對于任何一項(xiàng)嚴(yán)肅的科學(xué)研究來說,前期成果的梳理是不可或缺的必要前提。然而社會科學(xué)發(fā)展至今,任何一個(gè)問題的前期研究都可能汗牛充棟,對之進(jìn)行篩選,避免望洋興嘆,可謂當(dāng)代研究者的必要技能。
科學(xué)篩選文獻(xiàn),引用率自然是首選標(biāo)準(zhǔn)。就我自己的研究體會而言,經(jīng)典文獻(xiàn)之所以經(jīng)典,一是提出了基礎(chǔ)理論命題,為后續(xù)的研究提供了實(shí)證分析以及檢驗(yàn)的基礎(chǔ),如科斯《企業(yè)的性質(zhì)》和《社會成本問題》;二是在方法論的意義上提出了具體標(biāo)準(zhǔn),為后續(xù)的研究者提供了分析框架,如海因克茨和茨威格特的《比較法總論》;三是用實(shí)證研究(個(gè)案或大數(shù)據(jù))展示了新的現(xiàn)象,對既有理論提出挑戰(zhàn),并使新范式的誕生成為可能。當(dāng)然,原因不一而足,但即便存在諸如友情互引或過度自引這類「噪音」,引用率本身仍然不失為簡明可操作的標(biāo)準(zhǔn),對研究者來說利大于弊。在我國,侯猛教授即在《北大法律評論》發(fā)表《CSSCI法學(xué)期刊:誰更有知識影響力?》一文進(jìn)行過探討,殊值參考。
高引用率文章的遴選,可以有不同的方法和標(biāo)準(zhǔn)。如谷歌學(xué)術(shù)(Google Scholar)就是一個(gè)極好用的工具,然而,如果能由專業(yè)人士加以進(jìn)一步細(xì)化,自然更具考價(jià)值。在法學(xué)領(lǐng)域,耶魯大學(xué)法學(xué)院的圖書館副館長、法律檢索學(xué)講師夏皮羅(Fred R. Shapiro)即做了率先垂范,在電腦網(wǎng)絡(luò)技術(shù)尚未普及的年代,他就分別于1985和1996年對引用率最高的法學(xué)文章做了統(tǒng)計(jì)分析,而在2012年,他與又哈佛大學(xué)圖書館的高級研究員米歇爾·皮爾斯(Michelle Pearse)合作,在《密歇根法律評論》發(fā)表了研究成果《Themost-cited law review articles of all time》。由于網(wǎng)絡(luò)技術(shù)和各類法律數(shù)據(jù)庫的發(fā)達(dá),本次相較于以往,在全面性和科學(xué)性方面均有大幅提升,更為重要的是,作者介紹了自己的研究方法,并對不同的數(shù)據(jù)庫或搜索引擎進(jìn)行了對比,這對于我國未來的研究,亦有極大的參考意義。
一、方法
夏皮羅等所用的數(shù)據(jù)主要來源于Heinonline數(shù)據(jù)庫,該數(shù)據(jù)庫收錄了從19世紀(jì)以來美國的所有法律期刊上的文獻(xiàn),共有大約一百四十多萬篇。但是,由于Heinonline數(shù)據(jù)庫本身的局限在于以法學(xué)文獻(xiàn)為主,但一方面,其并未收錄一些大學(xué)出版社、學(xué)術(shù)團(tuán)體以及商業(yè)機(jī)構(gòu)出版的刊物,另一方面,對于一些用了跨學(xué)科研究方法的文獻(xiàn)來說,要衡量其影響力就不應(yīng)當(dāng)局限于法律期刊,因此作者還利用科學(xué)網(wǎng)(Web of Science)的社會科學(xué)引文索引(Social SciencesCitation Index,即我們熟悉的SSCI)對統(tǒng)計(jì)結(jié)果予以修正。 二、數(shù)據(jù)
經(jīng)過研究,作者用五個(gè)表格列出了高引用率的文章以及高產(chǎn)作者。 表1:全時(shí)間段引用率最高的法學(xué)期刊論文 排名 | 引用數(shù) | 文章 | 1. | 5157 | R.H. Coase, The Problem of Social Cost, 3 J.L. & ECON. 1 (1960).| 法經(jīng)濟(jì)學(xué)最重要的論文之一,著名的「科斯定理」即來源于此 | 2. | 3678 | Samuel D. Warren & Louis D. Brandeis, The Right to Privacy, 4 HARV. L. REV. 193 (1890).| 一篇論文奠定隱私權(quán)理論基礎(chǔ)。 | 3. | 3138 | O.W. Holmes, The Path of the Law, 10 HARV. L. REV. 457 (1897).| 名言「法律的生命不在于邏輯,而在于經(jīng)驗(yàn)」即來源于此。 | 4. | 2771 | Gerald Gunther, The Supreme Court, 1971 Term--Foreword: In Search of Evolving Doctrine on a Changing Court: A Model for a Newer Equal Protection, 86 HARV. L. REV. 1 (1972). | 5. | 2343 | Herbert Wechsler, Toward Neutral Principles of Constitutional Law, 73 HARV. L. REV. 1 (1959). | 6. | 1980 | Guido Calabresi & A. Douglas Melamed, Property Rules, Liability Rules, and Inalienability: One View of the Cathedral, 85 HARV. L. REV. 1089 (1972). | 7. | 1874 | Charles A. Reich, The New Property, 73 YALE L.J. 733 (1964). | 8. | 1794 | Charles R. Lawrence III, The Id, the Ego, and Equal Protection: Reckoning with Unconscious Racism, 39 STAN. L. REV. 317 (1987). | 9. | 1701 | William J. Brennan, Jr., State Constitutions and the Protection of Individual Rights, 90 HARV. L. REV. 489 (1977). | 10. | 1653 | Robert H. Bork, Neutral Principles and Some First Amendment Problems, 47 IND. L.J. 1 (1971). | 11. | 1600 | Abram Chayes, The Role of the Judge in Public Law Litigation, 89 |
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| HARV. L. REV. 1281 (1976). | 12. | 1580 | Frank I. Michelman, Property, Utility, and Fairness: Comments on the Ethical Foundations of 'Just Compensation' Law, 80 HARV. L. REV. 1165 (1967). |
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| 13. | 1538 | William L. Prosser, The Assault upon the Citadel (Strict Liability to the Consumer), 69 YALE L.J. 1099 (1960). |
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| 14. | 1485 | Duncan Kennedy, Form and Substance in Private Law Adjudication, 89 HARV. L. REV. 1685 (1976). |
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| 15. | 1465 | Stewart Macaulay, Non-Contractual Relations in Business: A Preliminary Study, 28 AM. SOC. REV. 55 (1963). |
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| 16. | 1370 | Robert M. Cover, The Supreme Court, 1982 Term--Foreword: Nomos and Narrative, 97 HARV. L. REV. 4 (1983). |
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| 17. | 1299 | Anthony G. Amsterdam, Perspectives on the Fourth Amendment, 58 MINN. L. REV. 349 (1974). |
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| 18. | 1286 | Angela P. Harris, Race and Essentialism in Feminist Legal Theory, 42 STAN. L. REV. 581 (1990). |
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| 19. | 1236 | Robert H. Mnookin & Lewis Kornhauser, Bargaining in the Shadow of the Law: The Case of Divorce, 88 YALE L.J. 950 (1979). |
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| 20. | 1224 | John Hart Ely, The Wages of Crying Wolf: A Comment on Roe v. Wade, 82 YALE L.J. 920 (1973). |
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| 21. | 1195 | William L. Cary, Federalism and Corporate Law: Reflections upon Delaware, 83 YALE L.J. 663 (1974). | 22. | 1167 | Owen M. Fiss, Against Settlement, 93 YALE L.J. 1073 (1984). | 23. | 1065 | H.L.A. Hart, Positivism and the Separation of Law and Morals, 71 HARV. L. REV. 593 (1958). |
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| 24. | 1034 | Paul Brest, The Misconceived Quest for the Original Understanding, 60 B.U. L. REV. 204 (1980). |
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| 25. | 1024 | Frank I. Michelman, The Supreme Court, 1968 Term--Foreword: On Protecting the Poor through the Fourteenth Amendment, 83 HARV. L. REV. 7 (1969). |
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| 26. | 1023 | Lon L. Fuller, The Forms and Limits of Adjudication, 92 HARV. L. REV. 353 (1978). |
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| 27. | 1017 | Owen M. Fiss, The Supreme Court, 1978 Term--Foreword: The Forms of Justice, 93 HARV. L. REV. 1 (1979). |
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| 28. | 988 | Herbert Wechsler, The Political Safeguards of Federalism: The Role of the States in the Composition and Selection of the National Government, 54 COLUM. L. REV. 543 (1954). |
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| 29. | 978 | Henry G. Manne, Mergers and the Market for Corporate Control, 73 J. POL. ECON. 110 (1965). |
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| 30. | 976 | William L. Prosser, The Fall of the Citadel (Strict Liability to the Consumer), 50 MINN. L. REV. 791 (1966). |
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| 31. | 975 | Joseph L. Sax, Takings and the Police Power, 74 YALE L . J . 36 (1964). |
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| 32. | 948 | Kimberlé Williams Crenshaw, Race, Reform, and Retrenchment: Transformation and Legitimation in Antidiscrimination Law, 101 HARV. L. REV. 1331 (1988). |
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| 33. | 947 | Mari J. Matsuda, Public Response to Racist Speech: Considering the Victim's Story, 87 MICH. L. REV. 2320 (1989). |
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| 34. | 942 | Frank H. Easterbrook & Daniel R. Fischel, The Proper Role of a Target's Management in Responding to a Tender Offer, 94 HARV. L. REV. 1161 (1981). |
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| 35. | 932 | William W. Van Alstyne, The Demise of the Right-Privilege Distinction in Constitutional Law, 81 HARV. L. REV. 1439 (1968). |
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| 36. | 931 | Antonin Scalia, The Rule of Law as a Law of Rules, 56 U. CHI. L. REV. 1175 (1989). |
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| 37. | 906 | Marc Galanter, Why the 'Haves' Come Out Ahead: Speculations on the Limits of Legal Change, 9 LAW & SOC'Y REV. 95 (1974). | 38. | 905 | Henry M. Hart, Jr., The Power of Congress to Limit the Jurisdiction of Federal Courts: An Exercise in Dialectic, 66 HARV. L. REV. 1362 (1953). |
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| 39. | 900 | Felix S. Cohen, Transcendental Nonsense and the Functional Approach, 35 COLUM. L. REV. 809 (1935). |
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| 40. | 895 | Alexander Meiklejohn, The First Amendment Is an Absolute, 1961 SUP. CT. REV. 245 (1961). |
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| 41. | 891 | Thomas I. Emerson, Toward a General Theory of the First Amendment, 72 YALE L.J. 877 (1963). |
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| 42. | 890 | Margaret Jane Radin, Market-Inalienability, 100 HARV. L. REV. 1849 (1987). |
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| 43. | 882 | Karl N. Llewellyn, Remarks on the Theory of Appellate Decision and the Rules or Canons about How Statutes Are to Be Construed, 3 VAND. L. REV. 395 (1950). |
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| 44. | 872 | Kimberlé Crenshaw, Mapping the Margins: Intersectionality, Identity Politics, and Violence Against Women of Color, 43 STAN. L. REV. 1241 (1991). |
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| 45. | 869 | William L. Prosser, Privacy, 48 CALIF. L. REV. 383 (1960). | 46. | 856 | Joseph L. Sax, The Public Trust Doctrine in Natural Resource Law: Effective Judicial Intervention, 68 MICH. L. REV. 471 (1970). |
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| 46. | 856 | Cass R. Sunstein, Interest Groups in American Public Law, 38 STAN. L. REV. 29 (1985). |
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| 48. | 838 | Henry J. Friendly, 'Some Kind of Hearing', 123 U. PA. L. REV. 1267 (1975). |
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| 49. | 831 | L.L. Fuller & William R. Perdue, Jr., The Reliance Interest in Contract Damages, 46 YALE L.J. 52 (1936). |
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| 50. | 820 | Wesley N. Hohfeld, Some Fundamental Legal Conceptions as Applied in Judicial Reasoning, 23 YALE L.J. 16 (1913). |
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| 51. | 819 | Friedrich Kessler, Contracts of Adhesion--Some Thoughts about Freedom of Contract, 43 COLUM. L. REV. 629 (1943). |
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| 52. | 816 | Richard B. Stewart, The Reformation of American Administrative Law, 88 HARV. L. REV. 1667 (1975). |
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| 53. | 814 | Felix Frankfurter, Some Reflections on the Reading of Statutes, |
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| 47 COLUM. L. REV. 527 (1947). | 53. | 814 | Lon L. Fuller, Positivism and Fidelity to Law--A Reply to Professor Hart, 71 HARV. L. REV. 630 (1958). |
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| 55. | 812 | Thomas C. Grey, Do We Have an Unwritten Constitution?, 27 STAN. L. REV. 703 (1975). |
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| 56. | 798 | James B. Thayer, The Origin and Scope of the American Doctrine of Constitutional Law, 7 HARV. L. REV. 129 (1893). |
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| 57. | 783 | Christine Jolls, Cass R. Sunstein & Richard Thaler, A Behavioral Approach to Law and Economics, 50 STAN. L. REV. 1471 (1998). |
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| 58. | 782 | Anthony G. Amsterdam, Note, The Void-for-Vagueness Doctrine in the Supreme Court, 109 U. PA. L. REV. 67 (1960). |
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| 59. | 778 | Frank Michelman, Law's Republic, 97 YALE L.J. 1493 (1988). | 60. | 775 | Margaret Jane Radin, Property and Personhood, 34 STAN. L. REV. 957 (1982). |
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| 61. | 774 | George L. Priest & Benjamin Klein, The Selection of Disputes for Litigation, 13 J. LEGAL STUD. 1 (1984). |
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| 62. | 771 | Frances E. Olsen, The Family and the Market: A Study of Ideology and Legal Reform, 96 HARV. L. REV. 1497 (1983). |
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| 63. | 766 | Ian Ayres & Robert Gertner, Filling Gaps in Incomplete Contracts: An Economic Theory of Default Rules, 99 YALE L.J. 87 (1989). |
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| 64. | 765 | Richard A. Posner, Theories of Economic Regulation, 5 BELL J. ECON. & MGMT. SCI. 335 (1974). |
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| 65. | 752 | John Rawls, Two Concepts of Rules, 64 PHIL. REV. 3 (1955). | 66. | 749 | John W. Wade, On the Nature of Strict Tort Liability for Products, 44 MISS. L.J. 825 (1973). |
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| 67. | 744 | Cass R. Sunstein, Beyond the Republican Revival, 97 YALE L.J. 1539 (1988). |
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| 68. | 743 | Richard Delgado, Storytelling for Oppositionists and Others: A Plea for Narrative, 87 MICH. L. REV. 2411 (1989). |
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| 69. | 739 | Guido Calabresi, Some Thoughts on Risk Distribution and the Law of Torts, 70 YALE L.J. 499 (1961). |
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| 70. | 734 | Arthur Allen Leff, Unconscionability and the Code--The Emperor's New Clause, 115 U. PA. L. REV. 485 (1967). |
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| 71. | 732 | H. Jefferson Powell, The Original Understanding of Original Intent, 98 HARV. L. REV. 885 (1985). |
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| 72. | 729 | Owen M. Fiss, Groups and the Equal Protection Clause, 5 PHIL. & PUB. AFF. 107 (1976). |
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| 73. | 728 | Philip Areeda & Donald F. Turner, Predatory Pricing and Related Practices Under Section 2 of the Sherman Act, 88 HARV. L. REV. 697 (1975). |
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| 74. | 726 | Ronald J. Gilson & Reinier H. Kraakman, The Mechanisms of Market Efficiency, 70 VA. L. REV. 549 (1984). |
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| 75. | 722 | William N. Eskridge, Jr., The New Textualism, 37 UCLA L. REV. 621(1990). |
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| 76. | 718 | Marc Galanter, Reading the Landscape of Disputes: What We Know and Don't Know (And Think We Know) About Our Allegedly Contentious and Litigious Society, 31 UCLA L. REV. 4 (1983). |
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| 77. | 717 | Henry J. Friendly, In Praise of Erie--and of the New Federal Common Law, 39 N.Y.U. L. REV. 383 (1964). |
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| 78. | 715 | Charles Fairman, Does the Fourteenth Amendment Incorporate the Bill of Rights? The Original Understanding, 2 STAN. L. REV. 5 (1949). |
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| 79. | 714 | Mark V. Tushnet, Following the Rules Laid Down: A Critique of Interpretivism and Neutral Principles, 96 HARV. L. REV. 781 (1983). |
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| 80. | 708 | Frank I. Michelman, The Supreme Court, 1985 Term--Foreword: Traces of Self-Government, 100 HARV. L. REV. 4 (1986). | (tie) |
| 80. | 708 | Henry P. Monaghan, The Supreme Court, 1974 Term--Foreword: Constitutional Common Law, 89 HARV. L. REV. 1 (1975). | (tie) |
| 82. | 700 | John Hart Ely, Legislative and Administrative Motivation in Constitutional Law, 79 YALE L.J. 1205 (1970). |
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| 83. | 696 | Paul Brest, The Supreme Court, 1975 Term--Foreword: In Defense of the Antidiscrimination Principle, 90 HARV. L. REV. 1 (1976). |
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| 84. | 688 | Laurence H. Tribe, Trial by Mathematics: Precision and Ritual in the Legal Process, 84 HARV. L. REV. 1329 (1971). |
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| 85. | 685 | Henry B. Hansmann, The Role of Nonprofit Enterprise, 89 YALE L.J. 835 (1980). |
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| 86. | 684 | Harry T. Edwards, The Growing Disjunction between Legal Education and the Legal Profession, 91 MICH. L. REV. 34 (1992). |
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| 87. | 680 | Neil Gotanda, A Critique of 'Our Constitution Is Color-Blind', 44 STAN. L. REV. 1 (1991). |
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| 88. | 678 | Martha Minow, The Supreme Court, 1986 Term--Foreword: Justice Engendered, 101 HARV. L. REV. 10 (1987). |
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| 89. | 673 | Alan David Freeman, Legitimizing Racial Discrimination through Antidiscrimination Law: A Critical Review of Supreme Court Doctrine, 62 MINN. L. REV. 1049 (1978). |
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| 90. | 671 | Ian R. Macneil, Contracts: Adjustment of Long-Term Economic Relations Under Classical, Neoclassical, and Relational Contract Law, 72 NW. U. L. REV. 854 (1978). |
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| 91. | 667 | Lawrence Gene Sager, Fair Measure: The Legal Status of Underenforced Constitutional Norms, 91 HARV. L. REV. 1212 (1978). |
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| 92. | 666 | Henry M. Hart, Jr., The Supreme Court, 1958 Term--Foreword: The Time Chart of the Justices, 73 HARV. L. REV. 84 (1959). |
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| 93. | 663 | Edwin M. Borchard, Government Liability in Tort, 34 YALE L.J. 1 (1924). | (tie) |
| 93. (tie) | 663 | Catharine A. MacKinnon, Feminism, Marxism, Method, and the State: Toward Feminist Jurisprudence, 8 SIGNS 635 (1983). | 95. (tie) | 656 | Charles L. Black, Jr., The Supreme Court, 1966 Term--Foreword: State Action, Equal Protection, and California's Proposition 14, 81 HARV. L. REV. 69 (1967). | 95. | 656 | Jonathan R. Macey, Promoting Public-Regarding Legislation through Statutory Interpretation: An Interest Group Model, 86 COLUM. L. REV. 223 (1986). |
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| 97. | 655 | Mari J. Matsuda, Looking to the Bottom: Critical Legal Studies and Reparations, 22 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 323 (1987). |
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| 98. | 653 | Akhil Reed Amar, Of Sovereignty and Federalism, 96 YALE L.J. 1425(1987). |
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| 99. | 649 | Paul M. Bator, Finality in Criminal Law and Federal Habeas Corpus for State Prisoners, 76 HARV. L. REV. 441 (1963). |
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| 100. | 646 | Owen M. Fiss, Objectivity and Interpretation, 34 STAN. L. REV. 739 (1982). |
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三、解讀 針對以上統(tǒng)計(jì)結(jié)果,夏皮羅教授指出,盡管引用率作為衡量文章質(zhì)量或影響力的指標(biāo)本身并不完美,更多是起到提示的作用,但從中可以觀察到不少有意義的發(fā)現(xiàn)。首先,社會科學(xué)與法律研究的影響并不對等,盡管法學(xué)文章引用社會科學(xué)的成果是常見現(xiàn)象,但其本身較少被社會科學(xué)類文章引用。
其次,從全時(shí)期的百強(qiáng)名單來看,列入高產(chǎn)作者的有:
排名 | 姓名 | 文章數(shù) | 1 | Owen M. Fiss、 | 4 |
| Frank I. Michelman | 4 | 2 | Lon L. Fuller | 3 |
| William L. Prosser | 3 |
| Cass R. Sunstein | 3 | 3 | Anthony G. Amsterdam | 2 |
| Guido Calabresi | 2 |
| Paul Brest | 2 |
| Kimberlé Crenshaw | 2 |
| John Hart Ely | 2 |
| Henry J. Friendly | 2 |
| Marc Galanter | 2 |
| Henry M. Hart, Jr. | 2 |
| Mari J. Matsuda | 2 |
| Margaret Jane | 2 |
| Radin, Joseph L. Sax | 2 |
| Herbert Wechsler | 2 |
如果把表3的早期文獻(xiàn)納入,那么富勒(LonL. Fuller)的高引用文獻(xiàn)就多了一篇(共四篇),而CharlesL. Black, Jr.以及盧埃林(KarlN. Llewellyn)可以憑借一篇早期文獻(xiàn)成為高產(chǎn)作者(每人兩篇)。在入選的高引文章所刊登的期刊中,哈佛法律評論獨(dú)占鰲頭,共有35篇入選百強(qiáng)名單,其中前6名就有5篇,前16名共有10篇。另外,百篇高引論文中至少有11多篇刊登在哈佛法律評論著名的最高法院年度總結(jié)前言(AnnualForewords to the Supreme Court Term)。從作者發(fā)文時(shí)候的任職機(jī)構(gòu)來看,哈佛略(16.3)領(lǐng)先于耶魯(15.5)。 從高產(chǎn)作者的現(xiàn)在任職機(jī)構(gòu)來看,哈佛(11.3)也領(lǐng)先于耶魯(9.3)。而從高產(chǎn)作者的畢業(yè)學(xué)校來看,哈佛(35.2)同樣領(lǐng)先于耶魯(22.5)。 表2和4的數(shù)據(jù)較能說明近年來引用率較高的論文。從中可以看到,哈佛法律評論并沒有像全時(shí)期排名中那樣具有遙遙領(lǐng)先的優(yōu)勢,表2列出的百篇論文中,前五甲刊物分別為HarvardLaw Review, Yale Law Journal, StanfordLaw Review, Columbia Law Review 和 Michigan Law Review。
排名 | 期刊 | 論文數(shù) | 1 | Harvard Law Review | 18 | 2 | Yale Law Journal | 17 | 3 | Stanford Law Review | 11 | 4 | Columbia Law Review | 9 | 4 | Michigan Law Review | 9 |
夏皮羅提醒道,對于高產(chǎn)作者的統(tǒng)計(jì)并不能完整反映學(xué)者的學(xué)術(shù)影響力,因?yàn)橹匾闹鞑]有納入統(tǒng)計(jì),而且專著本身也可能將作者的特定文章編入,而降低該文章的引用率。另外,學(xué)者的研究領(lǐng)域也會對其文章的引用率產(chǎn)生實(shí)質(zhì)影響。
根據(jù)統(tǒng)計(jì)分析結(jié)果,夏皮羅對比了之前的研究結(jié)果。在1996年,哈佛、耶魯和芝加哥大學(xué)是法學(xué)研究的三巨頭,但現(xiàn)在芝加哥大學(xué)很難與前兩者并駕齊驅(qū)。可能是因?yàn)椴ㄋ辜{(RichardA. Posner)和伊斯特布魯克(FrankH. Easterbrook)到法院任職,而桑斯坦轉(zhuǎn)會哈佛。針對芝加哥大學(xué)領(lǐng)先地位下降的另一種可能的解釋是其強(qiáng)項(xiàng)——法律經(jīng)濟(jì)學(xué)運(yùn)動影響力下降,但夏皮羅認(rèn)為這一解釋并不成立,從上世紀(jì)90年代到本世紀(jì)初,法律經(jīng)濟(jì)學(xué)的文章引用率相當(dāng)高,桑斯坦等人編寫的《行為法律經(jīng)濟(jì)學(xué)ABehavioral Approach to Law and Economics》引用率在近20年來獨(dú)占鰲頭??梢哉f在針對傳統(tǒng)教義法學(xué)發(fā)起挑戰(zhàn)的運(yùn)動中,法律經(jīng)濟(jì)學(xué)最明顯地成為「常規(guī)科學(xué)」,躋身于主流學(xué)術(shù)研究之列。相比之下,批判法學(xué)(criticallegal studies)和批判種族理論(criticalrace theory)的影響力式微,女性主義法學(xué)則比前兩者更有持續(xù)的影響力。另一個(gè)趨勢是,傳統(tǒng)上較為小眾的知識產(chǎn)權(quán)法研究成果在近十五年來影響力與日俱增。這與科技發(fā)展密不可分。
第二作者PEARSE對文章所用的方法論進(jìn)行了進(jìn)一步的總結(jié),尤為重要的是,他對比了谷歌學(xué)術(shù)、微軟學(xué)術(shù)以及一些商用數(shù)據(jù)庫的優(yōu)勢與不足。谷歌學(xué)術(shù)的優(yōu)勢在于文獻(xiàn)來源遠(yuǎn)遠(yuǎn)比Heinonline和SSCI要廣(尤其是加上Googlebook),然而這一優(yōu)勢本身也導(dǎo)致難以進(jìn)行精確的分析,如對同一篇文章,可能因?yàn)椴煌瑪?shù)據(jù)庫(Heinonline,Lexis等)都有收錄,谷歌計(jì)算引用率的時(shí)候會將結(jié)果疊加。微軟學(xué)術(shù)面世不久,盡管目前其整體收錄的期刊范圍尚不清楚,但從一些初步的檢索可以看到,法律評論期刊收錄得并不多,并且同樣也無法擺脫前述谷歌學(xué)術(shù)存在的問題。近年來,一些商業(yè)數(shù)據(jù)庫也添加了引用索引功能,列出文章被篇文章引用,或在本數(shù)據(jù)庫中被引用的次數(shù)等,但問題在于其只能呈現(xiàn)本數(shù)據(jù)庫中的引用情況,這就限制了數(shù)據(jù)的準(zhǔn)確性。 法學(xué)研究與立法和法律解釋相關(guān),因此衡量法學(xué)文獻(xiàn)對真實(shí)世界影響的標(biāo)準(zhǔn)是對律師、法官、立法者以及政策制定者的影響。法學(xué)文獻(xiàn)在學(xué)術(shù)界的影響以及在學(xué)術(shù)文章的引用并不意味著其對司法實(shí)踐產(chǎn)生了影響。對此,衡量法學(xué)論文對司法界的影響的一個(gè)方式,就是看文章被司法判決引用的次數(shù),這可以通過Westlaw的「KeyCite」(https://en./wiki/Westlaw#KeyCite)或lexis的「Shepard's」(https://en./wiki/Shepard%27s_Citations)進(jìn)行檢索。另外,也可以看法學(xué)文獻(xiàn)被政府文件,以及學(xué)者在立法或政策制定過程中的參與來衡量。這些標(biāo)準(zhǔn)在將來是否會成為法學(xué)院教職獲?。òńK身教職)的考量因素,有待觀察。
另外,隨著SSRN等免費(fèi)共享學(xué)術(shù)論文網(wǎng)站的興起,下載量和瀏覽量也逐漸成為衡量論文影響力的指標(biāo)。與引用率不同,這一類指標(biāo)更為真實(shí)地反映了文章的「受歡迎度」。但SSRN已經(jīng)意識到下載量和引用率的區(qū)分,并開始嘗試統(tǒng)計(jì)文章在本網(wǎng)站的引用情況,盡管功能尚待完善,數(shù)據(jù)也不夠完整。還有一種所謂的「普及度」衡量標(biāo)準(zhǔn),即綜合通過文章在傳統(tǒng)媒體、博客等的利用率來判斷其影響力,可謂在影響力的判斷上采取了最廣泛的「關(guān)注度與受承認(rèn)」的標(biāo)準(zhǔn)。這個(gè)標(biāo)準(zhǔn)的重要性與日俱增,但并不清楚其能否在法學(xué)文章影響力以及法學(xué)院招人政策上,發(fā)揮比傳統(tǒng)引用率更大的作用。
最后,PEARSE對引用率度量法的局限性做了總結(jié),提出受制于數(shù)據(jù)來源等因素,用引用率度量學(xué)術(shù)成果影響力的結(jié)果必然有局限性,更重要的是,這些數(shù)據(jù)分析很可能缺乏相應(yīng)的「定性分析」(比如,被引文獻(xiàn)在引用文章中到底是什么地位,是作為作者論證的重要論據(jù),還是僅僅提及一下),另外,部分引用可能是因?yàn)樽髡叻磳Ρ灰墨I(xiàn)的觀點(diǎn),還有可能是作者的自我引用。那么,在用引用率衡量學(xué)術(shù)影響的時(shí)候,是否還要進(jìn)一步區(qū)分積極(贊同)、消極(反對)、自我引用等呢?這一問題也是難以回答的。
對于法學(xué)研究和引用率度量法未來的展望,PEARSE認(rèn)為,在當(dāng)前法學(xué)院招聘(終身教職授予)政策不變的情況下,諸如學(xué)術(shù)博客這樣的新式學(xué)術(shù)載體并不會對傳統(tǒng)法學(xué)研究造成太大沖擊,但它們無疑為學(xué)術(shù)成果的評議和利用、學(xué)者信譽(yù)的建立等提供了更為平等的機(jī)會。而且,即便是諸如哈佛、耶魯這樣的傳統(tǒng)精英法學(xué)院仍然沿用原有的人事體制以及學(xué)術(shù)影響力標(biāo)準(zhǔn),法學(xué)教育的變革或許會促使新的衡量標(biāo)準(zhǔn)發(fā)揮更大作用。
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