A thought for my fellow CEOs: Of course, the immediate future is uncertain; America has faced the unknown since 1776. It’s just that sometimes people focus on the myriad of uncertainties that always exist while at other times they ignore them (usually because the recent past has been uneventful).
給我的CEO伙伴們的一點想法：毫無疑問，未來永遠是充滿不確定性的，美國從1776年開始就一直面對各種不確定性。只不過有時候人們非常在意無以計數(shù)的、一直存在的各種不確定性，而另外一些時候，他們卻無視不確定性（通常是因為那段時間太平無事）。
American business will do fine over time. And stocks will do well just as certainly, since their fate is tied to business performance. Periodic setbacks will occur, yes, but investors and managers are in a game that is heavily stacked in their favor. (The Dow Jones Industrials advanced from 66 to 11,497 in the 20th Century, a staggering 17,320% increase that materialized despite four costly wars, a Great Depression and many recessions. And don’t forget that shareholders received substantial dividends throughout the century as well.)
美國公司前景光明。股票也一定會會表現(xiàn)良好，因為它們的命運是和公司的業(yè)績聯(lián)系在一起的。周期性的困難在所難免，但是投資者和經(jīng)理人處在一個由他們的喜好所影響的游戲中。（道瓊斯工業(yè)指數(shù)在20世紀里從66漲到了11,497，期間經(jīng)歷了四次損失慘重的戰(zhàn)爭，一次大蕭條和多次的衰退，最終依然蹣跚上升了17,320%。而且不要忘了，投資者還收到了不少的分紅。)
Since the basic game is so favorable, Charlie and I believe it’s a terrible mistake to try to dance in and out of it based upon the turn of tarot cards, the predictions of “experts,” or the ebb and flow of business activity. The risks of being out of the game are huge compared to the risks of being in it.
因為這個游戲是如此的誘人，查理和我認為嘗試依據(jù)塔羅牌的排列，“專家”的預(yù)測，或者商業(yè)周期進進出出是一個巨大的錯誤。錯過這個游戲的風(fēng)險比呆在里面要大得多。(注1：別聽專家預(yù)測，也甭想利用周期性趨勢操作）（注2：塔羅牌由22張主牌（大阿卡那）與56張副牌（小阿卡那）組成，共計78張牌。塔羅的占卜方法是以某種形式將牌排列好（即展開），然后再查看牌所再的位置及牌的象征內(nèi)容來做判斷。可以針對戀愛、健康、財運、事業(yè)、婚姻等不同的需求進行占卜，尤其是再不知道下一階段應(yīng)該采取什么行動的時候，它是一種非常好的提示路標(biāo)。由牌面?zhèn)鬟_出的信息，只要我們仔細玩味，就會有相當(dāng)高的準(zhǔn)確度。）
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More than 50 years ago, Charlie told me that it was far better to buy a wonderful business at a fair price than to buy a fair business at a wonderful price. Despite the compelling logic of his position, I have sometimes reverted to my old habit of bargain-hunting, with results ranging from tolerable to terrible. Fortunately, my mistakes have usually occurred when I made smaller purchases. Our large acquisitions have generally worked out well and, in a few cases, more than well.
50多年前，查理就告訴我，以合理的價格買入一家優(yōu)秀的公司比以一個便宜的價格買入一家平庸的公司劃算。盡管這個道理背后的邏輯非常清楚，我還是時不時地犯廉價收購的毛病，其結(jié)果有些難以接受，有些則極其糟糕。幸運的是，我只在進行小筆收購的時候犯毛病。我們的大筆收購?fù)ǔ＝Y(jié)果都不錯，有部分可不僅僅是不錯。
Of course, a business with terrific economics can be a bad investment if the price paid is excessive. We have paid substantial premiums to net tangible assets for most of our businesses, a cost that is reflected in the large figure we show for intangible assets. Overall, however, we are getting a decent return on the capital we have deployed in this sector. Furthermore, the intrinsic value of the businesses, in aggregate, exceeds their carrying value by a good margin. Even so, the difference between intrinsic value and carrying value in the insurance and regulated-industry segments is far greater. It is there that the huge winners reside.
當(dāng)然，如果出價過高，買入一些具有良好經(jīng)濟特性的公司也可能成為一筆糟糕的投資。(注1：誤導(dǎo)，嚴重誤導(dǎo)···老巴對以“合理價格買入優(yōu)秀公司”之闡述是相當(dāng)全面的。只是，大多數(shù)人都斷章取義，忽略第二段表述；在我看來，買貴了=嚴重糟糕的投資，就是仙女都不成。）
我們大多數(shù)的收購里都支付了遠超有形凈資產(chǎn)的溢價，這些成本反映在財報巨額的無形資產(chǎn)數(shù)據(jù)中。不過總體來說，我們收獲了與投資額相稱的回報。而且，這些公司的內(nèi)在價值，遠超它們的賬面價值。需要說明的是，在保險板塊和受管制的行業(yè)板塊，內(nèi)在價值和賬面價值之間的差距更加巨大。那里才是真正的大贏家所在之處。
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But never forget: In repurchase decisions, price is all-important. Value is destroyed when purchases are made above intrinsic value. The directors and I believe that continuing shareholders are benefitted in a meaningful way by purchases up to our 120% limit.
不要忘了：在回購決策里，價格是最重要的。如果回購價格高于內(nèi)在價值那就是在毀滅價值。董事們和我都認為，繼續(xù)以低于賬面價值120%的價格回購股票對股東是有利的。
Above all, dividend policy should always be clear, consistent and rational. A capricious policy willconfuse owners and drive away would-be investors. Phil Fisher put it wonderfully 54 years ago in Chapter 7 of his Common Stocks and Uncommon Profits, a book that ranks behind only The Intelligent Investor and the 1940 edition of Security Analysis in the all-time-best list for the serious investor. Phil explained that you can successfully run a restaurant that serves hamburgers or, alternatively, one that features Chinese food. But you can’t switch capriciously between the two and retain the fans of either.
總而言之，分紅策略必須一致保持清晰、穩(wěn)定并且理性。反復(fù)無常的策略會把股東弄糊涂，也會排斥潛在的投資者。(注1：小心，某年度突然大比例分紅將是“價值陷阱”。）Phil Fisher 54年前在他的《普通股和不普通的利潤》一書的第7章非常經(jīng)典地解釋了這件事情，對認真的投資者而言，這本書在經(jīng)典書目上僅次于《聰明的投資者》以及1940年版的《證券分析》。Phil說你可以成功地運營一家賣漢堡的餐館，或者一家以中國菜為主打的餐館，但是你不可能不停地轉(zhuǎn)換還同時留住兩類顧客。
Most companies pay consistent dividends, generally trying to increase them annually and
cutting them very reluctantly. Our “Big Four” portfolio companies follow this sensible and understandable approach and, in certain cases, also repurchase shares quite aggressively.
大多數(shù)公司奉行穩(wěn)定的分紅策略，一般逐步增加分紅，削減分紅通常是非常不情愿的。我們的“四大”投資組合就遵循類似的、可理解的模式。有時候，它們還非常積極地回購股票。
We applaud their actions and hope they continue on their present paths. We like increased dividends, and we love repurchases at appropriate prices.
我們拍手稱贊它們現(xiàn)行的策略，并希望它們繼續(xù)保持。我們喜歡增加分紅，我們也喜歡以合理的價格回購股票。(注1：恩，必須認真核對股息率，檢查股票回購記錄。）
At Berkshire, however, we have consistently followed a different approach that we know has been sensible and that we hope has been made understandable by the paragraphs you have just read. We will stick with this policy as long as we believe our assumptions about the book-value buildup and the market-price premium seem reasonable. If the prospects for either factor change materially for the worse, we will reexamine our actions.
當(dāng)然在伯克希爾，我們一直采取了另外一條不同的分紅策略，(注1：誤解，千萬別理解為“不分紅是好事”，誰能有老巴紅利再投資的能力？）我們深知這樣做的合理性，我們也希望上述的段落能幫助大家理解這一策略。只要我們認為關(guān)于賬面價值增長和市場價格的假設(shè)依然合理，我們就會一直堅持上述策略。如果將來某項因素變化導(dǎo)致了實質(zhì)性的改變，我們將會重新審視我們的策略。
