【編譯】石雨宸 呂紫煙 伍雨荷 楊沛鑫 阮辰陽 黃慧彬 李思

【審?！?/span>李博軒 王國欣 姚寰宇

【題目】Why the COVID-19 response needs International Relations

【作者】Sara E Davies，澳大利亞研究委員會（ARC）未來研究員(Future Fellowship)，澳大利亞格里菲斯大學(xué)政府與國際關(guān)系學(xué)院治理與公共政策中心教授；Clare Wenham，倫敦政治經(jīng)濟(jì)學(xué)院衛(wèi)生政策系全球衛(wèi)生政策助理教授。

【摘要】COVID-19大流行影響了所有國家，但政府的應(yīng)對方式取決于政治如何運(yùn)作。在這種情況下，世界衛(wèi)生組織（WHO）試圖協(xié)調(diào)向各國提供的建議并持續(xù)管控疫情。考慮到COVID-19的政治動因，我們認(rèn)為這是推進(jìn)國際關(guān)系知識的重要時(shí)刻，作為納入世衛(wèi)組織流行病控制知識輸入庫的一種必要和獨(dú)特的方法。歷史上曾經(jīng)主張技術(shù)專長勝于政治的努力是多余和過時(shí)的：世衛(wèi)組織一直被成員國政治化。我們建議世衛(wèi)組織接受政治，參與外交政策和外交專門知識。我們提出了國際關(guān)系方法可以為公共衛(wèi)生決策和技術(shù)政策協(xié)調(diào)提供信息的實(shí)例以作為切入點(diǎn)。撰寫這篇文章是為了讓世衛(wèi)組織、多邊組織、捐助籌資部門、各國政府和國際非政府組織中應(yīng)對新冠肺炎的工作人員接受政治分析，而不是回避它。彼此協(xié)調(diào)的政治合作對戰(zhàn)勝新冠肺炎至關(guān)重要。

The COVID-19 pandemic affects all countries, but how governments respond is dictated by politics. Amid this, the World Health Organization (WHO) has tried to coordinate advice to states and offer ongoing management of the outbreak. Given the political drivers of COVID-19, we argue this is an important moment to advance International Relations knowledge as a necessary and distinctive method for inclusion in the WHO repertoire of knowledge inputs for epidemic control. Historical efforts to assert technical expertise over politics is redundant and outdated: the WHO has always been politicized by member states. We suggest WHO needs to embrace the politics and engage foreign policy and diplomatic expertise. We suggest practical examples of the entry points where International Relations methods can inform public health decision-making and technical policy coordination. We write this as a primer for those working in response to COVID-19 in WHO, multilateral organizations, donor financing departments, governments and international non-governmental organizations, to embrace political analysis rather than shy away from it. Coordinated political cooperation is vital to overcome COVID-19.

【編譯】石雨宸

【審校】李博軒

【題目】Is COVID-19 the end of US hegemony? Public bads, leadership failures and monetary hegemony

【作者】Carla Norrl?f，芬蘭國際事務(wù)研究所客座研究教授，多倫多大學(xué)政治學(xué)副教授，梅西學(xué)院高級研究員，國際問題研究所研究員。研究方向是國際合作理論，特別關(guān)注大國，尤其是美國在貨幣、貿(mào)易和安全領(lǐng)域的霸權(quán)。

【摘要】新冠肺炎是戰(zhàn)后最大的侵襲性全球危機(jī)，危及人類活動的各個(gè)方面。通過將新冠肺炎疫情定義為公害（public bad），作者闡述了在20世紀(jì)和21世紀(jì)，關(guān)于美國與自由國際秩序（LIO）關(guān)系的其中一個(gè)重大議題。作者將新冠病毒概念化為公害，并分析了它對美國霸權(quán)的影響。與其他國際公害和許多構(gòu)成自由國際秩序的重要公共產(chǎn)品不同，新冠疫情不僅會帶來某種程度的競爭，而且具有部分排他性，從而將其更多地轉(zhuǎn)變?yōu)榫銟凡慨a(chǎn)品。在國內(nèi)層面，作者分析了未能有效控制新冠疫情公害如何損害了美國保障公民健康和國內(nèi)經(jīng)濟(jì)的能力，而這正是美國發(fā)揮國際領(lǐng)導(dǎo)力的基礎(chǔ)。這些失敗影響了美國向全球提供其他公共產(chǎn)品。在國際層面，作者闡明了美國是如何在放棄世界衛(wèi)生組織（WHO）的同時(shí)，將這場危機(jī)用作戰(zhàn)略武器，來加強(qiáng)其反對自由國際運(yùn)動的堅(jiān)定立場。雖然美國僅僅在貨幣這一單一領(lǐng)域發(fā)揮了領(lǐng)導(dǎo)作用，但作者認(rèn)為，這一舉措對維持美國霸權(quán)地位的影響更大。然而，如果美國繼續(xù)對新冠疫情管理不當(dāng)，它的貨幣霸權(quán)甚至也有可能受到威脅。

COVID-19 is the most invasive global crisis in the postwar era, jeopardizing all dimensions of human activity. By theorizing COVID-19 as a public bad, I shed light on one of the great debates of the twentieth and twenty-first centuries regarding the relationship between the United States and liberal international order (LIO). Conceptualizing the pandemic as a public bad, I analyze its consequences for US hegemony. Unlike other international public bads and many of the most important public goods that make up the LIO, the COVID-19 public bad not only has some degree of rivalry but can be made partially excludable, transforming it into more of a club good. Domestically, I demonstrate how the failure to effectively manage the COVID-19 public bad has compromised America's ability to secure the health of its citizens and the domestic economy, the very foundations for its international leadership. These failures jeopardize US provision of other global public goods. Internationally, I show how the US has already used the crisis strategically to reinforce its opposition to free international movement while abandoning the primary international institution tasked with fighting the public bad, the World Health Organization (WHO). While the only area where the United States has exercised leadership is in the monetary sphere, I argue this feat is more consequential for maintaining hegemony. However, even monetary hegemony could be at risk if the pandemic continues to be mismanaged.

【編譯】呂紫煙

【審校】姚寰宇

【題目】Bytes not waves: information communication technologies, global jihadism and counterterrorism

【作者】Patrick Bury，英國巴斯大學(xué)高級講師；Daniela Richterova，英國布魯內(nèi)爾大學(xué)社科學(xué)院講師；Michael Chertoff，美國前國土安全部部長。

【摘要】戴維·拉波波特提出的四波全球性宗教恐怖主義浪潮理論時(shí)至當(dāng)下仍具有重大的影響力。然而，包括這一理論在內(nèi)，既有恐怖主義類型研究常常忽略了信息技術(shù)（ICTs）在全球宗教恐怖運(yùn)動演變中所起到的作用。本文聚焦于業(yè)已實(shí)行的恐怖主義襲擊，立足于信息技術(shù)發(fā)展理解宗教恐怖運(yùn)動的演變，實(shí)現(xiàn)了兩點(diǎn)理論上的創(chuàng)新。本文的核心論點(diǎn)是：20世紀(jì)90年代以來，在信息技術(shù)的影響下，宗教恐怖運(yùn)動在戰(zhàn)略、組織和行動策略上都發(fā)生了巨大的轉(zhuǎn)變，可以根據(jù)這些轉(zhuǎn)變將宗教恐怖主義劃分為四個(gè)互有重疊的階段。第一代宗教恐怖主義出現(xiàn)在世紀(jì)之交，這一時(shí)期宗教恐怖組織的特征為自上而下領(lǐng)導(dǎo)的階層制度、海外注資及海外受訓(xùn)，以及具有符號意味的恐怖襲擊。此后，第一代宗教恐怖主義逐漸演變?yōu)榈诙约暗谌诮炭植乐髁x。第二代宗教恐怖主義的主要特征為一系列具有全球性影響力的規(guī)模小、相互協(xié)調(diào)的恐怖襲擊。第三代宗教恐怖主義則表現(xiàn)為利用個(gè)人的粗略謀劃實(shí)現(xiàn)的、獨(dú)立于核心恐怖組織的恐怖活動。如今，宗教恐怖主義已經(jīng)演變到第四代，即“網(wǎng)絡(luò)恐怖主義”。本文認(rèn)為，這種分類方法能夠針對信息技術(shù)對全球宗教恐怖主義的動力機(jī)制提供有效的概念基礎(chǔ)，從而助力研究和實(shí)踐工作；這一動力機(jī)制亦能為其他國際性恐怖主義運(yùn)動提供參考借鑒。本文在結(jié)論中分析了反恐機(jī)制應(yīng)當(dāng)如何應(yīng)對這些變遷，并為后續(xù)研究指明了可能的論域。

Rapoport's conceptualization of the last, religious wave of four global waves remains highly influential. But it, and other typologies, have placed too little emphasis on the influence of information and communication technologies (ICTs) on the evolution of global jihadist activities. This article makes two new contributions by developing both a new ICT-based typology for understanding jihadist evolutions, and by focusing on successful attacks. Our central argument is that ICTs’ impact on global jihadism has facilitated dramatic transformations of its strategy, organization and tactics since the 1990s, and that these can be understood as four overlapping iterations. ‘Jihadism 1.0’ describes the hierarchical, top-down directed and overseas financed and trained terrorist organizations that conducted iconic attacks at the turn of the millennium. Jihadism has since evolved into ‘Jihadism 2.0’ and then ‘Jihadism 3.0’. Jihadism 2.0 recognizes that a number of smaller, coordinated attacks can have a global impact. Jihadism 3.0 is inspired terrorism that has no links to the central terror organization, utilizing individuals and crude tactics. Finally, jihadism is evolving toward ‘Jihadism 4.0’, or cyberterrorism. We argue this typology provides a useful basis for scholars and practitioners to conceptualize the ICT dynamics influencing global jihadism, and these may be applicable to other global terrorists. The conclusion analyses how counter-terrorism services can respond to these evolutions and charts areas for future research.

【編譯】伍雨荷

【審?！?/strong>姚寰宇

【題目】The future war studies community and the Chinese revolution in military affairs

【作者】廖凱，山東大學(xué)政治學(xué)與公共管理學(xué)院副教授。

【摘要】本文追溯了中國軍事改革有關(guān)的思想與概念的起源與演化，將《解放軍報(bào)》的“軍事學(xué)習(xí)”專欄和“軍事論壇”作為未來戰(zhàn)爭學(xué)術(shù)共同體的核心，而自20世紀(jì)80年代初以來，其是一支主張對軍事研究和國防規(guī)劃采取前瞻性研究的重要力量。通過回顧該團(tuán)體的研究和活動，本文認(rèn)為這個(gè)團(tuán)體處于解放軍研究國外軍事理論和思想并將其中國化的前沿。具體來看，在二十世紀(jì)八十年代早期，他們促成了對國際安全環(huán)境的重新評估，并塑造了中國領(lǐng)導(dǎo)人的威脅認(rèn)知，，并最終引導(dǎo)中國人民解放軍的戰(zhàn)略思想從為全面戰(zhàn)爭備戰(zhàn)轉(zhuǎn)向了和平時(shí)期的軍隊(duì)建設(shè)。在八十年代末，他們提出了解放軍未來戰(zhàn)爭研究的倡議，將局部戰(zhàn)爭和高科技戰(zhàn)爭的概念引入解放軍。作為主要的智庫，他們?yōu)榻夥跑?993年提出的“打贏高技術(shù)條件下的局部戰(zhàn)爭”思想奠定了理論基礎(chǔ)，并為中國軍事改革鋪平了道路。

This article traces the origins and evolution of the ideas and concepts associated with the Chinese revolution in military affairs (RMA). It identifies the PLA Daily's ‘Study Military’ column and ‘Military Salon’ as core elements of a future war studies community that has been a major force advocating a forward-looking approach to military studies and defence planning since the early 1980s. It examines their studies and activities, and argues that this community was at the forefront of studying foreign military theories and ideas and introduced RMA-related concepts to China and adapted them to the Chinese context. More specifically, in the early 1980s, they contributed to the reassessing of the international security environment and shaped the Chinese leadership's threat perception, which eventually led to the shift of the People's Liberation Army's (PLA) strategic thought from preparing for imminent all-out war to peacetime army-building. In the late 1980s, they proposed major PLA-wide future war studies initiatives, which resulted in introducing the concepts of local war and high-tech wars into the PLA. They were a major intellectual force that laid the theoretical foundation for the PLA's doctrine of ‘local war under high-tech conditions’, announced in 1993, which paved the way to the RMA with Chinese characteristics.

【編譯】楊沛鑫

【審校】李博軒

【題目】Water weaponization in the Syrian conflict: strategies of domination and cooperation

【作者】Marwa Daoudy（喬治敦大學(xué)）

【摘要】行為體在國內(nèi)沖突中如何將水武器化？現(xiàn)有的水武器化（water weaponization）類型在國家與非國家行為體間具有決定性差異，并提及例如恐怖主義這樣模糊的標(biāo)簽。此外，這些類型既忽視了參與暴力沖突的不同行為體也會在水方面以特定方式合作，也忽略了在戰(zhàn)爭之外的情境下水武器化的可能性。本文以敘利亞為案例，利用泄露的“伊斯蘭國文件”以及第一手資料和采訪，提出水武器化的一種新的分類方式。首先，本文記述敘利亞的阿拉伯復(fù)興社會黨政權(quán)如何在內(nèi)戰(zhàn)前以水作為武器來控制國內(nèi)的庫爾德人并獲得合法性，而水武器中的基礎(chǔ)設(shè)施又是如何在戰(zhàn)時(shí)提升了伊斯蘭國控制敘利亞東北部的能力。其次，本文探究諸如伊斯蘭國與庫爾德民主聯(lián)盟等非國家武裝組織是如何通過對具有重大戰(zhàn)術(shù)意義的水系統(tǒng)進(jìn)行瞄準(zhǔn)和利用從而采取與敘利亞政府類似的水武器化戰(zhàn)略的。最后，本文向我們說明諸如伊斯蘭國與阿薩德政權(quán)等敵對勢力是如何將合作性水協(xié)定武器化以互相促進(jìn)利益，即便此舉會使平民遭受暴力影響。由上所述，本文將水武器化戰(zhàn)略分為四類：控制與合法性、軍事工具、軍事目標(biāo)以及合作。這樣一種新的分類方式有三點(diǎn)好處。第一，可以解釋在沖突之外的國家-社會關(guān)系中水如何被武器化；第二，可以完善現(xiàn)有的將水視為軍事工具和目標(biāo)的定義；第三，可以評估水合作的類似于武器的效果。

How do actors weaponize water in intrastate conflicts? Existing typologies of water weaponization make deterministic differentiations between state and non-state actors and invoke opaque labels like ‘terrorism’. Furthermore, these typologies ignore how various actors engaged in violent conflict also cooperate over water, and whether water weaponization occurs beyond war. I propose a new typology for water weaponization in an analysis of the case of Syria, drawing on the leaked ‘ISIS papers’ as well as primary sources and interviews. The study begins by charting how the Ba'athist regime used water as a weapon of domination and legitimacy against its Kurdish population with infrastructure that would later facilitate the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria's (ISIS) ability to take hold of northeast Syria. I then turn to how non-state armed groups like ISIS and the Kurdish Democratic Union Party (PYD) have adopted strategies of water weaponization similar to the Syrian government by targeting and channelling water systems with major tactical implications. Finally, I show how enemy parties such as ISIS and the al-Assad regime weaponized cooperative water agreements to advance their mutual interests with violent implications for civilians. As such, I sort strategies of water weaponization into four categories: domination and legitimacy, military tools, military targets, and cooperation. In doing so, this new typology makes three main contributions, by: 1) accounting for how water is weaponized in state-society relations outside conflict; 2) refining existing definitions of water as a military tool and target; and 3) appraising the weapon-like effects of water cooperation.

【編譯】阮辰陽

【審校】王國欣

【題目】Global–local dynamics in anti-feminist discourses: an analysis of Indian, Russian and US online communities

【作者】Ann-Kathrin Rothermel，波茨坦大學(xué)研究助理和博士候選人，柏林全球和跨地區(qū)研究研究生院的研究員。

【摘要】女權(quán)是全球人權(quán)共識中的核心部分。然而當(dāng)前反女權(quán)主義和厭惡女性的政治正日益流行，這些都對女權(quán)主義者的利益造成了威脅。為解釋當(dāng)前這一運(yùn)動的復(fù)興，本文分析了反女權(quán)主義的網(wǎng)絡(luò)社區(qū)是如何在地方和全球的發(fā)展趨勢及其關(guān)系的交叉點(diǎn)中建構(gòu)他們的集體身份的。通過對印度、俄羅斯和美國的六個(gè)十分受歡迎的反女權(quán)主義網(wǎng)絡(luò)社區(qū)表征的深入分析，本文闡明了反女權(quán)主義者如何用話語建構(gòu)起反女權(quán)主義者“自我”以及女權(quán)主義者“他者”的身份，這種建構(gòu)介于對變革的地方化反抗，以及對全球化帶來的更加廣闊的社會發(fā)展結(jié)果的抵制的共同敘事。研究結(jié)果反映出了一個(gè)復(fù)雜的全球-地方的動態(tài)關(guān)系，這組關(guān)系提供了一個(gè)微妙的、在不同情境下對反女權(quán)主義的集體身份構(gòu)建和動員過程之間異同的理解。通過明確地聚焦于建構(gòu)反女權(quán)主義身份的話語生產(chǎn)地點(diǎn)的角色，為三個(gè)不同的大陸上反女權(quán)主義網(wǎng)絡(luò)社區(qū)提供新的論據(jù)，本文為當(dāng)前社會運(yùn)動研究和女權(quán)主義國際關(guān)系研究中的跨國反女權(quán)主義運(yùn)動討論做出了貢獻(xiàn)。

Women's rights are a core part of a global consensus on human rights. However, we are currently experiencing an increasing popularity of anti-feminist and misogynist politics threatening to override feminist gains. In order to help explain this current revival and appeal, in this article I analyse how anti-feminist communities construct their collective identities at the intersection of local and global trends and affiliations. Through an in-depth analysis of representations in the collective identities of six popular online anti-feminist communities based in India, Russia and the United States, I shed light on how anti-feminists discursively construct their anti-feminist ‘self’ and the feminist ‘other’ between narratives of localized resistance to change and backlash against the results of broader societal developments associated with globalization. The results expose a complex set of global–local dynamics, which provide a nuanced understanding of the differences and commonalities of anti-feminist collective identity-building and mobilization processes across contexts. By explicitly focusing on the role of discursively produced locations for anti-feminist identity-building and providing new evidence on anti-feminist communities across three different continents, the article contributes to current discussions on transnational anti-feminist mobilizations in both social movement studies and feminist International Relations.

【編譯】黃慧彬

【審?！?/strong>姚寰宇 

【題目】Who stole disarmament? History and nostalgia in nuclear abolition discourse

【作者】Kj?lv Egeland，在巴黎政治學(xué)院致力于安全研究，著重研究戰(zhàn)略話語和全球核秩序。主要研究方向?yàn)楹嗽捳Z與政治、國際法律哲學(xué)和意識形態(tài)批判。

【摘要】近年來，裁軍界有影響力的人員堅(jiān)持認(rèn)為，朝著國際社會的共同的目標(biāo)—創(chuàng)造一個(gè)沒有核武器的世界的下一步的重點(diǎn)在于重塑20世紀(jì)80年代末和90年代盛行的合作精神和行動。持這一想法的廢除核武器的支持者認(rèn)為應(yīng)該將精力集中在恢復(fù)冷戰(zhàn)結(jié)束后嘗試實(shí)施過的軍備控制方案上。在本文中，我認(rèn)為，這一使裁軍再次偉大的呼吁反映了對過去從未有過的無端懷舊，助長了對已確立的消除核武器方法的過度信任。冷戰(zhàn)的結(jié)束并沒有讓世界走上核廢除之路，而是讓人們將核武器合法化視為對抗“未來不確定因素”和鞏固維持核武器庫權(quán)力結(jié)構(gòu)的籌碼。通過過度宣傳過去在消除核武器方面的進(jìn)展，對已經(jīng)遺失的廢核共識的懷舊敘事會使現(xiàn)有的核秩序合理化，打擊對新的核廢棄方法的追求，例如將核武器污名化和實(shí)施核威懾。

Influential members of the disarmament community have in recent years maintained that further progress towards the international community's nominally shared goal of a world without nuclear weapons depends on recapturing the spirit and practices of cooperation that prevailed in the late 1980s and 1990s. Proponents of abolition, in this view, should focus their efforts on revitalizing the tried and tested arms control formula that was implemented following the end of the Cold War. In this article, I argue that this call to make disarmament great again reflects unwarranted nostalgia for a past that never was, fostering overconfidence in established approaches to the elimination of nuclear weapons. Far from putting the world on course to nuclear abolition, the end of the Cold War saw the legitimation of nuclear weapons as a hedge against ‘future uncertainties’ and entrenchment of the power structures that sustain the retention of nuclear armouries. By overselling past progress towards the elimination of nuclear arms, the nostalgic narrative of a lost abolitionist consensus is used to rationalize the existing nuclear order and delegitimize the pursuit of new approaches to elimination such as the movement to stigmatize nuclear weapons and the practice of nuclear deterrence.

【編譯】李思

【審?！?/strong>王國欣