原文來自USV的合伙人Fred Wilson 2015年底的一篇Blog。 在傳統(tǒng)的經(jīng)濟(jì)里，沒有負(fù)毛利率這件事。但是互聯(lián)網(wǎng)的世界里，由于互聯(lián)網(wǎng)的高增長可能，加上資本的推動，追逐增長而保持負(fù)毛利率成為很普遍的現(xiàn)象。負(fù)毛利率戰(zhàn)略要成功，比想象的要難的多的多，其底線就是：業(yè)務(wù)實(shí)現(xiàn)壟斷性。否則，不管是通過鎖定用戶后未來提價(jià)，還是通過規(guī)模化后降低成本，都是困難的。

There’s been a lot of talk coming out of silicon valley lately about fast growing companies with high valuations that are going to face problems in the coming year(s).

硅谷最近很多人談?wù)撃切┛焖僭鲩L的高估值公司，認(rèn)為他們會在未來的幾年內(nèi)面臨問題。

Bill Gurley said this recently: “I do think you’ll see some dead unicorns this year”

Bill Gurley最近說：“我想你今年會看到一些死的獨(dú)角獸”

Mike Moritz said this recently: “There are a considerable number of unicorns that will become extinct.”

Mike Mortiz最近說：“有相當(dāng)多的獨(dú)角獸將會滅絕。

But how is this going to happen?

但是，這樣的事情會如何發(fā)生呢？

The most likely scenario is the thing that has been driving growth (and valuations) for these companies ultimately comes home  to roost. And that is negative gross margins.

最可能的情況是，當(dāng)初驅(qū)動這些公司增長（和估值）的幕后推手會反過來會成為罪魁禍?zhǔn)祝ㄋ^，成也蕭何敗蕭何）。這個幕后推手就是負(fù)毛利率。

We have seen a tremendous number of high growth companies raising money this year with negative gross margins. Which means they sell something for less than it costs them to make it.

今年以來，我們看到了大量的高增長公司融到了錢，但是毛利率為負(fù)。這意味著他們賣的東西的價(jià)格低于他們的生產(chǎn)成本。

It can be an “on-demand” service provider that subsidizes the cost of the workers on its platform so that the service seems like it costs less than it actually does. Why would an on-demand startup take this approach? To build demand for the service, of course. The idea is get users hooked on a home cleaning service, a ridesharing service, a food delivery service, or a gym roaming service by bringing it to market at a price point that is highly attractive and then, once the users are truly hooked, take the price up.

它可能是一個“按需”服務(wù)提供商，在其平臺上補(bǔ)貼工人的成本，使其服務(wù)看起來比實(shí)際成本低。為什么“按需”服務(wù)的創(chuàng)業(yè)公司采用這種方法？答案顯然：為其提供的服務(wù)吸引需求。這么做的想法是，通過把價(jià)格降到有吸引力的位置讓用戶上鉤，不管是家庭清潔服務(wù)、交通分享服務(wù)、食品快遞服務(wù)還是健身房漫游服務(wù)，一旦用戶真正上鉤了，再把價(jià)格上漲起來。

It can be a service provided to startups, like the ability to ship via an API, or the ability to process payments via an API, or the ability to pay your employees or give them benefits. All of these examples have a real cost component to them. They are not pure software. And there are providers in the market who are not passing through the true cost, in effect subsidizing the cost of the service, to gain market share. This results in fast growth but negative gross margins. Again, the companies that are doing this are hoping that once they get to scale and users are “l(fā)ocked in”, they can raise prices.

它也可能是為初創(chuàng)公司提供服務(wù)的公司，例如通過API接口提供貨運(yùn)服務(wù)，或者通過API接口提供支付能力，或者幫助公司支付員工或給員工發(fā)放付復(fù)利。所有這些例子都有一個真正的成本組件。它們不是純軟件。市場的服務(wù)商為了獲取市場份額，價(jià)格低于成本，實(shí)際上補(bǔ)貼了服務(wù)的成本。這導(dǎo)致增長很快，但毛利率為負(fù)。同樣，這樣做的公司希望，一旦他們達(dá)到規(guī)模和用戶“鎖定”，他們就可以提高價(jià)格。

There are other examples out there of companies with negative gross margins, but these two categories are where we’ve seen a lot of this kind of behavior.

還有其他負(fù)毛利率的公司的例子，但這兩個類別里，我們已經(jīng)看到了很多這種行為。

The thing that is wrong with this strategy is that taking prices up, or using your volume to drive costs down, in order to get to positive gross margins is a lot harder than most people think. If there are other startups competing with you and offering a similar service, you aren’t going to be able to take prices up without losing customers to a similar competitor, unless your service truly has “l(fā)ock in.” And most don’t. Using volume to drive costs down can work, but if there are similar services out there, the provider who is being asked to take a cut by you might just move their supply over to another competitor offering a higher price.

這種策略是錯誤的，原因在于：希望通過提價(jià)或利用規(guī)模優(yōu)勢降低成本從而實(shí)現(xiàn)正的毛利率，要比大多數(shù)人想象的難得多。如果有其他創(chuàng)業(yè)公司與你競爭并提供類似的服務(wù)，你提高價(jià)格的話，客戶將流向競爭對手，除非你的服務(wù)能真正“鎖定”客戶。而大多數(shù)公司不可能鎖定。使用規(guī)模來降低成本是可以的，但是如果有類似的服務(wù)，被要求降價(jià)的供應(yīng)商可能會跑到出價(jià)更高的競爭對手那里，給他們供貨。

The bottom line is the primary way this strategy works is if you obtain a monopoly position in your market and you are the only game in town for your customers and suppliers. But given the massive amount of startup capital that is out there and the endless number of entrepreneurs starting businesses similar to each other these days, I think it will be hard for most companies to achieve monopoly position (which is somewhat in conflict with what I wrote here the other day).

這種策略要想成功，其底線是，你在你的市場上獲得壟斷地位，你是你的客戶和供應(yīng)商唯一的選擇。但是考慮到市場上大量的創(chuàng)業(yè)資本和不斷涌現(xiàn)的彼此類似的創(chuàng)業(yè)公司，我認(rèn)為，大多數(shù)公司將難以實(shí)現(xiàn)壟斷地位（這有點(diǎn)與我以前寫的“贏家通吃大部分”矛盾）。

Yes, there will be a few that succeed with this strategy. Getting a huge lead on your competitors, raising a ton of money to operate a scorched earth strategy and force your competitors out of the market, will work for some. But not nearly as many as the capital markets seem to think.

是的，肯定會有一些公司因?yàn)檫@個戰(zhàn)略而成功。相對于競爭對手獲得巨大的領(lǐng)先優(yōu)勢，籌集大量資金來實(shí)施焦土戰(zhàn)略迫使競爭對手退出市場，這對一些公司能夠管用。但絕對不像資本市場想象的那么多。

And so most of the companies out there who are growing like weeds using a negative gross margin strategy are going to find that the capital markets will ultimately lose patience with this strategy and force them to get to positive gross margins, which will in turn cut into growth and what we will be left with is a ton of flatlined zero gross margin businesses carrying billion dollar plus valuations. And that is what Gurley and Moritz see when they look out into next year and the year beyond. They aren’t alone.

因此，大多數(shù)采用了負(fù)毛利率戰(zhàn)略而像野草一樣瘋長的公司，將會發(fā)現(xiàn)資本市場會最終失去對這一戰(zhàn)略的耐心，并迫使他們達(dá)到正向的毛利率，這反過來會削減增長，而留給我們的是一大堆的零毛利潤業(yè)務(wù)以及超過10億美元的估值。這就是Gurley和Moritz展望明年和未來幾年里看到的。他們的觀點(diǎn)，并不孤獨(dú)。

愉悅資本是新一代VC基金，由劉二海、李瀟、戴汨創(chuàng)立。我們是創(chuàng)始人也是投資經(jīng)理。