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Why leaving the euro would still be bad for both Greece and the currency area
為什么說離開歐元對希臘和這個(gè)貨幣區(qū)來說仍舊是一件壞事

Jan 17th 2015 | From the print edition of The Economist

譯者：老狒狒

IN 2012 Greece held two elections which might have led to its exit from the euro zone. In the event, that was avoided—a good thing since the costs of a “Grexit” would almost certainly have outweighed any gains, not only for Greece but for the entire currency area. Now yet another election, on January 25th, threatens Greece's membership of the euro zone. What would Grexit entail this time? And does it make any more sense?

2012年，希臘舉行了兩次可能會導(dǎo)致該國離開歐元區(qū)的選舉。到頭來，退歐被避免了。這是好事，因?yàn)椤跋ＥD退歐”的代價(jià)幾乎肯定會超過任何所得，不僅對希臘來說是如此，對整個(gè)貨幣區(qū)也是如此。如今，定于1月25日的另一場選舉又在威脅希臘的歐元區(qū)成員國資格。那么，這一次的希臘退歐會帶來什么呢？是否還有其他影響？

The mechanics of Grexit would be straightforward. The change in currencies would be immediate as the government redenominated domestic assets and liabilities into drachma, most likely on a one-to-one basis with euros. The Greek central bank would be severed from the European Central Bank (ECB) in Frankfurt. Instead it would conduct Greek monetary policy, in drachma, through operations with banks whose domestic balance-sheets would now be in drachma, too.

希臘退歐的機(jī)制將是簡單明了的。隨著政府重新啟用德拉克馬來標(biāo)價(jià)其國內(nèi)資產(chǎn)和負(fù)債——極有可能是建立在1歐元兌換1德拉克馬的基礎(chǔ)上，貨幣方面的變化會是直接的。希臘央行會被剝離出法蘭克福的歐洲央行。它會轉(zhuǎn)而通過與其國內(nèi)資產(chǎn)負(fù)債表也使用德拉克馬計(jì)價(jià)的銀行之間的操作來指揮希臘的貨幣政策。

Though the starting-point might be parity between a euro and a drachma, the new currency would quickly depreciate. Estimates from the IMF in 2012 suggested that it would fall against the euro by 50%. Such a reduction could spur an eventual economic revival by making Greece more competitive. After Argentina severed its decade-long link with the dollar in 2002, it experienced several years of rapid growth, helped admittedly by a commodity-price boom that played to its strengths as an agricultural exporter. The hope would be that Greece could also exploit its improved competitiveness, especially by attracting more tourists.

盡管在一開始的時(shí)候，歐元和德拉克馬可能是平價(jià)的。但是，新貨幣會快速地貶值。 根據(jù)IMF在2012年的估算，德拉克馬會對歐元下跌50％。如此的縮水可能會因?yàn)樽屜ＥD變得更有競爭力而最終帶來一場經(jīng)濟(jì)復(fù)蘇。在阿根廷于2012年切斷其與美元長達(dá)十年之久的聯(lián)系后，該國曾經(jīng)歷了數(shù)年的快速增長，雖然這場快速增長被公認(rèn)為得到了可以發(fā)揮該國作為一個(gè)農(nóng)業(yè)出口國的力量的大宗商品價(jià)格上漲的幫助?，F(xiàn)在的希望是，希臘也能利用好他們已經(jīng)得到提高的競爭力，尤其是通過吸引更多游客的辦法。

Even so, there would be several drawbacks. Grexit would be a huge short-term shock to the economy. Reintroducing new notes and coins would take several months. This would be likely to create chaos, even though ever more people are making payments electronically. In all likelihood, Greece would have to leave the EU as well, which would cut it off from the bloc's single market (and regional financial assistance). Inflation would surge as soaring import prices rippled through the economy; the IMF's analysis in 2012 suggested that Greek domestic prices would rise by 35%. The uncertainties caused by Grexit would undermine both consumer and business confidence.

即便如此，希臘退歐依舊存在數(shù)個(gè)缺陷。希臘退歐會在短期內(nèi)對經(jīng)濟(jì)造成巨大的沖擊。重新引入新的貨幣會用去幾個(gè)月的時(shí)間。即便是越來越多的人正在讓支付電子化，這仍有可能造成混亂。希臘極有可能也要被迫離開歐盟，這會將該國從歐盟統(tǒng)一市場（和地區(qū)性財(cái)政援助）中分割出去。隨著飛漲的進(jìn)口價(jià)格傳導(dǎo)至整個(gè)經(jīng)濟(jì)體，通脹會大幅上升。IMF曾在2012年的分析中指出，希臘的國內(nèi)物價(jià)會上漲35％。希臘退歐所帶來的各種不確定性會動搖消費(fèi)者和商業(yè)的信心。


All of which makes an Argentina-style boom highly unlikely. The economy would probably be pushed back into recession, only a year after it had started to recover. The IMF estimated that Grexit would cause an already sliding economy to contract by an additional eight percentage points in 2012.

所有這一切讓一場阿根廷式的繁榮成為極不可能的事情。經(jīng)濟(jì)體可能會在開始復(fù)蘇后僅一年，就被推回到衰退之中。根據(jù)IMF在2012年的估算，希臘退歐會導(dǎo)致這個(gè)已經(jīng)處在下滑之中的經(jīng)濟(jì)體額外收縮8個(gè)百分點(diǎn)。

The uncertainties would persist as the Greek government found itself stuck in an Argentine-style legal imbroglio, making it impossible to borrow from abroad. Although the Greek government could redenominate domestic debt it could not do so for foreign debt. That burden, still in euros, would grow dramatically overnight in relation to the devalued drachma-based economy and the Greek tax base, which would make a fresh default unavoidable. Long legal battles would be inevitable, especially with private holders of the new Greek bonds issued in a restructuring in 2012, which were written under English law.

種種不確定性會隨著希臘政府發(fā)現(xiàn)自己深陷一場阿根廷式的法律糾紛之中而持續(xù)存在下去，這種情況會讓向國外借錢變得不可能。盡管希臘政府能重新對其國內(nèi)債務(wù)進(jìn)行計(jì)價(jià)，但是他們不能對國外債務(wù)做這種事。債務(wù)負(fù)擔(dān)，因?yàn)槿耘f以歐元計(jì)價(jià)，相對于以貶值的德拉克馬為基礎(chǔ)的經(jīng)濟(jì)和萎縮了的希臘稅基來說，會在非常短時(shí)間內(nèi)急劇加重，這會讓一場新的違約成為無法避免之事。漫長的法律斗爭將是不可避免的，尤其是同希臘在2012年的債務(wù)重組過程中發(fā)行的新債券的私人持有者之間的法律斗爭，因?yàn)檫@些新債券都是根據(jù)英國法制定的。

In some respects, Greece is better-placed now to cope with an exit than in 2012. According to the European Commission, the government ran a primary surplus (ie, before interest payments) of 2.7% of GDP in 2014, whereas two years earlier it was still heavily in deficit (3.6%). Greece's once forbiddingly large current-account deficit (which reached 15% of GDP in 2008) is more or less back in balance. Grexit would therefore not cause a sudden budgetary crunch, and the balance of payments would be more resilient to the immediate effects of rising import prices and would gain from bigger exports.

從其他一些方面來說，在應(yīng)對退歐這個(gè)問題上，希臘當(dāng)前的境況要好于2012年。據(jù)歐盟委員會，希臘政府的基本盈余（即支付利息之前的盈余）為該國2014年GDP的2.7%，而就在兩年前，該國還處于嚴(yán)重的入不敷出之中（赤字占2014年GDP的3.6%）。希臘曾經(jīng)一度令人望而生畏的巨額經(jīng)常賬戶赤字（2008年曾經(jīng)達(dá)到當(dāng)年GDP的15%）已經(jīng)多少回歸收支平衡。因此，希臘退歐不會引發(fā)一場突如其來的預(yù)算危機(jī)，同時(shí)，收支的平衡會對不斷上漲的進(jìn)口價(jià)格的直接影響更具彈性，并且會讓該國從出口的增加中有所收獲。

But Greece is also better placed than before to prosper within the euro zone. A sudden exit would set back a promising recovery. Following a savage recession, in which GDP shrank by 27% from its previous peak, the economy has been growing since the start of 2014. It is now much more competitive than before, following big falls in wage costs. The sheer size of Greek public debt, at 175% of GDP, is cause for concern. But in fact much of this is owed to other euro-zone countries, and these have provided hidden debt relief through extending maturities and charging minimally low interest rates. Interest payments have also been deferred for ten years on a big chunk of Greek debt. As a result, even though Greece's stock of debt is now much higher than before the crisis, its interest payments are lower: 4% of GDP compared with 5% in 2008, when the debt was 109% of GDP.

但是，希臘當(dāng)前在歐元區(qū)內(nèi)處境也比以前有所改善。突然的退出會推遲一場原本令人期盼的復(fù)蘇。在經(jīng)歷了一場GDP比其巔峰時(shí)期萎縮了27％的殘酷衰退后，自2014年開始，希臘經(jīng)濟(jì)就一直在增長。如今，在工資成本大幅降低后，競爭力比以前有了很大的提高。為GDP175％的希臘公共債務(wù)的龐大規(guī)模是擔(dān)心的原因所在。但是 ，實(shí)際上，這些債務(wù)大都是欠其他歐元區(qū)國家的，而且已經(jīng)通過延期和支付最低利率等方式提供了隱性的債務(wù)減免。大部分的希臘債務(wù)的利息支付也被延期了10年。因此，即便希臘當(dāng)前的巨額債務(wù)遠(yuǎn)遠(yuǎn)高于危機(jī)之前，但是因該支付的利息降低了。相比債務(wù)為GDP109%而應(yīng)當(dāng)支付的利息為GDP5%的2008年，現(xiàn)在應(yīng)該支付的利息為GDP的4％。

Beware Greeks bearing precedents
小心希臘成為先例

For the euro zone, the balance of benefits and costs is also unfavourable, though less so than in 2012. The gain for Greece's creditors from Grexit would be one of discipline. A departure would show that members of the currency club have to abide by its rules, sending a strong message to rebellious politicians elsewhere on the periphery to fall into line. The risk that Grexit might cause a wider break-up is lower than in 2012 thanks to various new defence mechanisms, including a permanent rescue fund and the readiness of the ECB to come to the aid of countries facing a buyers' strike on their government bonds.

對于歐元區(qū)來說，收獲與付出之間的平衡也是難以稱心如意的，盡管其程度比2012年減少了一些。希臘債權(quán)人從希臘退歐中的所得將是紀(jì)律方面的。分手將向外界展示，這個(gè)貨幣俱樂部的成員不得不恪守自己制定的紀(jì)律，這將是對歐元區(qū)外圍國家的反叛政客發(fā)出一個(gè)強(qiáng)烈的信息，目的就是讓他們就范。希臘退歐可能引發(fā)一場更大范圍解體的風(fēng)險(xiǎn)，已經(jīng)因?yàn)橐幌盗行碌姆烙鶛C(jī)制比2012年有所降低。這些新的防御機(jī)制包括一個(gè)永久性的救助基金以及歐洲央行對政府債券面臨買家攻擊的國家伸出援手的意愿。

Even so, Grexit would still be a shock. Its detrimental impact on an already weak economic recovery could cause GDP across the rest of the euro zone to be lower by 1.5% in 18 months' time than it would otherwise have been, according to JPMorgan Chase, a bank. Grexit would shatter the principle that membership of the single currency is for ever. A sell-off in the bonds of other countries that might appear susceptible would naturally follow. The euro zone might now cope better with Grexit, but the cost of showing that the currency club can fracture would still outweigh the gain of enforcing discipline.

即便如此，希臘退歐仍會是一場沖擊。據(jù)摩根大通估算，相比不退歐，退歐對已在微弱復(fù)蘇的經(jīng)濟(jì)的不利影響可能會導(dǎo)致歐元區(qū)其他國家的GDP在18個(gè)月內(nèi)下降1.5%。希臘退歐會徹底打碎“單一貨幣的成員國資格是永久的”這一原則。對其他可能是易受影響的國家的債券的拋售潮會隨之而來。如今，歐元區(qū)可能能夠更好地應(yīng)對希臘退歐，但是展示這個(gè)貨幣俱樂部可以破裂的代價(jià)依舊會超過執(zhí)行紀(jì)律所帶來的收獲。

From the print edition: Finance and economics