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Investment management 投資管理 The rise of BlackRock In 25 years, BlackRock has become the world's biggest investor. Is its dominance a problem? 經(jīng)過(guò)25年的發(fā)展，貝萊德已成為全球最大的投資者。它那種呼風(fēng)喚雨的能力是一個(gè)問(wèn)題嗎？ Dec 7th 2013 | From the print edition  ASK conspiracy theorists who they think really runs the world, and they will probably point to global banks, such as Citigroup, Bank of America and JPMorgan Chase. Oil giants such as Exxon Mobil and Shell may also earn a mention. Or perhaps they would focus on the consumer-goods firms that hold billions in their thrall: Apple, McDonald's or Nestlé. 誰(shuí)在真正地控制著這個(gè)世界？陰謀論者會(huì)說(shuō)：是跨國(guó)銀行，是石油巨頭，或者是消費(fèi)品公司中的巨無(wú)霸；是花旗、美銀、摩根大通，是埃克森-美孚，是殼牌，是兜里揣著數(shù)十億美元的蘋(píng)果、麥當(dāng)勞和雀巢。 One firm unlikely to feature on their list is BlackRock, an investment manager whose name rings few bells outside financial circles. Yet it is the single biggest shareholder in all the companies listed above. It owns a stake in almost every listed company not just in America but globally. (Indeed, it is the biggest shareholder in Pearson, in turn the biggest shareholder in The Economist.) Its reach extends further: to corporate bonds, sovereign debt, commodities, hedge funds and beyond. It is easily the biggest investor in the world, with $4.1 trillion of directly controlled assets (almost as much as all private-equity and hedge funds put together) and another $11 trillion it oversees through its trading platform, Aladdin (see article). 不過(guò)，有一家公司不會(huì)出現(xiàn)在他們的名單上，那就是：貝萊德。作為一家資產(chǎn)管理公司，貝萊德并不為金融圈之外的人所熟知。但它卻是上述大公司的最大單一股 東。它幾乎在每一家上市公司中都有股份，不管它們是美國(guó)的還是別的國(guó)家的。實(shí)際上，它還是培生公司的第一大股東，因而也就是本刊的第一大股東。它的觸角還 伸向了更多領(lǐng)域，如企業(yè)債券、主權(quán)債務(wù)、商品期貨、對(duì)沖基金，不一而足。它直接掌管的資產(chǎn)價(jià)值已達(dá)4.1萬(wàn)億美元，幾乎是對(duì)沖基金和私募股權(quán)基金的總和，另外它還通過(guò)自己的交易平臺(tái)—— 阿拉丁間接掌控著11萬(wàn)億美元的資產(chǎn)。貝萊德無(wú)疑是當(dāng)今世界上最大的投資者。 Established in 1988 by a group of Wall Streeters led by Larry Fink, BlackRock succeeded in part by offering “passive” investment products, such as exchange-traded funds, which aim to track indices such as the S&P 500. These are cheap alternatives to traditional mutual funds, which often do more to enrich money managers than clients (though BlackRock offers plenty of those, too). The sector continues to grow fast, and BlackRock, partly through its iShares brand, is the largest competitor in an industry where scale brings benefits. Its clients, ranging from Arab sovereign-wealth funds to mom-and-pop investors, save billions in fees as a result. 這家由拉里·芬克牽頭，數(shù)位華爾街金融家在1988年聯(lián)合創(chuàng)建的公司之所以能有今天，其中一部分原因就在于他們給顧客提供了一種“被動(dòng)型”的投資產(chǎn)品，這 種產(chǎn)品類似于交易所交易基金，以跟蹤像標(biāo)普500這樣的指數(shù)為投資目標(biāo)。作為傳統(tǒng)的共同基金的替代品，被動(dòng)型投資產(chǎn)品的特點(diǎn)是費(fèi)用低廉。而這一點(diǎn)也就決定 了，常常是資金管理人而不是客戶（雖然貝萊德也沒(méi)少給客戶掙錢(qián)）才是此類產(chǎn)品的受益者。這是一種規(guī)模帶來(lái)利潤(rùn)的產(chǎn)業(yè)。借助于此類產(chǎn)品持續(xù)而快速的發(fā)展，并 且還通過(guò)自己的iShare品牌，貝萊德已經(jīng)成為這一行業(yè)中的最大競(jìng)爭(zhēng)者，它已經(jīng)為自己上至海灣國(guó)家主權(quán)財(cái)富基金下至缺乏經(jīng)驗(yàn)的中小投資者的客戶節(jié)省了數(shù) 十億美元的費(fèi)用。 The other reason for its success is its management of risk in its actively managed portfolio. Early on, for instance, it was a leader in mortgage-backed securities. But because it analysed their riskiness zipcode by zipcode, it not only avoided a bail-out in the chaos that followed the collapse of Lehman, but also advised the American government and others on how to keep the financial system ticking in the darkest days of 2008, and picked up profitable money-management units from struggling financial institutions in the aftermath of the crisis. 貝萊德成功的另一個(gè)原因是：在對(duì)掌控的投資組合進(jìn)行風(fēng)險(xiǎn)管理時(shí)實(shí)行“主動(dòng)型”的模式。比如說(shuō)，在危機(jī)爆發(fā)前，它曾一度是抵押貸款市場(chǎng)上的一個(gè)領(lǐng)頭羊。但 是，由于它對(duì)風(fēng)險(xiǎn)進(jìn)行了拉鏈?zhǔn)降呐挪?，結(jié)果不僅在雷曼兄弟破產(chǎn)后的混亂中，避免了被救助的命運(yùn)，而且還為美國(guó)政府和其他人提供了如何在最黑暗的日子中保持 金融系統(tǒng)正常運(yùn)轉(zhuǎn)的建議，同時(shí)還從正在危機(jī)中苦苦掙扎的金融機(jī)構(gòu)手中撿的了具有盈利能力的資產(chǎn)管理部門(mén)。 Other people's money 別人的錢(qián) Compared with the many banks which are flourishing only thanks to state largesse, BlackRock's success—based on providing value to customers and paying attention to detail—is well-deserved. Yet when taxpayers have spent billions rescuing financial institutions deemed too big to fail, a 25-year-old company that has grown so vast so quickly sets nerves jangling. American regulators are therefore thinking about designating BlackRock and some of its rivals as “systemically important”. The tag might land them with hefty regulatory requirements. 同眾多僅靠國(guó)家慷慨救助才有今日興盛的銀行相比，貝萊德的成功源于在為顧客掙錢(qián)的同時(shí)，還將注意力 集中的細(xì)節(jié)方面，因而這對(duì)它來(lái)說(shuō)，是當(dāng)之無(wú)愧的。然而，就在納稅人為拯救因“大到不能到”的金融機(jī)構(gòu)而花費(fèi)了數(shù)億美元之際，一家只有25年歷史的公司卻在 不斷壯大，其規(guī)模之大速度之快，已經(jīng)讓人們繃緊了神經(jīng)。美國(guó)的監(jiān)管方正在考慮將貝萊德及其對(duì)手貼上“系統(tǒng)重要性”的標(biāo)簽，令他們接受嚴(yán)格的監(jiān)管。 If the regulators' concern is to avoid a repeat of the last crisis, they are barking up the wrong tree. Unlike banks, whose loans and deposits go on their balance-sheets as assets and liabilities, BlackRock is a mere manager of other people's money. It has control over investments it holds on behalf of others—which gives it great influence—but it neither keeps the profits nor suffers the losses on them. Whereas banks tumble if their assets lose even a fraction of their value, BlackRock can pass on any shortfalls to its clients, and withstand far greater shocks. In fact, by being on hand to pick up assets cheaply from distressed sellers, an unleveraged asset manager arguably stabilises markets rather than disrupting them. 如果監(jiān)管方的關(guān)切是避免危機(jī)重演，那么他們就是找錯(cuò)了攻擊對(duì)象。貝萊德不同于將貸款和存款當(dāng)做資產(chǎn)與負(fù)債而寫(xiě)入資產(chǎn)負(fù)債表的銀行，它只是一個(gè)資金管理者，管理的是別人的資金。雖說(shuō)它手中掌握著代表別人而持有的投資，并且還因此還對(duì)別人具有重大的影響力。但是，她既不能把盈利揣在自己的兜里，也不會(huì)因投資失敗而代人承受損失。相比因資產(chǎn)價(jià)格稍有下跌即搖來(lái)晃去的銀行來(lái)說(shuō)，貝萊德能在投資失敗時(shí)將損失傳遞給顧客，能經(jīng)受住更大的沖擊。實(shí)際上，通過(guò)持有從失意的賣家手里低價(jià)收購(gòu)而來(lái)的資產(chǎn)，一個(gè)不使用杠桿的資產(chǎn)管理人的這種行為是在穩(wěn)定市場(chǎng)而不是擾亂市場(chǎng)。 But for regulators that want not merely to prevent a repeat of the last blow-up but also to identify the sources of future systemic perils, BlackRock raises another, subtler issue, concerning not the ownership of assets but the way buying and selling decisions are made. The $15 trillion of assets managed on its Aladdin platform amount to around 7% of all the shares, bonds and loans in the world. As a result, those who oversee many of the world's biggest pools of money are looking at the financial world, at least in part, through a lens crafted by BlackRock. Some 17,000 traders in banks, insurance companies, sovereign-wealth funds and others rely in part on BlackRock's analytical models to guide their investing. 但是如果監(jiān)管方的目的不只是防止危機(jī)重演，而且還想提前為將來(lái)的系統(tǒng)性危機(jī)確定根源，那么貝萊德就 給他們提出了另一個(gè)問(wèn)題，一個(gè)更加非常微妙的問(wèn)題，一個(gè)不關(guān)乎資產(chǎn)所有權(quán)，只涉及做出買賣決定的方式的問(wèn)題。鑒于“阿拉丁”交易平臺(tái)所管理的15萬(wàn)億美元 資產(chǎn)大約相當(dāng)于全球所有的股票、債券和債務(wù)的總和的7%，因此對(duì)于那些管理著世界上為數(shù)眾多大型資金池的人來(lái)說(shuō)，起碼會(huì)有一部分人透過(guò)貝萊德提供的鏡片來(lái) 觀察金融圈內(nèi)的投資動(dòng)向。也就是，目前全世界大約有17000名來(lái)自銀行、保險(xiǎn)公司、主權(quán)財(cái)富基金和其他行業(yè)的資金管理人依靠貝萊德的分析模型來(lái)指導(dǎo)他們 的投資。 Aladdin's genius 阿拉丁之才 That is a tribute to BlackRock's elaborate risk-management models, but it is also discomfiting. A principle of healthy markets is that a cacophony of diverse actors come to different conclusions on the price of things, based on their own idiosyncratic analyses. The value of any asset is discovered by melding all these different opinions into a single price. An ecosystem which is dominated by a single line of thinking is not healthy, in politics, in nature or in markets. Such groupthink in finance is a recipe for booms (when everyone wants to buy the same thing) and busts (when they all rush to sell). Though Aladdin advises clients on investment decisions rather than making them, it inevitably frames how they think of market risk. 這是對(duì)貝萊德那種細(xì)致入微的風(fēng)險(xiǎn)管理模式的一種獎(jiǎng)勵(lì)，但是也正在毀掉這種風(fēng)控模式。健康市場(chǎng)的原則是：市場(chǎng)上什么人都有，對(duì)于同一件物品的價(jià)格，個(gè)人有個(gè)人的想法，難于統(tǒng)一。所謂資產(chǎn)的價(jià)值發(fā)現(xiàn)，就是把所有這些不一樣的觀點(diǎn)融合成一個(gè)統(tǒng)一的價(jià)格。但是，如果一種生態(tài)系統(tǒng)被單獨(dú)一種觀點(diǎn)所主導(dǎo)，無(wú)論這種生態(tài)系統(tǒng)是 有關(guān)政治的，還是自然的，亦或市場(chǎng)的，這種生態(tài)系統(tǒng)都是不健康的。此類群體意識(shí)是金融圈的一道“大餐”，無(wú)論是在人人都想著搶購(gòu)?fù)患锲返姆睒s期，還是 在所有人都急于拋售的泡沫破裂期，都是如此。盡管“阿拉丁”的任務(wù)是給投資者提供投資建議而不是投資決定，但是它仍然會(huì)不可避免地破壞投資者對(duì)市場(chǎng)風(fēng)險(xiǎn)的 判斷。 The last crisis had many causes. One of them, which perhaps lay behind all the others, was that investors stopped thinking critically about what they were buying. Too many decided to trust credit-rating agencies, which assured them, for example, that packages of American subprime mortgages were extremely unlikely to default. BlackRock's models are no doubt better than the clunkers put out by Moody's or Standard & Poor's up to 2008: the firm's relative recent success has proved that. But too many investors relying on a single model spreads an unhealthy orthodoxy and is likely to make the markets more volatile than they otherwise would be. 造成2008年危機(jī)的原因有很多，但其中最有可能被忽視的一個(gè)原因就是，投資者已經(jīng)不能再對(duì)他們正在購(gòu)買的物品進(jìn) 行批判性的思考，太多的人決定相信給他們做出保證的評(píng)級(jí)公司。比如說(shuō)，評(píng)級(jí)公司對(duì)投資者保證說(shuō)，打包的次級(jí)抵押貸款絕對(duì)不可能違約。相比穆迪公司或者標(biāo)普 公司在2008年之前所設(shè)置的已經(jīng)不合時(shí)宜的模型來(lái)說(shuō)，貝萊德的模型無(wú)疑是更好的，而且它在最近的成功也相應(yīng)地證明了這一點(diǎn)。但是，當(dāng)投資者對(duì)某種模型產(chǎn) 生過(guò)度的依賴時(shí)，就會(huì)傳播一種不健康的血統(tǒng)論，而且還有可能讓市場(chǎng)變得比原來(lái)更加脆弱。 That is probably not a serious systemic risk, for it will be self-limiting: the more money follows BlackRock, the more money there is to be made betting against it. The real danger is for investors. The more they rely on BlackRock's analysis, the smaller the upside when it gets things right and the greater the downside when it gets things wrong—as, one day, it eventually will. Until then BlackRock's single-minded focus on mastering risk is to be commended. If its peers in the financial world had taken the same approach in the run-up to 2008, much of the chaos of the past five years would have been averted. 這或許不是一種嚴(yán)重的系統(tǒng)性風(fēng)險(xiǎn)，因?yàn)樗哂凶晕壹s束的性質(zhì)。也就是說(shuō)，跟風(fēng)貝萊德的資金越多，對(duì)賭的資金也就越多。這對(duì)于投資者來(lái)說(shuō)才是真正的風(fēng)險(xiǎn)。當(dāng) 他們對(duì)貝萊德的分析的依賴性越來(lái)越強(qiáng)時(shí)，如果貝萊德分析的對(duì)，價(jià)格會(huì)上漲，但上漲的幅度不會(huì)很大；如果貝萊德的分析不正確，價(jià)格就會(huì)大幅下跌，而且這一天 早晚會(huì)出現(xiàn)。屆時(shí)，人們才會(huì)把注意力放在貝萊德那種一心專注于掌控風(fēng)險(xiǎn)的做法上去。若貝萊德的同行能在2008年之前就采納這樣的做法，過(guò)去5年中的絕大 多數(shù)混亂也就可以避免了。 |
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