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Tesco and accounting 特易購與會計 Feeding the beast 喂養(yǎng)野獸 Oct 23rd 2014, 10:55 BY BUTTONWOOD 譯者：chyuju1010 IN HER excellent play about Enron,Lucy Prebble portrays the shadow companies set up by the energy giantas raptors, kept in the basement, but endlessly needing to be fed. It is hardnot to think of that scene when reading Tesco's interim results today,which show a fall in pre-tax profits of 92%. The key part ofthe statement is that amounts have been pulled forward or deferred, contrary to Tesco Group accounting policies; there have been similar practices in prior reporting periods; the current and prior practices appear to be linked as income pulled forward grew period by period 在露西·普雷布（Lucy Prebble）關于安然公司（Enron）的戲劇中，她將這家能源巨頭的影子公司描述成猛禽，雖然它被關在地下室，卻需要主人不斷地喂養(yǎng)。今天特易購的中期業(yè)績出來后，很難不去想象那樣一種場景，因為報告顯示特易購的稅前利潤下降了92%！報告中的關鍵部分是： 大量營收被提前列入或者成本被延遲計算，這不符合特易購集團的會計規(guī)則。在先前的報告期間也存在相似操作；提前計入的收入一期一期增加，這似乎是當前操作和先前操作相關聯(lián)之處。 Full details will await the Financial Conduct Authority's investigation. But anyone who has studied corporate accounts will realise this is one of two familiar issues; profits are recognised earlyand/or costs are recognised late. It is easy to see how the problem snowballs.Say the company is struggling to meet a quarterly earnings target. Profitsare brought forward and the target is met. But of course those profits would have accrued in subsequent quarters so new wheezes need to be found to keep profits rising. 更多的細節(jié)需要等到金融市場行為監(jiān)管局調(diào)查后才知道。但是每個學過公司會計的人會馬上意識到這是兩個相似問題中的一種：提早確認成本、延遲確認收入。我們可以很明顯看出特易購的問題已經(jīng)像滾雪球般存在很久了。也就是說該公司一直在努力掙扎，希望達到季度利潤目標。所以利潤被提前計入，這樣目標就實現(xiàn)了。當然了，這些利潤需要在接下來的季度里實現(xiàn)，因而為了確保利潤能夠增長，公司需要尋找新的招術。 The problem is that accounting is a very subjective business. If you sell goods, some may be faulty and need returning, which will hurt profits. But what proportion? And when?These are not answers to which the question can reliably be known in advance.Under pressure, it is easy to take the optimistic view. 但問題在于會計是一個主觀性很強的事務。如果你銷售商品，一些可能會損壞并且需要召回，這會削弱利潤。但是有多少會損壞呢？它們會發(fā)生在什么時候呢？這些答案不是我們可以在事先就能得到可靠結(jié)果的那種。在這種壓力下，采取樂觀的態(tài)度是很容易的。 There is a revealing passage in the autobiography of Jack Welch, onetime head of GE, about the Kidder Peabody scandal (when a rogue trader at the group's investment banking subsidiary lost thegroup $350m) which shows how subjective accounts canbe. He wrote that The response of our business leaders to the crisis was typical of the GE culture. Even though the books had closed on the quarter, many immediately offered to pitch in to cover the Kidder gap.Some said they could find an extra $10m, $20m, and even $30m from their businesses to offset the surprise. 通用的前任執(zhí)行官杰克·韋爾奇（JackWelch）在他的自傳里有談到季德爾·皮博迪（Kidder Peabody）丑聞（當時集團投資銀行子公司的一名流氓交易員讓集團損失了3.5億美元），書中揭示了會計可以變得多么主觀。他寫道： 商業(yè)領導對危機的反應具有典型的通用文化特點。即使季度賬簿已經(jīng)編制完，很多人立馬提出可以幫助公司消掉季德爾所帶來的損失。一些人說他們可以從他們的業(yè)務中獲得到額外的一千萬，兩千萬甚至三千萬，從而沖銷這起令人咋舌的丑聞。 Readers should bedeeply cynical of suggestions that accounts are much more reliable these days and that therefore historic valuation measures, like the cyclically-adjusted or Shiller price-earning ratio, are irrelevant. First, this is very hard to believe in an era when the short-term incentive to meet quarterly earnings target is so high, because executive share options depend on it; whywould this lead to less accounting manipulation than the mid-20th century when the average holding period for investors was measured in years, not months, and executives got paid regardless of the share price? 讀者應當憤慨那種說現(xiàn)代會計準則如今更加可靠的言論，以及那種關于歷史成本計價法無關緊要的說法，這些方法有周期調(diào)整或者席勒（Shiller）的市盈率。第一點是，我們很難相信我們身處的時代，給予高層行政人員完成季度利潤的短期激勵如此之高，因為他們的股份認購依賴于利潤。為什么這會造成比20世紀中期更少的會計操縱呢？當時投資者平均持有股票時間以年為單位，而不是月份，而且不管股價如何，高層行政人員都能得到收入。 One study,for example, found that nearly half of all companies shifted their financial year end by a month or two between 1993 and 2008. When this happens Companies tend to report disproportionately high recurring operating expenses, such as the cost of goods sold, as well as high selling, general and administrative expenses (SGA) in the missing months, the study found. In fact, asubset of 224 companies in the study reported an an average extra after-tax loss equal to 4.7 percent of beginning book value of equity per month in themissing-month period. 舉例來說，有一項研究發(fā)現(xiàn)在1993年和2008年，幾乎一半公司改變了它們的財政結(jié)算日期，，一般相差一個月或兩個月。當這種情況發(fā)生時： 研究發(fā)現(xiàn)，公司在“缺失的月份”里傾向于不合比例地報道高額的經(jīng)常性運營支出，如商品銷售成本，銷售費用，一般費用和管理費用。事實上，研究的224個公司中的一些，與最初賬簿中的所有者權益相比，他們在“缺失的月份”期間平均多出4.7%的稅后損失。 A further irony is that analysts want to eliminate the 2008 earnings numbers from the Shiller comparisonbecause they artificially deflate the figures. One would have thought that aperiod of steadily rising profits, followed by a collapse, is apretty good indicator that earnings manipulation is afoot. James Montier of GMO dealt fairly neatly with this issue in a recent note (this is a link to the website, look for the CAPE crusader piece) 一件極具反諷的事情是分析師們試圖從席勒模型比較中刪除2008年的收入數(shù)字，因為他們?nèi)藶榈貕旱土藬?shù)字。當一個人預期有增長的利潤而結(jié)果卻是滑鐵盧，這當然是利潤操縱會醞釀而生的絕佳信號。最近GMO的James Montier在處理這個問題上就做的十分漂亮。 Another current criticism of theShiller P/E is that the impact of goodwill impairment accounting (FASB 142) has led to a situation in which earnings are much more volatile than has been thecase historically, thus invalidating the earnings series that underpins the calculation. 關于席勒市盈率當前的另一個批評是商譽減損會計準則（FASA 142條）的沖擊已經(jīng)造成了一種情況，在這種情況下，收入比以往具有更大的波動性，因此使基于收入序列的計算變得無效。 To some extent this criticism isalready rebutted by the analysis above: 10-year average earnings are significantly above their trend. This is not suggestive of a situation whereby average earnings are being dragged down by the very low numbers recorded duringthe Global Financial Crisis. Much as it is tempting for those of a bullish nature to focus on the extent of the drawdown in earnings in 2008, they happily ignore the peak levels of earnings seen before the crisis, or indeed the rapid recovery in earnings (helped as it was by the suspension of FASB 157 onfinancials’ mark-to-market assets). This is why we average – it smooths out the highs and lows. 但在某種程度上這種批評已經(jīng)被上述分析駁倒：十年平均收入明顯超過他們的預測。這并不包括全球危機期間被嚴重拖垮的收入數(shù)據(jù)。正如那些傾向于看漲的人喜歡盯住2008年收入削減的程度，他們也容易快樂地就忽視了危機前的高潮，或者之后快速的恢復（FASB 157公允價值計量的暫停使用幫助了恢復）。這就是為什么我們平均化——它剃除了高潮和低谷。 The volatility of reported (GAAP)earnings is neatly captured in a paper thatcompares them with the profits numbers reported in the national accounts(NIPA). It finds that 在一篇比較由GAAP（一般公認會計原則）方式計量的收入和NIPA（美國：國民收入和生產(chǎn)賬戶）方式計量利潤的文章中，GAAP原則下收入的波動性被很好的分析了。它發(fā)現(xiàn)： Using a sample of aggregate GAAP and NIPA earnings over 1950-2010, the main findings are as follows. GAAP and NIPA earnings are in remarkable sync in the early years, with similar means and standard deviations, and with earnings changes correlating at 0.89 during1950-1980. This close relation greatly deteriorates, however, during the secondhalf of the sample, 1981-2010. While the behavior of NIPA earnings remain sroughly the same over these two periods, the volatility of GAAP earnings increases ten-fold,and the correlation between GAAP and NIPA earnings changes falls to 0.35. Additional tests reveal that the increase in the volatility of GAAP earnings is mostly due to rapid earnings reversals, and especially the effectof large transient items during economic downturns 利用1950年至2010年GAAP和NIPA收入中的一些樣本，主要發(fā)現(xiàn)如下：早期GAAP和NIPA收入數(shù)據(jù)明顯同步，有著相似的均值和標準差，1950年至1980年相關系數(shù)達到0.89。然而在后半期的樣本中，也就是1981年至2010年，這種緊密聯(lián)系開始遭遇破壞。NIPA計算下的收入基本上平穩(wěn)，而GAAP下的收入波動性上升十倍，二者之間的相關性跌落至0.35.另外一些測試發(fā)現(xiàn)了GAAP收入的波動性很大程度由于快速的收入逆轉(zhuǎn)，特別是由于經(jīng)濟衰退中大量臨時項目帶來的影響。 Some of this volatility may indeedbe down to the use of mark-to-market accounting which means that changes in asset prices can affect the numbers. But why should that make one more relaxed about today's profits? First, the last 15 years have shown is that asset prices can change abruptly and second, central banks have done their best to prop up asset prices since 2008. Bulls also argue that there is no need to worry about the high ratio of US corporate profits to GDP because it is partly down to overseas profits. But that is another oddargument when the main worry in the markets is that the US economy is doing so much better than elsewhere. 一些波動性確實要歸因于使用每日盯市的會計準則，這種原則意味著資產(chǎn)價格的變動可以影響收入。但是為什么這樣會讓一個人更樂意關注今天的利潤呢？第一，過去的十五年已經(jīng)表明資產(chǎn)價格可能會突然急劇變化；第二，08年伊始中央銀行已經(jīng)盡全力支撐資產(chǎn)價格。持牛市觀點的人爭論說沒必要擔心美國公司利潤與GDP比率相當高，因為這部分源于美國有大量的海外利潤。但這又是另外一個奇怪的觀點，因為市場上一個蔓延的擔憂就是為什么美國經(jīng)濟的表現(xiàn)比其他經(jīng)濟體好這么多。 What investors should take fromthe Tesco saga is a degree of caution. That Britain's premier retailer, one ofthe most widely held stocks that is followed by almost 50 analysts can restate its profits so dramatically, is a sign that it can happen anywhere. 曾經(jīng)傳奇的特易購公司所賜予的傳奇事件，投資者應當從中學會謹慎。這家英國領先的零售商，它還是近50位分析師跟蹤分析且被廣泛持有股份中的一只，如果它能這么令人震驚地重新陳述利潤，那明顯暗示著其他任何地方也會發(fā)生這種情景。 譯者注： Missing months:這是公司變更財務結(jié)算日期的過度期間，一般是一兩個月。這段期間不被計入季度報表中。2008年高盛成為銀行控股公司后，將財務結(jié)算日期由11月改到12月，即所謂的日歷年度（CalendarYear）。12月份高盛報出13億美元的損失，而2009年一季度卻有26億美元的收入。這引起了《紐約時報》首席金融記者FloydNorris的注意。后來兩位耶魯大學教授KaiDu和FrankZhang發(fā)表了一篇論文：Orphans Deserve Attention:FinancialReporting in the Missing Months.即文中所說的研究。這在某種程度引起了一些注視。根據(jù)他們研究，很多公司都采取過變更結(jié)算日期策略。而在過度期間，即Missingmonths(或stubperiod,或orphanmonths),都會出現(xiàn)大量的成本支出。而這又不會算在新的季度報表里，賣方分析師、數(shù)據(jù)庫以及媒體對MissingMonths都不太關心（另一原因是企業(yè)采取小心的策略使之被忽視或推遲發(fā)布），而公眾的投資策略常常依賴這些人和媒體，所以問題顯得比較嚴重。事實上，當企業(yè)申請變更結(jié)算日期，美國國稅局（IRS）并需要企業(yè)提供任何理由。這在CFO網(wǎng)站有報道，譯者亦親自下載美國國稅局申請表查驗之，確實如此。 Correlating：相關性，即correlation coefficient，相關系數(shù)。統(tǒng)計學相關術語，一般是字母R(r)。取值范圍在-1和1之間，符號代表相關方向。其絕對值越大說明相關性越強。 |r|>0.95 存在顯著性相關； |r|≥0.8 高度相關； 0.5≤|r|<0.8 中度相關； 0.3≤|r|<0.5 低度相關； Tesco:特易購，英國零售商。位列于美國Wal-mart，法國Carrefour之后的全球第三大零售商。它在英國成長迅速，所以作者稱作它Saga不僅為他個人觀點，但會計事件也堪稱奇跡，所以這里面一語雙關，極具反諷之意。特易購財務報表遭受重創(chuàng)是因為旗下一些部門造假，即所謂的需要被喂養(yǎng)的影子公司。另外，譯者經(jīng)驗，特易購旗下的樂購超市里面一大特色是酒類非常豐富
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