lián)網(wǎng)領(lǐng)域這么多近乎壟斷的公司，如Facebook ,谷歌，維基百科， LinkedIn ， Craigslist ，亞馬遜和 Twitter 。事實(shí)上，乍一看，技術(shù)行業(yè)真的是 “ 贏家通吃 ” 的市場(chǎng)。

這種觀點(diǎn)很大程度上支持了為什么Uber的估值是其競(jìng)爭(zhēng)對(duì)手Lyft的12倍，而其收入只有Lyft的4倍。

新的反駁觀點(diǎn)

隨著近期 Lyft 和滴滴融資總額超過 20 億美金，似乎投資者并不準(zhǔn)備認(rèn)輸，這或許是明智的，上面討論的支持 “ 贏者通吃 ” 理論的兩個(gè)關(guān)鍵點(diǎn)上Uber都有缺陷。

如同Quartz網(wǎng)站的文章指出的， 第一個(gè)錯(cuò)誤在于不理解有兩種不同的網(wǎng)絡(luò)效應(yīng)。

Uber的例子也是同樣。公司的競(jìng)爭(zhēng)優(yōu)勢(shì)主要來自于路上的司機(jī)數(shù)目和經(jīng)營(yíng)城市的數(shù)量。這兩者都是供給側(cè)的好處。

不過，雖然供給側(cè)的網(wǎng)絡(luò)效應(yīng)有自己的優(yōu)勢(shì)，這不是一個(gè)無法戰(zhàn)勝的競(jìng)爭(zhēng)優(yōu)勢(shì)。在這種特殊情況下，挑戰(zhàn)它的方法是采購(gòu)規(guī)模 — 吸引更多的司機(jī)，開到更多的城市，等等 ...

競(jìng)爭(zhēng)對(duì)手如Lyft，正在做這樣的事情，而且已經(jīng)融了20億美金。

事實(shí)上，Lyft的總裁 John 認(rèn)為，“在運(yùn)輸行業(yè)，尤其是我們的業(yè)務(wù)，有很強(qiáng)的網(wǎng)絡(luò)效應(yīng)，但只是一定的程度上。 ”具體來說，John發(fā)現(xiàn)，“一旦你能達(dá)到3分鐘內(nèi)接客，網(wǎng)絡(luò)上有更多的人并沒有什么額外的好處?！?/span>

看一看 Uber 泄露的財(cái)務(wù)數(shù)據(jù)，我們發(fā)現(xiàn)，在 2014 年第二季度他們 “ 銷售成本 ” 和 “ 運(yùn)營(yíng)和支持 ” 合計(jì) 4900 萬(wàn)美金，而對(duì)應(yīng)收入只有5800萬(wàn)美金。傳統(tǒng)的會(huì)計(jì)準(zhǔn)則會(huì)把這些作為可變成本，這和額外計(jì)為固定成本的的 1.15 億美金的營(yíng)銷成本、研發(fā)和一般開銷是分開的。

雖然文件沒有逐行列出費(fèi)用的明細(xì)，但是很容易推測(cè)，這些費(fèi)用的很大一部分都直接關(guān)系到他們的服務(wù)產(chǎn)品的拓展。例如，Uber在每一個(gè)新的城市啟動(dòng)時(shí)，它必須創(chuàng)建一個(gè)本地的團(tuán)隊(duì)來處理特定的政治、法規(guī)和消費(fèi)者的喜好。Uber也有可能花很多錢獲取新的司機(jī)，包括市場(chǎng)營(yíng)銷、獎(jiǎng)勵(lì)和獎(jiǎng)金、篩選和背景調(diào)查。最后，Uber要為司機(jī)提供保險(xiǎn)，這也是直接的邊際成本。

而如果像加利福尼亞州一樣的裁決 — 法官認(rèn)定Uber的司機(jī)實(shí)際上就是員工—在全國(guó)范圍內(nèi)被采納，那么邊際成本可能會(huì)飆升。據(jù)一些分析人士，如果提供醫(yī)療、失業(yè)、工傷，工資稅、401K、休假和報(bào)銷行使的里程、汽油和過路費(fèi)，邊際成本會(huì)提高一個(gè)數(shù)量級(jí)，公司為每個(gè)司機(jī)要額外支付1.3萬(wàn)美金(即 41 億美金一年)。

所以，雖然零邊際成本是技術(shù)公司獲得壟斷地位的主要要素之一，它在共享出行行業(yè)里并不存在。

但Uber遠(yuǎn)不是一個(gè)出租車服務(wù)公司， Uber可以做更多!

一些硅谷的專家會(huì)說，盯著出行共享市場(chǎng)是近視的，Uber將演變成一個(gè)通用的 “ 技術(shù)工具 ” ，將重新點(diǎn)燃網(wǎng)絡(luò)效應(yīng)的良性循環(huán)，一直達(dá)到全球壟斷。

例如，許多業(yè)內(nèi)人士認(rèn)為，Uber可以創(chuàng)建一個(gè)全方位服務(wù)的 “ 城市物流網(wǎng)絡(luò) ” ，完全擁有配送服務(wù)令人垂涎的 “ 最后一英里 ” 。隨著如 UberRUSH (快遞)， UberEATS (送外賣)和 UberCargo 服務(wù)(搬運(yùn))服務(wù)的推出，該公司似乎在向這個(gè)方向前進(jìn)。

Uber會(huì)立即獲得需求端的網(wǎng)絡(luò)效應(yīng)嗎?大多數(shù)人并不關(guān)心誰(shuí)提供了服務(wù)，只要他們能準(zhǔn)時(shí)趕到那里。所以這把我們帶到了我們開始的地方 ...... 有規(guī)模優(yōu)勢(shì)，但他們來自供給端?？紤]到市場(chǎng)的已有玩家如FedEx和 UPS 在這個(gè)市場(chǎng)的經(jīng)驗(yàn)和規(guī)模，競(jìng)爭(zhēng)可能不會(huì)像很多Uber多頭相信的那樣很快消失。如同F(xiàn)edEx首席執(zhí)行官弗雷德 · 史密斯說： “ 我認(rèn)為這只是一個(gè)城市神話，說Uber在某種程度上改變了物流行業(yè)的基本成本結(jié)構(gòu)。 ”

硅谷的價(jià)值投資?

當(dāng)Uber的口號(hào)從 “ 每個(gè)人的私人司機(jī) ” 改變?yōu)?“ 生活方式和物流的交匯”，毫無疑問，它這么做是把自己定位成科技公司，就像 Facebook ， LinkedIn 和 Twitter 一樣，認(rèn)為自己可以很容易利用網(wǎng)絡(luò)效應(yīng)的良性循環(huán)來壟斷市場(chǎng)。

因此，盡管共享出行市場(chǎng)和物流可能已經(jīng)進(jìn)化到不再是嚴(yán)格的模擬市場(chǎng)，(比如，它不會(huì)經(jīng)歷歷史上我們?cè)诰频?、航空公司?/ 或汽車租賃公司市場(chǎng)看到的競(jìng)爭(zhēng)程度)，但它也不是嚴(yán)格的 “ 數(shù)字化 ” 市場(chǎng)。只要網(wǎng)絡(luò)效應(yīng)留在供給側(cè)，只要擴(kuò)展需要邊際成本，只要監(jiān)管的威脅仍然存在，那么Uber就不可能成為一個(gè)真正的壟斷者，像一些硅谷內(nèi)部人士希望的那樣。

事實(shí)上，正如John指出的， Lyft “ 在所有排名前 20 位的市場(chǎng)正獲得越來越多的份額 ” ，如果一個(gè)玩家有完全的壟斷地位，這是不可能發(fā)生的。

因此，考慮到所有這些潛在的競(jìng)爭(zhēng) — 事實(shí)上，共享出行和物流市場(chǎng)都可能可以支持多個(gè)競(jìng)爭(zhēng)對(duì)手，這對(duì)Uber有什么影響?是否值得700億美金的價(jià)格?

好吧，我現(xiàn)在不會(huì)對(duì)這個(gè)發(fā)表意見，但我要說的是，很多投資者，甚至是出了名的保守的紐約大學(xué)教授 Damodoran ，似乎也這么認(rèn)為。

但是，也許這一切里更重要的問題是：如果你相信Uber估值合理(或至少接近)，那么為什么 Lyft ，滴滴和 GrabTaxi 估值比它低很多?

畢竟，這些公司都建立了類似的基礎(chǔ)設(shè)施建設(shè)， Lyft 在 Uber 的老巢舊金山控制了 40 %以上的市場(chǎng)份額，收入是其1/4而估值是其 1/12; 滴滴號(hào)稱(注：因?yàn)橛鋹傎Y本投資了神州專車，為了保持中立，我只能呵呵一下，“號(hào)稱”)在利潤(rùn)豐厚的中國(guó)市場(chǎng)擁有 87 %的市場(chǎng)份額，估值是Uber的1/3 ; ，Ola，在印度市場(chǎng)號(hào)稱擁有80%的市場(chǎng)份額，估值才和 Lyft 差不多。

考慮到這些差異，也許是老派的價(jià)值投資在硅谷這個(gè)地方也有用武之地 …

附英文原文：

When top 3 player Sidecar closed earlier this year and sold its assets to GM, many pronounced the ride-sharing wars over and the prevailing wisdom seemed to suggest that Uber was destined to become a monopoly.

But recent multi-billion dollar investments in Lyft and Didi Chuxing have challenged that perception and caused many to wonder whether this market has room for more than one player…

The Silicon Valley Argument

An article written earlier this year in the New Yorker argues that industries driven by technology can’t support multiple players, and that competition in Silicon Valley trends toward one monopolistic winner.

The primary reason for this stems from the economics of network effects – a phenomenon where the value of a product or service increases with the number of people using it. Network effects are seen in companies such as Facebook, eBay and Skype; all virtual monopolies in their field.

A second reason for the existence of internet monopolies can be found in the economics of zero marginal cost distribution – a situation where an additional good or service can be produced without any increase in total cost. With the exception of the minimal cost of increased bandwidth, it’s largely free for Google or Snapchat to host another user.

Together, these two forces create a virtuous cycle. Once a service becomes popular, it creates additional consumer demand. Since the cost of distribution is largely zero, it’s easy to attract and onboard new customers to the service. These additional users make the offering more valuable and, in turn, attract even more users. This cycle continues and makes the internet a breeding ground for unfair competition.

When it comes to technology companies, law professor Tim Wu explains: “over the long haul, competition has been the exception, monopoly the rule”. That’s why we see so many near monopolies in the space, such as Facebook, Google, Wikipedia, LinkedIn, Craigslist, Amazon and Twitter. Indeed, at first glance, it seems that technology industries may be “winner-takes-all” markets.

This view is likely a large part of the reason that Uber is valued at 12x more than its nearest competitor Lyft, despite only having 4x the revenue.

The Emerging Counterpoint

With recent investments in Lyft and Didi Chuxing totaling over $2 billion, it seems like investors aren’t ready to throw in towel yet, and that’s probably wise given that there are two key faults underpinning the “winner-takes-all” theory discussed above.

As pointed out in this article on Quartz, the first mistake is not understanding that there are two different types of “network effects”.

The first is known as a “demand-side network effect”. In a demand-side network effect, the value of a product or service is directly increased by each additional user solely due to the addition of that user. Facebook is the perfect example of this – you join Facebook because all of your friends are on there. From an economic point of view, demand-side network effects are a game-changer, as even a small competitive lead can rapidly snowball into an entrenched competitive advantage.

The other type of network effect is known as a “supply-side network effect”. In a supply-side network effect, increased usage of a product or service has no influence on the direct utility for users, but it spawns the production of valuable complimentary goods and services. A great example of this can be seen with cell phone carriers. The more users a carrier has, the more money they can afford to spend on infrastructure. The better the infrastructure, the better the quality of service. In this case, the number of users is indirectly influencing the customer’s choice: although people may not join a carrier because their friends are on there, they are likely to join the carrier with the best service.

And that’s the case with Uber. The company’s competitive advantage largely stems from the number of drivers they have on the road and the number of cities they operate in. Both of these are supply-side benefits.

But while supply-side network effects definitely have their advantages, this is not a competitive edge that can’t be overcome. In this particular case, the way to challenge it is by Purchasing scale – attracting more drivers, opening in more cities, etc...

With $2 billion in funding to date, that’s exactly what competitors such as Lyft are doing.

Indeed, Lyft President John Zimmer agrees that, “in a transportation business, specifically our business, there are very strong network effects, but only to a point.” Specifically, Zimmer found that “once you hit three minute pickup times, there's no benefit to having more people on the network.'

The second mistake in the “winner-takes-all” theory is that, unlike many technology companies, Uber does not experience zero marginal cost distribution. While it is true that the company’s business model has eliminated a lot of the costs associated with a traditional taxi business, such as vehicles and vehicle maintenance, licenses, insurance, gas and driver compensation and benefits, there are costs to distribution that still exist.

Taking a look at Uber’s leaked financials, we see that in the second quarter of 2014 they listed $49 million in “cost of revenue” and “operations and support” against $57 million of revenue. Traditional accounting standards would assume that these are variable costs, which are separate from the additional $115 million in “fixed costs” of sales and marketing, R&D and general overhead.

While the document doesn’t break out expenses by line item, it’s easy to speculate that a large portion of these costs are directly tied to the expansion of their service offering. For instance, each time Uber launches in a new city, it has to create a local team to deal with the particular politics, regulations and consumer preferences of that environment. Uber also likely experiences substantial costs in the acquisition of new drivers, including marketing, incentives and bonuses, and screening and background checks. Finally, Uber now provides insurance to its drivers, and there’s a cost to that as well.

And if rulings such as the one in California - where a judge determined that an Uber driver was, in fact, an employee – gain national traction, then distribution costs could skyrocket. According to some anaLysts, offering health insurance, unemployment, worker’s compensation, payroll taxes, 401K, vacation time and reimbursement for miles, gas and tolls, could raise distribution costs by an order of magnitude, and cost the company an additional $13K per driver (or $4.1 billion per year).

So while zero marginal cost distribution is a key ingredient in the recipe for making a tech monopoly, it simply doesn’t exist in the ride-sharing industry.

In summary, investors are beginning to realize that the Silicon Valley view that ride-sharing is a “winner-take-all” market is flawed for two reasons: 1) the absence of demand-side network effects and 2) tangible marginal costs to distribution.

But Uber Has the Potential to be So Much More Than a Taxi-Service!

Some Silicon Valley pundits will argue that focusing on ride-sharing is myopic, and that Uber will evolve into an all-purpose “tech utility” that will re-ignite the virtuous cycle of network effects and pave the way to global domination.

For instance, many insiders believe that Uber can create a full service “urban logistics fabric” and completely own the coveted “l(fā)ast mile” of distribution. With services such as UberRUSH (courier), UberEATS (food delivery) and UberCargo (moving), the company seems to be heading in this direction.

But even if Uber is able to realize its dream of owning the “interdiv of lifestyle and logistics”, does this change the underlying economics?

Would Uber instantly gain demand-side network effects? Most people don’t care who delivers their packages, as long as they get there on time. So that leaves us where we started…there are advantages to scale, but they come from the supply side. And given that incumbents such as FedEx and UPS have both experience in this market AND scale, competition might not disappear as quickly as some Uber bulls would have you think. As FedEx CEO Fred Smith says “I think there’s just an urban mythology that [Uber] somehow changes the basic cost input of the logistics business”.

Would Uber instantly gain zero marginal cost distribution? No, it would face the same costs as discussed above.

Others believe that the emergence autonomous cars will hold the key to monopolistic power, but even that isn’t the panacea that some hold it out to be. If Uber continues on the path it seems to be heading now and takes ownership of these assets, then costs would likely increase. Even if it take the road that Lyft is travelling, and outsources the car ownership to someone else, there are still costs that are going to present themselves somewhere in the value chain. In parlance popularized by Milton Friedman, there’s “no free lunch” and delivery via any type of vehicle – even a solar powered self-driving one – is the exact opposite of zero marginal cost distribution.

If anything, as Uber aims to expand beyond its current offerings, competitors will have the time and space to perfect their own logistical framework and establish an advantage in the areas the Uber misses. Whether that’s FedEx, UPS, Instacart, Deliv, Amazon or Lyft is largely irrelevant – what matters is that there’s still room for competition.

In short, the maturation of technology and proliferation of options should serve as an opportunity for more players to enter the industry, not fewer.

Valley Value Investing?

When Uber changed its slogan from “everyone’s private driver” to “where lifestyle meets logistics” it undoubtedly did so to position itself as a “technology company” that, like Facebook, LinkedIn, and Twitter, could easily dominate its market with the virtuous cycle of network effects.

But let’s get serious for a second: It’s 2016, EVERY company with a chance of long-term success is, in one way or another, a “technology company”. If you’re not leveraging technology, you’re already dead.

So while the market for ride-sharing and logistics may have evolved to the point where it’s no longer strictly analog (i.e. it probably won’t experience the same level of competition that we’ve historically seen in hotels, airlines and / or rental car companies), it’s not strictly “DIGital” either. As long as the network effects remain on the supply-side, as long as there are costs to expansion and as long as the threat of regulation remains, then it’s unlikely that Uber will ever become a true monopoly in the way that some Silicon Valley insiders hope.

Indeed, as John Zimmer points out, Lyft is “gaining share in all top 20 markets” and that’s not what happens when one player has a complete monopoly.

So given all of this potential competition – the fact that both the ride-sharing and logistics market can likely support multiple competitors, where does that leave Uber? Is it worth the $70 billion price tag?

Well, I won’t opine on this right now, but what I will say is that a lot of its investors, and even the notoriously conservative NYU professor Aswath Damodoran, seem to think so.

But perhaps the more important question in all of this is the following: if you believe that Uber is fairly valued (or at least close to it), then why are Lyft, Ola, Didi Chuxing and GrabTaxi valued so low?

After all, these companies are all building a similar infrastructure, and Lyft controls over 40% of the market in Uber’s home turf of San Francisco and has a fourth of the revenues of Uber at 1/12th of the valuation; Didi Chuxing claims to control over 87% of the lucrative Chinese market and has 1/3rd of the valuation of Uber; and Ola claims 80% of the Indian market and has a value similar to Lyft.

Given these discrepancies, perhaps old-school value investing has a place in Silicon Valley after all…