What do you do if business changes are recognized?

當(dāng)你發(fā)現(xiàn)一個(gè)公司發(fā)生變化時(shí)會(huì)怎么做？

If a good business is doing dumb things with your money, it is wise to get out. The option is always there to try to persuade the business to change its mind but this is difficult. Investment techniques must be simpatico with all.

• Source: BRK Annual Meeting 2001

• URL:

• Time: 2001

如果一個(gè)好的企業(yè)在用你的錢去做蠢事，退出是明智的選擇。當(dāng)然，嘗試說服公司改變主意永遠(yuǎn)是優(yōu)先選項(xiàng)，但這很難。投資技巧應(yīng)和一切和諧相處。

來源：BRK 2001年年會(huì)

時(shí)間：2001年

Do you know of any examples of companies that have lost and regained their competitive advantage?

據(jù)你所知，有沒有公司曾經(jīng)失去自己的競(jìng)爭(zhēng)優(yōu)勢(shì)，但后來又失而復(fù)得？

There aren't many examples of companies that lose and then regain competitive advantage. I have a friend who likes taking over lousy businesses and trying to turn them into great businesses. I asked him for examples of this over the past 100 years (and he couldn't name very many).

這種例子并不太多。我有一個(gè)朋友，他喜歡接管那些不討人喜歡的公司，然后嘗試把他們變成優(yōu)秀的企業(yè)。我一直有問他有沒有改造成功的例子（結(jié)果他也說不出來幾個(gè)）。

Sometimes businesses have problems, but haven't lost their competitive advantages. When GEICO had problems (in the mid-1970s), the model wasn't broken.

One example:Pepsi lost its edge post-WW II when costs went up, but they successfully changed. To some extent Gillette lost its competitive edge in the 1930s topenny blades, but then regained it.

有時(shí)候一個(gè)公司有問題并不代表會(huì)失去它的競(jìng)爭(zhēng)優(yōu)勢(shì)。20世紀(jì)70年代時(shí)GEICO也出現(xiàn)了問題，但是它們也并沒有因此破產(chǎn)。

但百事可樂是一個(gè)很好的例子。第二次世界大戰(zhàn)過后，它們失去了自己的優(yōu)勢(shì)，但后來他們成功轉(zhuǎn)型了。某種程度來說吉列也是一個(gè)例子。上世紀(jì)30年代的時(shí)候他們失去了競(jìng)爭(zhēng)優(yōu)勢(shì)地位，但是后來又奪回來了。

But generally speaking, when a company loses its edge, it's very difficult to regain. Packard (cars) went downscale one year and never regained its upscale image. Department stores have done this. You can always juice sales by going down market, but it's hard to go back up market.

• Source: BRK Annual Meeting 2003 Tilson Notes

• URL:

• Time: 2003

不過整體來說，公司一旦失去自己的競(jìng)爭(zhēng)優(yōu)勢(shì)，就很難重奪回來了。比如帕卡德汽車（Packard），有一年它們開始走下坡路，然后就再也沒有起來過，最后消失了。百貨商場(chǎng)也在重復(fù)同樣的道路。在市場(chǎng)上走下坡路容易，下去再上來可就難了。

來源：BRK 2003年年會(huì)Tilson筆記

時(shí)間：2003年 

Impact of regulation on businesses?

法律法規(guī)會(huì)對(duì)企業(yè)造成什么影響？

In some businesses, regulatory changes have a big impact, others none. We just try to think intelligently about any business that we’re in. What regulatory changes might there be? What might the impact be? If we’re in furniture retailing,we’re not going to think about it. It’s up to Charlie and me to think about this and weigh it in our evaluation of a company.

Tom Murphy (the former head of Capital Cities and Cap Cities/ABC) was way ahead of us on this one.

• Source: BRK Annual Meeting 2004 Tilson Notes

• URL:

• Time: 2004

對(duì)于某些公司來說，法律法規(guī)的改變會(huì)給它們帶來巨大影響。我們嘗試盡可能聰明地看待我們現(xiàn)在涉足的企業(yè)：它們所處的行業(yè)未來可能會(huì)迎來什么樣的政策變化？會(huì)帶來什么影響？如果是家具零售行業(yè)，我們就不會(huì)去考慮這個(gè)問題。這里就全由查理和我來衡量這個(gè)因素在給公司估值中的分量了。

這方面湯姆·墨菲（Tom Murphy，大都會(huì)通訊公司Capital Cities和美國廣播公司ABC的前掌門人）比我們超前很多。

來源：BRK2004年年會(huì)Tilson筆記

時(shí)間：2004年 

Would you commenton the quality of earnings in capital-intensive businesses, like utilities?

你會(huì)怎么評(píng)價(jià)資本密集型行業(yè)的盈利，比如公共事業(yè)？

Buffett:Capital-intensive industries outside the utility sector scare me more. We get decent returns on equity. You won’t get rich, but you won’t go broke either.You are better off in businesses that are not capital intensive.

Munger: A lot of moats have been filling up with sand lately.

• Source: BRK Annual Meeting 2009 Bruni Notes

• URL:

• Time: 2009

巴菲特：公共事業(yè)以外的資本密集型行業(yè)會(huì)更讓我害怕。我們還是可以獲得不錯(cuò)的權(quán)益回報(bào)的。你不會(huì)因此變得富有，但你也不會(huì)因此破產(chǎn)。不過你在非資本密集型的行業(yè)中可以表現(xiàn)更好。

芒格：感覺最近很多公司的護(hù)城河都在逐漸被填平。

來源：BRK 2009年年會(huì)Bruni筆記

時(shí)間：2009年 

Please talk about the shift to investing in capital intensive business and the ultimate impact on intrinsic value. Help us understand the time value of the necessary capital expenditures.

請(qǐng)談?wù)勀阕罱鼘?duì)資本密集型企業(yè)的投資以及其對(duì)企業(yè)股票內(nèi)在價(jià)值的最終影響。能幫我們更好地了解什么是必要資本支出的時(shí)間價(jià)值嗎？

WB: It’s clear you understand the question well, and it as important a question as you can ask. We are putting big money in big businesses with good economics, but not as good as when we were dealing with smaller amounts. $40m of capital required in See’s and it earns much more than that. If we could put in more we would. But wonderful businesses don’t soak up capital – we had $2.2b operating earnings inQ1. We have to put it out as intelligently as we can. When we find them, we’ll buy them. Can we put it to work intelligently? We think capital intensive businesses we have bought are good, working well. But it can’t work brilliantly, we can’t spend all that money and still get high returns. But does that mean we should pay out excess capital instead? No, because we think they can earn a good return even with the need to make capital investments incertain businesses. We are better paying it out only if we can’t translate it into more than $1 of present value. In our judgment with BNSF we did it, but scorecard will only come in 10 to 20 yrs. In Mid American, we have done it. Butit won’t be a Coca-Cola – which doesn’t need as much capital. I hope we don’t disappoint you. If anyone expects brilliant returns from this base at Berkshire, we don’t know how to do it.

• Source: BRK Annual Meeting 2010 Boodell Notes

• URL:

• Time: 2010

WB：看來你對(duì)這個(gè)問題很有見解，這也是一個(gè)很重要的問題。我們往一些經(jīng)濟(jì)狀況很不錯(cuò)的大型企業(yè)投了一大筆錢，但表現(xiàn)并沒有之前投錢沒那么多的時(shí)候好。我們往喜詩糖果里投了4千萬美元，但它們賺的錢遠(yuǎn)超于此。如果當(dāng)時(shí)可以投更多，我們會(huì)的。好的公司不會(huì)只一味地需求資本——第一季度喜詩糖果的營業(yè)收入達(dá)到了22億美元。我們需要把獲利拿出來，盡可能聰明地投到其他地方去——也就是說，如果我們找得到好標(biāo)的的話，我們就會(huì)去買。用這筆錢可以獲得不錯(cuò)的回報(bào)率么？可以，我們投資的資本密集型企業(yè)就表現(xiàn)得挺不錯(cuò)。但他們沒辦法表現(xiàn)得（像喜詩糖果那樣）出類拔萃，因?yàn)槲覀儸F(xiàn)在手上的資本規(guī)模太龐大了，不可能找到那么多（像喜詩糖果那樣）高回報(bào)率的標(biāo)的，所以沒辦法全花完。那怎么辦？某些行業(yè)的某些公司還是可以獲得不錯(cuò)的回報(bào)率的。如果我們沒法自己把手上的一塊錢在未來轉(zhuǎn)換成比這一塊錢現(xiàn)值更多的現(xiàn)金流，那還不如把這筆錢投出去。像我們之前買的BNSF就是這樣的例子，不過它的成績(jī)單可能得等上10到20年。我們當(dāng)時(shí)買中美能源（MidAmerican）也是出于同樣的想法。但是這些公司需要大量的資金，所以他們不可能成為可口可樂（這種不用多少資金就能獲得高回報(bào)的公司）。我不是故意要讓你失望的，但如果你想了解我們公司在這方面是否獲得了特別特別高的回報(bào)，我只能說，沒有，我們也不知道要怎么做。

來源：BRK 2010年年會(huì)Boodell筆記

時(shí)間：2010年 

How do you place a value on intangible assets? What are the signs of great ?“moats?” around abusiness and great managements? Do you place a dollar value on this? What discount rates do you use?

如何對(duì)無形資產(chǎn)進(jìn)行估值？有“深護(hù)城河”和優(yōu)秀管理層的公司有哪些特質(zhì)？你也會(huì)在這上面用一塊錢估值法么？采用什么貼現(xiàn)率？

We use a treasury rate for comparability across companies and time. As far as we’re concerned, a dollar earned by The Lucky Horseshoe Company is the same as a dollar earned by an Internet company -even if the market is a lot more enthusiastic about the Internet company dollar.

Valuation is anart. Look at Wrigley: pick a figure for what the volumes will be, their prices,their competition, the likelihood of management being bright with cash. All ofthat figures into the moat and its size, and what that business will earn.

我們采用類似國庫券利率的估值方法來比較不同時(shí)段的不同公司。一個(gè)幸運(yùn)馬蹄鐵公司賺的一塊錢和一個(gè)互聯(lián)網(wǎng)公司賺的一塊錢都是一樣的，雖然市場(chǎng)對(duì)后者的熱情更甚。

估值是一項(xiàng)藝術(shù)。以箭牌（Wrigley）為例，判斷其護(hù)城河深淺可以看它的股價(jià)、競(jìng)爭(zhēng)地位、管理層水平及其為公司帶來大量現(xiàn)金的可能性。這些數(shù)據(jù)也可以幫我們?nèi)ヅ袛喙緯?huì)掙多少錢。

There aren’t many businesses with a terrific moat. Coke has a terrific moat, right down to the container. How many other products can people identify correctly when they’re blind folded? Coke has not just market share, it has a great share of mind. People associate Coke with good things.Ten years from now, the moat formed by that share of mind will be even greater.

No formula infinance tells you that the moat is 28 feet wide and 16 feet deep. That’s what drives the a cademics crazy. Theycan compute standard deviations and betas, but they can’t understand moats. Maybe I’m being too hard on the academics.

有深護(hù)城河的公司并不是很多，可口可樂算一個(gè)。想象一下，（除了可口可樂，）人們被蒙住眼睛的時(shí)候還能猜中什么品牌？它已經(jīng)不僅是市場(chǎng)占有率的問題，它已經(jīng)成功“占有”了大多數(shù)人的想法，人們已經(jīng)習(xí)慣把可口可樂和美好事物聯(lián)系在一起。再過十年，這種“想法占有”的程度會(huì)更深。

金融界里并不存在一個(gè)公式會(huì)讓你準(zhǔn)確算出這個(gè)公司的“護(hù)城河”有28英尺寬16英尺深，相信這會(huì)讓很多“學(xué)術(shù)派”都抓狂，他們可以精確算出標(biāo)準(zhǔn)差和beta，但卻無法理解“護(hù)城河”?？赡芪疫@也是對(duì)他們要求太高了。

CM: You’re not sufficiently critical of the academics. They remind me of Long Term Capital Management - why do smart people do dumb things against their own self-interest?

Now we have whole finance departments full of destructive self-pity, which is one of the most dangerous forces in the world. And you are paying to send your children to those schools!

• Source: BRK Annual Meeting 1999

• URL:

• Time: 1999

CM：我覺得你對(duì)學(xué)術(shù)派的批評(píng)還不夠到位呢。他們讓我想起了美國長(zhǎng)期資本管理公司（Long Term Capital Management）——為什么聰明人總喜歡去做違背自己真正興趣的蠢事？

現(xiàn)在各個(gè)大學(xué)里的金融學(xué)院都充斥著這種自怨自艾的“書呆子”，這是毀滅性的，是世界上最危險(xiǎn)的現(xiàn)象之一。而你還要付錢把自己的孩子送進(jìn)這種學(xué)校！

來源：BRK 1999年年會(huì)

時(shí)間：1999年 

Not too long ago, a reasonable person might have concluded that Kellogg and Campbell Soup had big moats around their businesses, but that has proven not to be the case and their stocks have languished. What might we learn from this?

不久之前，一個(gè)挺靠譜的人曾經(jīng)說過家樂氏（Kellogg）和金寶湯（Campbell Soup）有很深的“護(hù)城河”，但它們現(xiàn)在股價(jià)都重挫了，證明這個(gè)說法并不正確。我們從中學(xué)到了什么呢？

I'm not anexpert on these companies, but my understanding is that Kellogg pushed their pricing too far. They didn't have to moat they thought they had versus General Mills and other major competitors. Campbell's problems are more related to lifestyle changes of Americans. Soup fits in a little less well than it did 40 years ago.

我對(duì)這些公司并不算是專家，但我的看法是家樂氏之前拉股價(jià)太賣力了，他們的競(jìng)爭(zhēng)對(duì)手有通用磨坊食品（General Mills）和其他強(qiáng)敵，他們以為的深“護(hù)城河”其實(shí)并不存在。金寶湯的問題更多是因?yàn)槊绹说纳罘绞阶兞耍揞^湯已經(jīng)沒有40年前這么符合人們的生活習(xí)慣了。

With soft drinks, there has been no decrease in demand for decades. 30% of liquid consumption of Americans is soda and 40% of that is Coke products, so 1/8th ofU.S. liquid consumption is Coke products.

Coffee and milk consumption has been declining every year -- it's clear where preferences go once people start drinking soda.

但軟飲則不一樣，過去幾十年對(duì)軟飲的需求沒有下降過。美國人30%的飲料消費(fèi)都花在蘇打飲料上，其中40%的消費(fèi)都是可口可樂的產(chǎn)品，也就是說，全美國八分之一的飲料消費(fèi)就是可口可樂。

咖啡和牛奶的消費(fèi)則每年都在下降——自從蘇打進(jìn)入人們的生活，偏好高下立見。

These trends are almost impossible not to happen in developing countries, where the consumption of Coke products is 1/50th what it is in the U.S. -- though Coke could screw it up by pricing too high.

就算是在發(fā)展中國家，雖然可口可樂的消費(fèi)只有美國的五十分之一，但這種趨勢(shì)也不大可能被避免，當(dāng)然，如果可口可樂定價(jià)太高，還是有可能把這個(gè)巨大發(fā)展?jié)摿o扼殺掉的。

Coke has also benefited from its relative price. Since 1930, its cost per ounce has only doubled. This very low price inflation has contributed to the increase in percapita consumption.

可口可樂的發(fā)展也得益于原材料的價(jià)格沒有太大變動(dòng)。從1930年代到現(xiàn)在，它每盎司的成本價(jià)只翻了一倍，通脹率是很低的。這也帶動(dòng)了人均消費(fèi)的提高。

Munger:'Kellogg's and Campbell's moats have also shrunk due to the increased buying power of supermarkets and companies like Wal-Mart. The muscle power of Wal-Mart and Costco has increased dramatically.'

There is always a battle between the retailers and manufacturers of branded products. In the1930s, A&P had its own line of branded products that did very well. It would be interesting to know what happened.

• Source: BRK Annual Meeting 2001 Tilson Notes

• URL:

• Time: April 2001

芒格：像沃爾瑪這樣的超市崛起也導(dǎo)致家樂氏和金寶湯的護(hù)城河“縮水”。這種超市的購買力上升得非常多。

而零售商和品牌生產(chǎn)商之間的“戰(zhàn)爭(zhēng)”永遠(yuǎn)都不會(huì)停止。20世紀(jì)30年代的時(shí)候，大西洋和太平洋食品公司（A&P）有自己的生產(chǎn)線，而且做得挺好的。但如果你們知道它之后發(fā)生了什么事情，你會(huì)覺得非常有趣。

來源：BRK 2001年年會(huì)Tilson筆記

時(shí)間：2001年4月

What's your opinion of downsizing and outsourcing?

你如何看待企業(yè)規(guī)?？s小和業(yè)務(wù)外包？

Whether or not such actions are necessary depends on the industry: if it’sa growing industry, you don’t need such measures. If there’s not enough growth in an industry to support all of the players, it’s in society’s best interests to have the most output produced with the least inputs - but society needs to help those who find themselves on the outside. ?“I believe this has been more of a media story than a real news story,?” Buffett explained. ?“I don’t believe there’s a greater percentage of people displaced as a percentage of the work force than there was ten years ago.?”

Monger’s take on the situation: ?“I can’t name afirm that was harmed by over-downsizing. I can rattle off name after name of ones that were ruined by bloat. It’s fashionable to say downsizing is wrong: I think it’s wrong that the firms got in such a state that they needed downsizing.?

• Source: BRK Annual Meeting 1997

• URL:

• Time: May 1997

行業(yè)走向決定著企業(yè)是否需要采取這些措施：如果這個(gè)行業(yè)正在成長(zhǎng)，你就無需考慮這些；但如果行業(yè)的成長(zhǎng)性已經(jīng)不足以支撐其中所有的玩家，那最符合整個(gè)社會(huì)利益的做法就是盡量用最少的投入換最大的產(chǎn)出，這個(gè)時(shí)候就會(huì)需要減小企業(yè)規(guī)模或者業(yè)務(wù)外包了。不過我覺得這更像個(gè)媒體故事而不是新聞故事。我不認(rèn)為這會(huì)帶來比十年前更多的失業(yè)。

芒格：在我的認(rèn)知里，沒有因?yàn)橐?guī)模過度縮小而受到傷害的公司。但我可以說一堆因?yàn)檫^度擴(kuò)張而受傷的公司。好像現(xiàn)在說規(guī)?？s小不好是一種潮流，但我覺得一個(gè)公司走到了需要縮小規(guī)模這一步才是犯了錯(cuò)誤。