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【導(dǎo)讀】美聯(lián)儲(chǔ)宣布將退出QE3，是不是太早了？詳見(jiàn)下文。 Free exchange 自由貿(mào)易 Early retirement 提前退休
譯者：forestmoon ON OCTOBER 29th the Federal Reserve said it would end “QE3”: the programme of asset purchases it first announced in September 2012 and began shrinking last December. Quantitative easing, or the buying of assets with newly created money, has been the workhorse of monetary policy since rich-world interest rates fell almost to zero in 2008-09. Despite its expansive use since then, many still see it as an exotic and possibly dangerous monetary tool. They raise three pressing questions: did it work, did it have unacceptable side effects, and was the Fed right to stop? 10月29日 美聯(lián)儲(chǔ)宣布它將結(jié)束“QE3（第三輪量化寬松）”：一項(xiàng)資產(chǎn)購(gòu)置計(jì)劃，它在2012年9月第一次宣布開(kāi)始執(zhí)行，并于去年12月開(kāi)始收縮。量化寬松，或者說(shuō)用新創(chuàng)造的貨幣購(gòu)買(mǎi)資產(chǎn)，自從2008~2009年期間富裕國(guó)家的利率幾乎掉至0時(shí)，已經(jīng)成為貨幣政策的主力。盡管自從那時(shí)起它便被廣泛使用，但仍被認(rèn)為是一項(xiàng)獨(dú)特并且可能危險(xiǎn)的貨幣工具。他們提出了三項(xiàng)緊迫的問(wèn)題：它有效嗎，它是否有可接受的副作用，美聯(lián)儲(chǔ)結(jié)束它的決策是否正確？ Though QE is often described as an “unconventional” form of monetary policy (as opposed to mundane adjustments to interest rates), it has actually been in use for some time. The Federal Reserve tried it from 1932 to 1936, and the Bank of Japan in the early 2000s. Both have used it again since the financial crisis, along with the Bank of England. 雖然QE經(jīng)常被描述為一個(gè)“沒(méi)有爭(zhēng)議的”貨幣政策形式（相比較于對(duì)利率的普通的調(diào)整），它實(shí)際上已經(jīng)被用了不少次了。美聯(lián)儲(chǔ)從1932~1936年期間就曾試圖用過(guò)，日本銀行在21世紀(jì)初期也曾用過(guò)。這兩個(gè)自金融危機(jī)伊始便又一次和英格蘭銀行一起采用了。 QE is thought to work in a few ways. Early in the recession asset purchases were primarily intended to ease credit by directing a firehose of liquidity into fearful markets. Other effects became more important over time, such as portfolio rebalancing. A bank that has sold bonds to the Fed will typically wish to spend the proceeds to buy some other asset. When banks buy new securities, the newly created money flows through the system, raising asset prices and reducing interest rates. That, in turn, should boost demand by making investment more attractive. If banks buy foreign assets, that may weaken the exchange rate, giving a boost to exporters. Finally, QE is also thought to work as a signal: research suggests that it reinforces central banks’ policy guidance, making promises to keep rates low more credible, for instance. QE被認(rèn)為從以下幾個(gè)方面其效果。在衰退的初始階段，資產(chǎn)購(gòu)置的初衷是為了通過(guò)在充滿(mǎn)恐懼情緒的市場(chǎng)中布置一個(gè)流動(dòng)性的消防帶來(lái)放松信貸。其它的效果將隨著時(shí)間推移變得更加重要，比如，資產(chǎn)組合的再平衡。一個(gè)把債券賣(mài)個(gè)美聯(lián)儲(chǔ)的銀行，很典型地，希望能夠花費(fèi)這個(gè)債券衍生出的收益來(lái)購(gòu)買(mǎi)其它資產(chǎn)。當(dāng)銀行買(mǎi)了新的有價(jià)證券時(shí)，新創(chuàng)造的貨幣將流向整個(gè)體系，提升資產(chǎn)價(jià)格，降低利率水平。這又進(jìn)一步通過(guò)使投資更有吸引力來(lái)提升需求。如果銀行買(mǎi)了國(guó)外的資產(chǎn)，這將降低匯率，刺激出口者。最后，QE也被視為一個(gè)信號(hào)：研究表明，它增強(qiáng)了中央銀行的政策指導(dǎo)，例如，使維持低利率的承諾更為可信。 QE’s detractors point out that central banks around the rich world have expanded their balance-sheets by trillions of dollars in recent years (see chart), yet are still nurturing lacklustre recoveries. Nonetheless, there is a consensus among researchers that QE has indeed lowered borrowing costs, and thus increased both economic output and inflation, as its advocates intended. In both America and Britain, for instance, several studies have concluded that it helped to lower interest rates. Those declines are generally held to have boosted economic growth. Recent work by Martin Weale and Tomasz Wieladek of the Bank of England found that for every 1% of GDP the Fed spent on bonds, both real output and inflation rose by about a third of a percentage point. Given how close so many economies now are to outright deflation, even a small boost to inflation is not to be sneered at. QE的批評(píng)者們支出，富國(guó)的中央銀行這些年已經(jīng)數(shù)以十億美元計(jì)地?cái)U(kuò)展了他們的資產(chǎn)負(fù)債表（見(jiàn)圖），卻仍然在給毫無(wú)生機(jī)的恢復(fù)過(guò)程輸送養(yǎng)分。盡管如此，研究者中已經(jīng)形成了一個(gè)共識(shí)，即QE確實(shí)降低了借貸成本，并因此增加了經(jīng)濟(jì)的產(chǎn)出和通脹，正如它的鼓吹者們宣稱(chēng)的那樣。比如，在美國(guó)和英國(guó)，不少研究已經(jīng)證實(shí)，它有益于降低利率，這一般可以促進(jìn)經(jīng)濟(jì)增長(zhǎng)。英格蘭銀行的Martin Weale 和 Tomasz Wieladek 的最新研究發(fā)現(xiàn)，美聯(lián)儲(chǔ)在債券上花費(fèi)的每1%的GDP，不論實(shí)際產(chǎn)出還是通脹，都將提升大約0.3個(gè)百分點(diǎn)?？紤]到那么多經(jīng)濟(jì)體如此地接近于完全通縮，哪怕一個(gè)小小的通脹提升都不可小覷。 Why haven’t central banks done more in that case? Excessive optimism is one reason; the Fed, for example, has repeatedly overestimated how quickly the American economy was likely to grow. The fear of possible side effects has also stayed central bankers’ hands. In some cases, those are subsiding: claims that the new trillions coursing through the economy would lead to hyper-inflation no longer seem credible, given how static prices remain. Central bankers are also increasingly confident that their pneumatic balance-sheets will not interfere with conventional monetary policy. The Fed, for instance, has begun paying interest on the excess reserves banks keep with it. By raising that rate it can attract extra reserves and thus curb bank lending. 為什么中央銀行沒(méi)有在那種情況下做得更多呢？過(guò)度樂(lè)觀(guān)主義是一個(gè)原因；例如，美聯(lián)儲(chǔ)不停地高估美國(guó)經(jīng)濟(jì)體有可能增長(zhǎng)多么迅速的可能性。對(duì)有可能產(chǎn)生的副作用的擔(dān)心同樣使央行投鼠忌器。在一些案例中，這些論點(diǎn)正在平息：宣稱(chēng)新的萬(wàn)億注入經(jīng)濟(jì)體將導(dǎo)致惡性通貨膨脹，在價(jià)格如此穩(wěn)定的情況下，已經(jīng)變得不那么可信。中央銀行正在對(duì)他們的充氣式膨脹的資產(chǎn)負(fù)債表將與傳統(tǒng)的貨幣政策不沖突變得更加有信心。例如，美聯(lián)儲(chǔ)已經(jīng)開(kāi)始對(duì)銀行持有的超額準(zhǔn)備金支付利息。提升這個(gè)利率，它將吸引更多的儲(chǔ)備金并因此控制銀行信貸。 The worry that QE is generating dangerous financial instability has been more persistent. Jeremy Stein, who served on the Fed’s Board of Governors from 2012 to 2014, thinks that persistently low interest rates have caused investors to embrace frighteningly risky assets in a search for yield. If QE spurs the construction of a financial house of cards, the argument runs, its eventual collapse may hurt more than QE ever helped. 對(duì)QE是否產(chǎn)生危險(xiǎn)的金融動(dòng)蕩的擔(dān)憂(yōu)則更為持久。曾于2012~2014年在美聯(lián)儲(chǔ)委員會(huì)效力的Jeremy Stein，認(rèn)為持續(xù)的低利率將導(dǎo)致投資者更熱衷于令人害怕的高風(fēng)險(xiǎn)資產(chǎn)以追逐利潤(rùn)。爭(zhēng)論稱(chēng)，如果QE刺激了這種不切實(shí)際的金融體系的建造，它將最終坍塌，并造成遠(yuǎn)比QE帶來(lái)的好處多得多的危害。 Risk-maker or risk-taker? These fears will be difficult to judge until more time has passed, yet there are good reasons to believe they are overstated. Most central bankers insist they have the regulatory tools to keep excessive risk-taking in check (although their recent record in that respect is inglorious). Recent research by Gabriel Chodorow-Reich of Harvard University finds that the “reach for yield” QE has prompted has been modest relative to its benefits. Asset purchases helped recapitalise ailing banks, he reckons, and higher asset values have dampened the incentive to make risky bets. Anyway, it is important to weigh QE’s risks against those of other policies. Were the European Central Bank to resort to QE, it might lead to undue risk-taking, but if the policy also reduced the odds of a catastrophic break-up of the euro it would be worthwhile. 風(fēng)險(xiǎn)制造者還是風(fēng)險(xiǎn)承擔(dān)者？ 短期內(nèi)對(duì)這些擔(dān)心難以判斷，但有充分理由相信它們被夸大了。許多中央銀行堅(jiān)持他們?cè)诤怂阒杏斜O(jiān)管工具以避免過(guò)度的風(fēng)險(xiǎn)承擔(dān)（雖然他們?cè)谶@方面過(guò)去的記錄是不光彩的）。哈佛大學(xué)的Gabriel Chodorow-Reich最近的研究發(fā)現(xiàn)，QE促進(jìn)的“拿來(lái)收益”相比于其好處，已經(jīng)比較適度了。他還認(rèn)為，資產(chǎn)購(gòu)置幫助狀態(tài)不佳的銀行重新積累資本，且更高的資產(chǎn)價(jià)值幫助弱化做高風(fēng)險(xiǎn)賭注的動(dòng)機(jī)。歐洲央行是將求助于QE，它可能導(dǎo)致超預(yù)期的風(fēng)險(xiǎn)承擔(dān)，但如果政策也降低了歐元崩潰風(fēng)險(xiǎn)的概率，那么也是值得的。 Critics’ third complaint is that QE raises inequality. Asset purchases, naturally, raise asset prices. Since the rich own most financial assets, QE tends to increase inequality through the “portfolio” channel. Yet to the extent that QE boosts growth, it reduces inequality, for joblessness is regressive: poorer workers suffer higher unemployment rates and more significant loss of income in weak economies. Higher inflation also makes debts easier to bear, because they can be repaid with money that is worth less. Since borrowers tend to be poorer than creditors, QE diminishes inequality in that way too. Recent research suggests that tight monetary policy tends to raise inequality while expansionary policy reduces it. 批評(píng)者的第三個(gè)抱怨是，QE加劇了不平等。資產(chǎn)購(gòu)置，一般提升了資產(chǎn)價(jià)格。因?yàn)楦蝗藫碛写蠖鄶?shù)的金融資產(chǎn)，QE傾向于通過(guò)資產(chǎn)組合的渠道加劇不平等。然而在某種程度上，QE促進(jìn)了增長(zhǎng)，也減少了不平等，因?yàn)槭I(yè)更有危害性：脆弱經(jīng)濟(jì)體中貧窮的勞動(dòng)者遭受了更高的失業(yè)率，以及更為顯著的收入減少。更高的通脹也使得負(fù)債更容易忍受，因?yàn)檫@些負(fù)債可以被價(jià)值更少的錢(qián)來(lái)償還。既然出借者變得比借入者更窮，那么QE從這個(gè)意義上也減少了不平等。最近的研究表明更緊的貨幣政策傾向于提升不平等，同時(shí)擴(kuò)張性的政策將減弱。 If QE works and its potential costs are overstated, should the Fed not keep at it? Those cheering its demise note that growth has been strong and steady for most of 2014, and that unemployment, at 5.9%, is near its long-term average. Yet history suggests that leaving QE behind is never simple. As long as interest rates remain near zero any nasty new development will force the Fed to resume it or stand by while the economy deteriorates. And low and falling expectations of inflation suggest that markets doubt the Fed’s ability to leave Japan-style stagnation behind. A premature exit from QE3 is a good way to make sure there is a QE4. 如果QE有效果并且它的潛在成本被夸大了，那么美聯(lián)儲(chǔ)是否需要繼續(xù)施行呢？那些對(duì)QE終止而歡呼的人發(fā)現(xiàn)，增長(zhǎng)在2014年的大多數(shù)時(shí)間變得強(qiáng)有力，并且失業(yè)率，5.9%的水平，已經(jīng)接近于它的長(zhǎng)期平均水平。但歷史表明把QE放在身后從來(lái)不是簡(jiǎn)單的。既然利率保持在0附近，任何令人不快的新進(jìn)展將逼迫美聯(lián)儲(chǔ)繼續(xù)實(shí)行，或站在一邊看著經(jīng)濟(jì)垮掉。并且，對(duì)通脹的低且持續(xù)下降的預(yù)期也表明，市場(chǎng)懷疑美聯(lián)儲(chǔ)拜托日本式滯漲的能力。一個(gè)QE3的過(guò)早的退出，是一個(gè)很好的辦法確認(rèn)還將有一個(gè)QE4. 【譯者注】 量化寬松政策：簡(jiǎn)單理解就是“印錢(qián)”。其中量化指的是擴(kuò)大一定數(shù)量的貨幣發(fā)行，寬松就是減少銀行儲(chǔ)備必須注資的壓力。當(dāng)銀行和金融機(jī)構(gòu)的有價(jià)證券被央行收購(gòu)時(shí)，新發(fā)行的錢(qián)幣便被成功地投入到私有銀行體系。 2014年10月29日，美國(guó)結(jié)束了維持兩年之久第三輪量化寬松政策，并重申將會(huì)在相當(dāng)長(zhǎng)一段時(shí)間保持利率在當(dāng)前低位。分析人士普遍認(rèn)為，美國(guó)退出QE可能會(huì)促使國(guó)際資本回流美國(guó)，但對(duì)中國(guó)資本流動(dòng)不會(huì)產(chǎn)生太大影響，中國(guó)央行穩(wěn)健的貨幣政策基調(diào)不會(huì)有太大改變。（來(lái)自百度百科） |
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